UZBEKS REACT TO EU SANCTIONS DECISION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000525

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2028
TAGS: PREL EUN PHUM PGOV UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKS REACT TO EU SANCTIONS DECISION


Classified By: A/DCM Ted Burkhalter; reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Norov called in Ambassador
on May 5, to discuss the April 28 EU decision to continue
suspension of visa sanctions. Norov downplayed the EU's
recognition of human rights steps the Uzbeks have taken and
focused instead on the EU's continued criticism, which he
said was not constructive. Drawing on points from President
Karimov, FM Norov underscored Uzbekistan's desire to continue
mending relations with the U.S., suggesting that the EU
approach was not the way to do this. Though the message is
not the one we would like to hear, it reflects the Government
of Uzbekistan's (and, in particular, President Karimov's)
continued inability to absorb negative publicity. It does
not, though, negate the small steps the Uzbeks have taken on
human rights. Rather, it underscores the importance of the
message Assistant Secretary Boucher will deliver when he
meets in early June with President Karimov. End summary.


2. (C) Norov called Ambassador in on May 5, to discuss the EU
decision. As anticipated, the Uzbeks focused not on the EU's
recognition of positive steps taken but instead on the EU's
criticism of steps that remained. Norov objected to what he
and other senior Uzbek leadership have increasingly termed
the "double standard" being applied to Uzbekistan, vis-a-vis
its neighbors. He asked about U.S. discussions with our
European colleagues in the run-up to the sanctions decision,
intimating that in the spirit of U.S.-Uzbek reengagement, we
could have done more to help the Uzbeks achieve their desired
outcome. The Ambassador responded that the EU decision
should actually be seen by the Uzbeks as a small victory.
The decision, he said, constituted a recognition of modest
steps such as ICRC prison visits and prisoner releases and
held the possibility of continued rapprochement, if further
steps were taken.


3. (C) Norov read to Ambassador several points from President
Karimov, underscoring Uzbekistan's continued desire for
mending relations with the U.S., one step at a time. Norov
contrasted the EU approach, as he saw it, with the approach
he clearly hoped for from the United States. He dismissed
the threat of EU sanctions, saying that positive steps taken
recently were in the interests of Uzbekistan and not designed
to please foreigners, and that to the Government of
Uzbekistan and to him personally it would make no difference
if the EU chose the path of sanctions. "We are an Asian
country," he emphasized - as if to mean that Europe did not
matter to Uzbekistan. Ambassador assured Norov that the
Government of Uzbekistan's opinions were useful in informing
U.S. policy but that we also wanted a constructive dialogue
on human rights, as part of our broader, balanced
relationship. Ambassador asked whether, in this light, the
Uzbeks' recent transmittal to Embassy of two volumes on the
GOU's investigation of the 2005 Andijon events, which the GOU
now refers to as a "tragedy," might presage further dialogue
on this most contentious of human rights issues. Norov
seemed interested but did not offer a response.


4. (C) Norov at one point raised the role of Human Rights
Watch, criticising their previous Uzbekistan country
researcher (director),Andrea Berg, for what he called a
complete lack of understanding of Uzbek culture. This was
the only time in the meeting when Norov visibly betrayed
strong emotion. Describing what he said were Berg's
published reports on the Uzbek mahalla (neighborhood)
committees, he said that this was not objective work.
Ambassador did not comment on Berg (who he has never met) but
encouraged the GOU to register HRW's newly arrived country
researcher, Igor Vorontsov. Norov pointed to HRW's public
call on the EU to reimpose sanctions and said he could hardly
endorse accreditation under these circumstances (implying
Karimov would have his head). Norov accused HRW (and Amnesty
International) of being "American organizations," adding that
"we all know who funds them." (Norov was equally suspicious

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of the overlap between the EU and NATO membership, seeming
not to understand how U.S. influence in the latter
organization could differ from U.S. influence in the former.)

Comment:
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5. (C) In focusing on the threat of possible future sanctions
and downplaying the success for Uzbekistan of the EU,s
decision to maintain suspension for another six months,
President Karimov is telling us (a) he continues to bristle
at negative publicity, "pressure," and "double standards"
applied to Uzbekistan; (b) he doesn,t understand the limits
of U.S. influence on the EU or the degree to which the U.S.
and Europe see things eye-to-eye on Uzbekistan; (c) he really
doesn,t "get it" that NGO,s truly don,t work for
governments; and (d) he is ready to entertain further strains
in relations with the "marginal" EU but would rather not do
so with the U.S. and is trying to peel one off from the
other. Assistant Secretary Boucher,s anticipated meeting
with Karimov in early June in Tashkent will be an opportunity
to remind the Uzbek leader once again that (a) NGO's are not
secret agents of the USG, (b) pressure for sanctions reflects
genuine concern among both western publics and governments
about GOU behavior, and (c) now is the time for greater
openness on the part of the GOU in order to lend credibility
to assertions (such as Karimov,s lengthy May 3 decree
outlining an "action plan" marking the 60th anniversary of
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights) that human rights
are being taken seriously.
NORLAND