Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT446
2008-04-16 07:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHIEF

Tags:  PREL ASEC ELTN KISL PBTS PGOV PHUM PINR PINS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNT #0446/01 1070757
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160757Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9515
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3890
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0103
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4505
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0372
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0327
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0383
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4099
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2373
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0411
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1044
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0073
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7370
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0208
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2427
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1111
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1786
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEWMFC/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000446 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC ELTN KISL PBTS PGOV PHUM PINR PINS
SNAR, SOCI, AF, UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHIEF
EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN
AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. TASHKENT 441

B. TASHKENT 445

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000446

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC ELTN KISL PBTS PGOV PHUM PINR PINS
SNAR, SOCI, AF, UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHIEF
EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN
AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. TASHKENT 441

B. TASHKENT 445

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: On March 31, A/DAS, Ambassador, and DCM met
with Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC) Murat
Ataev. Like FM Norov (septel) and Parliamentarian
Tashmukhamedova (septel),Ataev greeted the U.S. side warmly
and announced that the GOU's Ministries and the NSC are ready
for a step-by-step, gradual renewal of cooperation with the
United States. He said he understands the role and
significance of Afghanistan and expressed concern about the
progress the international community is making with
NATO/ISAF. He stressed strengthening central and provincial
government as the key to improving the situation there, which
is in Uzbekistan's, as well as the rest of the world's,
interest. End summary.


2. (C) Ataev said that counternarcotics is an area of concern
and a priority for Uzbekistan, and that Uzbekistan will
participate in related conferences with the OSCE in Tashkent,
Bishkek, and Vienna. In response to A/DAS's question on the
status of a Modalities and Information-Sharing Proposal on
border security cooperation that the Embassy had submitted to
the GOU in December, Ataev responded that this was still
under consideration, but he believed there would be a
positive outcome. He also said that the GOU will work
directly with the U.S. Embassy on border security issues
without intermediaries.


3. (C) Ataev announced that the NSC gave the go-ahead to
Customs over the weekend to allow four trucks carrying goods

overland to transit Uzbekistan to Manas Airbase in
Kyrgyzstan. (Comment: A/DAS Spratlen and DCM raised the
stuck shipment of CENTCOM construction materials with Customs
officials while visiting the Alat border crossing point with
Turkmenistan, 80 km from Bukhara, the day before. They were
told that the Customs officials had no orders to admit the
three trucks and allow them to transit Uzbekistan. They
believed the trucks had returned to their country of
destination. Subsequently, DAO learned that the Turkish
truck drivers had indeed left the border area and the
contractor had decided to try another route to Manas avoiding
Uzbekistan. The long-awaited order from Tashkent to Alat to
allow the trucks to transit had not reached Customs officials
there in time. DAO and Embassy GSO spent hundreds of staff
hours trying to get the green light from the GOU to admit the
trucks and then, when it came, it was too late. This episode
points to the need of a transit agreement with Uzbekistan for
materiel bound for Afghanistan. End comment.)


4. (C) Ataev spoke at length about the international effort
in Afghanistan, expressing concern that efforts to stabilize
the country are failing due to a fragmented effort that does
not adequately bolster weak central and provincial authority.
Ataev leaned forward, frequently gesturing and speaking
passionately, warning that Afghans do not want to accept
foreign values, and that conditions could worsen near the
borders with Iran and Tajikistan. Ataev predicted further
clashes in Kandahar. "The President of Afghanistan should
take measures to get expatriate Afghans back," he continued,
advising that they return from overseas to the central
government and local administrations. He admitted that some


won't want to do this, and complained that provincial
"leaders" in Afghanistan were just trying to serve the
interests of their respective clans, and that some are former
Mujahiddeen.


5. (C) Ataev added that there are former Mujahiddeen in the
National Parliament. He advised that the international
community not try to impose "alien values" on Afghanistan,
but try to train the Afghans who will be running the country
in 15-20 years. Ataev warned that local khans would just try
to seize financial assistance provided to Afghanistan. The
GOU is providing help to Afghanistan, he said. It is
providing electricity and construction materials to
Afghanistan, and is lowering prices for energy to help its
southern neighbor further. Uzbekistan is ready to give what
is necessary to its neighbors, he said.


6. (C) In response, A/DAS Spratlen said that the
international effort to secure Afghanistan incorporated both
military and reconstruction efforts on a broad international
scale. The effort, through its provincial reconstruction
teams and other efforts focused on a coordinated and
comprehensive approach to building a stronger government in
Kabul and the regions. While the road ahead was certainly
difficult, there had been successes and would be more as the
international effort becomes stronger through the work of the
newly-appointed UN Coordinator of the Civilian effort, Mr.
Kai Aide.


7. (C) On human rights and religious freedom, Ataev, echoing
the arguments of the Committee on Religious Affairs, said
that it is important to consider the mentality of communities
in Uzbekistan. When a member of a community converts to
another religion, other members of the community may not
accept this, he explained, but the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and special services are blamed for what happens to
these converts. Ataev said that radical Islamists have been
imported to Uzbekistan from Iran and Saudi Arabia under the
guise of religious instructors. This can lead to explosive
situations such as the terrorist bombings of 1999. He
described several soft security threats such as
trans-boundary water usage, trafficking, narcotics, and
border disputes that could lead to unrest. Spratlen noted
that it was important to distinguish between observant
behavior and extremism.


8. (C) Ataev asked that the United States give Uzbekistan and
Central Asia time for reform, and pledged that Uzbekistan
would achieve this. He said that he knows the State
Department receives some of its information from human rights
activists. Ataev said that he knows vehement human rights
activists who want the immediate adoption of western values.
He warned that a large proportion of these activists simply
want the money from internationally-sponsored grants, and
that some of them want to maintain their image as
freedom-fighters. He said that it would take another
generation before all of these reforms could be realized, and
implied that Uzbekistan was concerned about the potential for
unrest that could accompany reforms that were implemented too
hastily. Ataev then expressed concern about Iran's efforts
to consolidate its position in Tajikistan, and the desire of
their "northern neighbor" (Russia) to control everything
here.



9. (C) As the meeting came to an end, Ataev said that we
should know that the GOU supports a normalization of mutually
beneficial relations with the United States. Many other
countries have not adopted similar laws on political parties
and the abolition of the death penalty, he said. Spratlen
thanked Ataev for his concerns about regional security and
suggested that it was important for Uzbekistan to contribute
to the international effort. On bilateral issues, she told
Ataev that human rights progress was a priority for the U.S.
and the international community. It was important to
continue the dialogue, but action was also important.

Comment:
--------------


10. (C) Ataev is a key official in Uzbekistan's security
hierarchy. He served in the Soviet army in Afghanistan and
participated in Uzbekistan's diplomatic efforts to help
secure Afghanistan in the 1990s. Ataev served in the
National Security Service between 1991 and 2004, and was
Director of the Advanced School of Strategic Analysis and
Prognosis between 2004 and 2005, and has been Secretary of
the National Security Council since November 18, 2005.
During the meeting, he seemed eager for Uzbekistan to reduce
its diplomatic isolation, not least because of the
consequences for the country if his fears about Afghanistan
bear fruit. For that reason, he noted the current policy of
permitting U.S. citizens affiliated with ISAF/NATO to transit
the air bridge at Termez on a case-by-case basis. But, like
his fellow interlocutors, he defended the nation's slow
progress on human rights and democracy and its questionable
policies on fighting extremism.


11. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/DAS Spratlen.
NORLAND