UZBEKISTAN: GOVERNMENT SEEKS FEEDBACK ON "6 PLUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000449 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A FOR LAUREN FRESE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018 TAGS: PREL ASEC AORC PGOV AF UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: GOVERNMENT SEEKS FEEDBACK ON "6 PLUS 3" PROPOSAL, PLANS PARTICIPATION IN AFGHAN CONFERENCE REF: SECSTATE 32155 Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 11, First Deputy Foreign Minister Nematov told the Ambassador that the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) will indicate who will participate in the upcoming Afghanistan Support Conference in Paris, and provided us with a non-paper elaborating on the "6 plus 3" proposal that President Karimov floated during the April 2-4 NATO/EAPC summit in Bucharest. The proposal advises the creation of a "Contact Group" consisting of Afghanistan's neighbors, Russia, the United States, and NATO, and administered and coordinated by the United Nations. Curiously, it appears to leave out Afghanistan itself. Several officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have pressed for a U.S. response to this proposal, with one suggesting that a positive U.S. response could bring the bilateral relationship "to a higher level." Clearly, existing institutions are preferable to the creation of a new multilateral forum on Afghanistan. However, the proposal also comes in the context of Karimov's offer of transit for non-lethal supplies to ISAF. Rather than dismissing "6 plus 3" out of hand, we should look for ways to mesh this idea with existing formats, with an eye to maximizing regional engagement in support of ISAF and President Karzai. End summary. Paris Conference -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 11, the Ambassador met with First Deputy Foreign Minister Nematov to discuss Uzbekistan's participation in the upcoming international Afghanistan Support Conference in Paris this June (reftel). Nematov noted that the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) has not received an official invitation yet, but affirmed that the GOU will participate and will indicate who will represent it soon. 6 Plus 3 -------------- ¶3. (C) Nematov then passed the Ambassador a note from Foreign Minister Norov with a non-paper describing in more detail the "6 plus 3" proposal President Karimov floated at the April 2-4 NATO/EAPC summit in Bucharest. First, the proposal recommends a "Contact Group" consisting of the states bordering Afghanistan--Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--plus Russia, the United States, 
and NATO. Curiously, it advises against the inclusion of representatives from "power structures" in Afghanistan. It also rules out participation by the warring factions in Afghanistan. (Nematov, in response to a question from the Ambassador, specifically ruled out involvement of the Taliban in "6 plus 3.") Second, the non-paper calls for administration and coordination of the group's activity under the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Afghanistan. All decisions of the SIPDIS group should be made on the basis of consensus. Third, the proposal outlines the main objectives of the group: discussing approaches to the Afghan problem; supporting international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan; facilitating negotiations between warring factions in the country; supporting international efforts to combat drugs; developing recommendations to resolve key social, economic, and humanitarian problems; developing proposals on the extension of economic and humanitarian assistance provided to Afghanistan within the framework of multilateral organizations; and helping to facilitate step-by-step reforms in Afghanistan that strengthen governmental authority. Fourth, the document describes the mechanisms for realizing these goals. It calls for consultations of Foreign Ministers and Deputy Foreign Ministers of the member countries with a designated NATO representative and meetings of experts from the member countries, NATO, donor countries, and the United Nations to work out issues related to reconstruction and the economic revival of Afghanistan. Nematov urged us to study the proposal carefully and respond to the GOU as soon as possible. MFA Eager for Approval -------------- ¶4. (C) In a conversation with Poloff on April 15 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA Americas Desk Chief Ismat Fayzullaev asserted that U.S.-Uzbekistan relations would be influenced by the U.S. Government's response to this proposal. He said that the GOU was looking for a positive response, and that this could open doors and bring the bilateral relationship "to a higher level." Fayzullaev said that this proposal serves U.S., Uzbekistani, and regional interests. GOU officials also contacted the Ambassador and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe shortly after President Karimov's speech for their immediate reactions. ¶5. (C) Interestingly, NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simmons told NATO embassies on April 15 that in his discussions with MFA and National Security Advisor Ataev, it had been FM Norov who had pushed the "6 plus 3" proposal most avidly, wanting to focus on nothing else. Ataev, on the other hand, had seemed more sanguine about it and had received Simmons' tepid response to the proposal with equanimity. Comment: -------------- ¶6. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan clearly is anxious for an official U.S. response to this proposal in the near future. While existing mechanisms are preferable to the creation of any new multilateral forum on Afghanistan, we should be careful to ensure that our response--whatever the answer may be--reflects a thorough analysis of Uzbekistan's proposal. Uzbekistan's interest in supporting an international approach to Afghanistan, as well as its willingness to provide a corridor for non-military goods through its territory, is encouraging. Nevertheless, the Government of Uzbekistan needs to provide further important details related to this proposal that reflect a viable strategy. ¶7. (C) For instance, it is not clear what excluding Afghan "power structures" means. If--as appears to be the case--it means that the "6 plus 3" would talk about Afghanistan without Afghanistan in the room, that hardly seems attractive or useful. Likewise, the reference to "facilitating negotiations between warring factions" sounds suspiciously like fostering talks with the Taliban--another obvious non-starter. Indeed, given President Karimov's dismissive attitude toward President Karzai, one way to read Uzbekistan's proposal is as a prelude to paving the way for a "more acceptable" Afghan leader--again, not something we want to encourage. NATO does, however, have an interest in engaging Afghanistan, all of its neighbors, and Russia, in supporting ISAF and President Karzai--and existing formats appear to fall just short of this. NORLAND