UZBEKISTAN: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PREPARES TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000478 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018 TAGS: KNNP ASEC PREL UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PREPARES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING PORTAL MONITORS Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 7-8, visiting Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) officials Laurel Cotton and Lindsay Guthrie met with officials from Uzbekistan's Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) and the State Customs Committee (SCC) to discuss DOE's upcoming assumption of responsibility for maintenance of the radiation portal monitors installed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA's) Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative. INP representatives noted that its earlier problems with access to points of entry appeared to have been resolved, and stressed the importance of procuring additional spare parts for the radiation portal monitors. They also noted gaps in INP's ability to detect radiation incidents after normal business hours due to staffing shortages. Customs expressed interest in additional training opportunities and telecommunications equipment in support of portal monitor maintenance, noting two recent incidents that underscore the value of the program. Post supports continued efforts to maintain the DTRA-installed radiation portal monitors to serve mutual counterproliferation interests. End summary. Improved Access for Institute of Nuclear Physics -------------- --- ¶2. (C) On April 7-8, visiting Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) officials Laurel Cotton and Lindsay Guthrie met with officials from Uzbekistan's Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) and the State Customs Committee (SCC) to discuss DOE's upcoming assumption of responsibility for maintenance of the radiation portal monitors installed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA's) Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative. DOE's "Second Line of Defense" program seeks to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials at various points of entry, and has contracted with INP for maintenance and training. ¶3. (C) INP representatives present during the April 7 meeting at the institute included Director Umar Salikhbaev and leading researcher Vitaliy Petrenko. Salikhbaev assured the U.S. side that INP has the full permission of the Prime Minister to continue work related to the radiation portal monitor maintenance, and also enjoys the full support of the Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology. Moreover, INP has permission to receive four vehicles from Washington Group International (WGI) without being subject to any Customs fees or taxes. (Note: WGI has been DTRA's prime contractor in installing and maintaining radiation portal monitors. End note.) Salikhbaev also noted that while INP representatives had previously been prohibited from traveling to border crossing points, Customs had recently approved a timetable for INP trips to these areas. ¶4. (C) Petrenko affirmed Salikhbaev's statement about the border crossing points, and said that they can now travel freely to border crossing points where the radiation portal monitoring equipment has been installed. In December 2007 and January 2008, INP representatives began inspecting points of entry in Tashkent Province, including Gisht Kuprik, Navoi, Keles, Tashkent Airport, Nazarbek, Oybek, and Bekabod. Petrenko stated that INP had visited the Dustlik and Andarkhon POE's in the Ferghana Valley last week, as well as Sari-Asya and Ayritom in Surkhandariya Province. INP hoped to visit four other POE's this week, he continued. Requests for Portal Monitor Maintenance TASHKENT 00000478 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (C) Petrenko said that he did not foresee any significant difficulties with INP's work, but he did have several requests. First, he expressed concern that a number of invoices sent to AHTNA (a contractor for the WMD-PPI Project) had not been paid. Second, Petrenko noted that only a few of the spare parts necessary for radiation portal monitor maintenance had been delivered to INP, as the majority had gone to Customs; INP should receive all of them, he claimed. (Note: Customs later told the U.S. side that Customs should receive all of these spare parts, however. Technically, Customs also has the rights to these spares. End note.) Third, he noted that the equipment INP has been using has gradually worn out and is in need of replacement. In light of this, INP hoped for additional funding to set up a maintenance and repair area. He then provided the U.S. side with a list of spare parts necessary for the radiation portal monitors under Increments I, II, and III for the next year as well as a 2008 schedule for technical maintenance of 19 monitors under Increments I and II. ¶6. (C) Ms. Cotton indicated that a new contract would be signed between Pacific Northwest National Labs (PNNL) and INP, to which Salikhbaev responded positively. Salikhbaev said it was very important that a 2002 agreement between DOE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be renewed before it expires in July 2008. (Comment: This is probably a sub-agreement--not directly related to the US's continued work on radiation portal monitors--under the CTR/WMD umbrella agreement which will remain in force as long as the umbrella agreement remains in force. End comment.) ¶7. (C) Petrenko remarked that wherever INP representatives go, they conduct training with Customs officials. The training consists of two phases: first is general familiarization with how monitors work, and second is computer training for the operators of the portal monitors. ¶8. (C) Petrenko then noted some problems with INP's response capability to radiation detection incidents. When an alarm goes off at a given border post, INP is able to track it from Tashkent during normal business hours, he said. If something is detected after hours, however, INP cannot do anything. Petrenko said that he had raised the issue of hiring people to work the night shift before to no avail, and indicated that at least five people would be necessary to monitor the readings. State Customs Committee Eager to Continue Project -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) On April 8, the U.S. side met with the State Customs Committee (SCC). SCC officials present included Deputy Chairman Mansurov, Chief of Section for Radiation Portal Monitors Yergashev, Director of the International Cooperation Department Yunusov, and International Cooperation Department representative Abieva. Corroborating INP's earlier remark, Mansurov said that on March 18 the SCC and INP approved a timetable for the maintenance and repair of radiation portal monitors. The SCC is now slated to receive some equipment from WGI under Increment III, but has so far been unable to equip three posts. ¶10. (C) Mansurov indicated that Customs is keenly interested in training opportunities and telecommunications equipment to support the maintenance of the radiation portal monitors. He said that due to Customs' rotation system, regular, periodic training of Customs officials would be beneficial. Mansurov also said that Customs was ready to provide assistance in TASHKENT 00000478 003 OF 003 getting access for NNSA and INP to the border posts. He assured the U.S. side that Customs wants to continue work on this project, and mentioned two recent incidents in which radioactive material in railcars crossing the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border at Yalamat and at the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border at Alat was detected. He expressed hope that further cooperation would be effective, and pledged assistance of Customs officers toward this end. Comment: -------------- ¶11. (C) Post fully supports the continuation of radiation portal monitor maintenance under DOE's Second Line of Defense program in Uzbekistan, which are key to regional counterproliferation efforts. Post encourages subsequent visits to Uzbekistan from NNSA and PNNL to provide training and equipment to the GOU in support of this objective. NORLAND