Uzbekistan: CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt. General Allen

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 001522 SIPDIS MACDILL AFB FOR CENTCOM MICHAEL NORDEEN AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-22 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS ETRD PINR PHUM ECON KCOR TI AF UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt. General Allen Meets Foreign and Defense Ministers in Tashkent CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy P Buckley, Second Secretary; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: On December 19 CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt. General John Allen met separately with Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov and Defense Minister Kabul Berdiyev in Tashkent. Lt. Gen. Allen's visit laid the groundwork for a planned visit by CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus in January and wrapped up what Norov described as a "fruitful year in relations with the U.S. military," characterized by five flag-officer visits and cooperation in the wake of the July explosions at the munitions depot in Kagan. Norov restated Uzbekistan's concerns about stability in Afghanistan and outlined why President Karimov's 6 plus 3 plan does not include the Government of Afghanistan, yet he also pragmatically described how Uzbekistan needs Afghanistan and Iran to further its own economic interests. Norov also portrayed Uzbekistan as a conscientious regional broker that has resisted attempts by Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to expand influence in regional security; he also emphasized that "no regional initiative can be successful without the participation of Uzbekistan." ¶2. (C) Both officials expressed support for proposed cooperation in the transit of non-lethal supplies through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan, including via Navoiy, which the Government of Uzbekistan envisions as a budding air cargo hub. Berdiyev urged Lt. Gen. Allen to "resolve the transit issue quickly by completing contracts with Uzbekistan Airways and the Uzbekistan Transit Agency." Berdiyev also requested military equipment for the armed forces of Uzbekistan, which Lt. Gen. Allen suggested could be discussed by a proposed joint military committee. Lt. Gen Allen assured his interlocutors that the U.S. recognizes Uzbekistan's important role in improving peace and prosperity in Afghanistan, but he also emphasized that we should work towards a strong bilateral relationship based on broader mutual interests, including human rights (he cited International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to prisons in particular). End summary. Background -------------- ¶3. (C) CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt. General John Allen visited Tashkent on December 19 for separate meetings with Foreign Minister Norov and Defense Minister Berdiyev. This was the latest in a series of high-level U.S. military visits to Uzbekistan in 2008, each of which Norov recounted in his opening remarks as highlighting "a fruitful year in relations with the U.S. military." Lt. Gen Allen informed his hosts that CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus values the relationship with Uzbekistan and plans a visit in January 2009. The tone of the meetings was very warm and cordial. Unusually for official meetings, Norov did not rely on an interpreter and spoke in fluent English; he also displayed a more intellectual side, quoting recent articles in the International Herald Tribune and Foreign Affairs. Norov also spoke more off-the-cuff than usual and with surprising candor. He limited his scripted remarks to allow more give-and-take with his visitor. (Comment: Rumors have been circulating that Norov could soon be replaced as Foreign Minister and dispatched to Washington as the Uzbek Ambassador, so perhaps he is trying to rebrand himself with U.S. Government interlocutors. End comment.) Lt. Gen. Allen's Message -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Lt. Gen. Allen emphasized that the U.S. understands that the success in Afghanistan requires more than just a military solution and made clear to his Uzbek interlocutors (as well as to French Ambassador Hugues Pernet and UN Resident Coordinator Anita Nirody, with whom he also met) that the U.S. remains committed over the long haul to addressing the issues in Afghanistan. He commended the Uzbeks for their willingness to enhance their leadership on regional issues but emphasized that the Government of Afghanistan must be included in any new contact group. Lt. Gen TASHKENT 00001522 002 OF 004 Allen also noted that our bilateral relationship should grow to encompass a broad set of issues affecting our countries beyond just Afghanistan-related issues. These should include human rights -- he praised the Government of Uzbekistan for cooperation on ICRC visits to prisons and encouraged such cooperation to continue. In advance of CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus's visit, Lt. Gen. Allen also thanked Uzbekistan for previously rendered military assistance as well as its willingness to cooperate on the transit of goods that will support NATO operations in Afghanistan. Much at Stake in Afghanistan -------------- ¶5. (C) Norov focused his remarks on Afghanistan and expressed the Government of Uzbekistan's concern at what it sees as a growing threat from narcotics, terrorism, and instability. He reminded us that Uzbekistan played a "crucial role" in initial U.S. efforts to oust the Taliban and, despite achievements by NATO, lamented that "there is not a common position among NATO member states" to resolving the problems in Afghanistan. Whereas some NATO member states are planning to end troop commitments in the coming years, Norov stated that Uzbekistan has a common border and thousands of years of shared history with Afghanistan (including three million ethnic Uzbek kin residing in Afghanistan). He stated several times, as did Defense Minister Berdiyev later in the day, that "peace and stability are not possible solely through military force." Another Pitch for 6 Plus 3 -------------- ¶6. (C) Norov acknowledged that the U.S. position on Uzbekistan's proposed "6 plus 3" (all neighboring states plus the U.S., Russia, and NATO) UN-administered contact group on Afghanistan is clear -- that is, that the Government of Afghanistan must be included -- yet he nevertheless made another pitch on the grounds that the Karzai-led government does not have "strategic vertical control over its territory" and does not represent the majority of the Afghan people. Norov reiterated the typical Uzbek charges that Karzai is inept and corrupt, and Norov expressed alarm that "for the first time the Taliban has the support of ordinary Pashtuns." He cited Afghanistan talks prior to September 11, 2001 which put the Taliban and the Northern Alliance on equal footing as a precedent, and emphasized that opposition to Karzai would have no voice if the current administration took part in the 6 plus 3 group. Norov said "Afghans should decide what type of country to construct," and indicated that from the Uzbek perspective Karzai does not speak for the population. Norov expressed the Uzbek view that "right now a Pashtun strongman with influence is key in Afghanistan," and that democracy could come later. Other Suitors -------------- ¶7. (C) On several occasions Norov played up Uzbekistan's value as an independent-minded partner by mentioning that other countries and entities are vying for its cooperation. He noted that Uzbekistan resisted efforts to give a greater role to CSTO and SCO in Afghanistan-related regional security questions. Norov also said Uzbekistan "told President Medvedev that Russia lacks the resources to succeed in Afghanistan." Norov also said that Russia had been interested in using the Navoiy Airport as a base for bombers and claimed that Uzbekistan declined in order to pursue its vision of turning the facility into a commercial air cargo hub. He also referenced China's growing profile in the region and said "Iran is actively urging a state visit in either capital." Each of these countries plus others (namely Korea and Malaysia with regard to the Navoiy Airport),he noted, have proposed tangible development projects inside Uzbekistan, whereas the U.S. has been quiet on the investment front other than the GM engine plant which broke ground the day prior to the meeting. TASHKENT 00001522 003 OF 004 Venting about Tajikistan -------------- ¶8. (C) In characteristic Uzbek fashion, Norov blamed Tajikistan as well as the Karzai-led government in Afghanistan for regional woes. He accused the Government of Tajikistan of being directly involved in narcotics trafficking and opined that the CSTO and SCO should be more assertive in making Tajikistan accountable, especially since "every day travelers are seized at airports throughout the region -- including Moscow -- attempting to smuggle drugs via Tajikistan." Norov also explained that while most drugs in Uzbekistan originate in Afghanistan, they are smuggled via the long, rugged border with Tajikistan rather than the direct river border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Transport Links are Top Priority -------------- - ¶9. (C) Norov stated that "transportation infrastructure is our number one priority," and was pragmatic about why Uzbekistan needs a stable Afghanistan -- and also Iran -- as partners. "We are a doubly-landlocked country," he said, adding that it is essential for Uzbekistan to secure access to the seaports of the Persian Gulf. Other routes, he noted, are much longer, more expensive by several orders of magnitude, and cross the territories of several countries (especially Russia, thereby increasing Uzbekistan's dependency). Norov said it is imperative for the U.S. and NATO to revive transit routes through Afghanistan, and he welcomed Iranian construction of a railroad to Herat, noting that "Iran cannot be excluded" from efforts to link Afghanistan. Norov also reminded that links with Uzbekistan are in turn important for Afghanistan's development, and he emphasized the importance of a planned rail link from the railhead at Hayraton (near Termez) to Mazar-i-Sharif. Last year, according to Norov, 1.3 million tons of humanitarian aid and 700,000 tons of commercial commodities were shipped into Afghanistan via Termez and Hayraton. Step-by-Step Cooperation -------------- ¶10. (C) Norov reiterated the Government of Uzbekistan's mantra about a "step-by-step" increase in engagement with the U.S., explaining that there is a "strong potential for cooperation" but it should be "directed to areas of mutual importance." (Comment: This is Uzbekistan's way of saying let's do business but please back off on human rights pressure. End comment.) Norov expanded on this theme by noting that "our Constitution was not designed for making us look good in the West" but, rather, was focused on meeting the needs and desires of the Uzbek people. He continued that "we want cooperation on a strong basis, but without a public relations component." Navoiy: Make a Deal Quickly -------------- ¶11. (C) In a separate meeting, Defense Minister Berdiyev echoed Norov's comments about potential bilateral cooperation, noting he is "confident the relationship is growing," as evidenced by 30 planned mil-to-mil events in 2009. Like Norov, Berdiyev also thanked the U.S. for its assistance in the wake of the Kagan munitions depot explosions. Berdiyev stated that "we are ready to provide support on the upcoming transit of supplies" to Afghanistan, and he recommended the U.S. "resolve the issue quickly" by concluding contracts with Uzbekistan Airways and the Uzbekistan Transportation Agency to ship goods via rail and via the Navoiy Airport. Norov also had touched on "the importance of shipping non-lethal supplies via this route," which he underscored Uzbekistan "had supported from the very beginning." Military Equipment TASHKENT 00001522 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶12. (C) Berdiyev asked for the U.S. to provide military equipment to Uzbekistan's armed forces, attempting to link the need for the equipment to the expanded role Uzbekistan foresees in protecting cargo en route to Afghanistan via Uzbek territory. Specific equipment Berdiyev requested includes early warning detection devices, armored personnel carriers, unmanned aerial drones, and helicopters. In addition, Berdiyev suggested radar systems and radio surveillance equipment as well as assistance with repairing and replacing more than 1800 Harris radios purchased earlier with Foreign Military Finance (FMF) monies in addition to possibly replacing night-vision goggles likewise procured with FMF funds. He also requested the Government of Uzbekistan be provided some ability to assemble Harris radios in Uzbekistan. Lt. Gen. Allen proposed establishing a joint committee with U.S. and Uzbek military representatives to conduct a thorough assessment of existing capabilities and projected needs before determining whether such military equipment is warranted, which Berdiyev immediately agreed to. Embassy Comment: -------------- ¶13. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan, clearly pleased to be back on the map, appreciates the steady stream of high-ranking military visitors who visited during 2008 and look forward to a high-profile visit by CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus in early 2009. Cooperating on the commercial transshipment of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan makes economic sense for Uzbekistan which, despite its insistence that it remains untouched by the global economic crisis, is expected to suffer as remittances slow down from its citizens working abroad. Nonetheless, Uzbekistan will try to leverage this cooperation in order to secure some sort of return favor, be it military hardware, corporate investment, or slack on human rights. Gen. Petraeus's visit in January will be an opportunity to remind the Uzbeks that the quality of our partnership with them on Afghanistan will still depend in part on progress in the area of human rights. Deploying senior U.S. Government civilian officials to reinforce this message in the wake of Gen. Petraeus's visit should be an important component of the enhanced, more comprehensive bilateral dialogue that both we and the Uzbeks expect will unfold in 2009. 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