UZBEKISTAN TAKES ANOTHER SWIPE AT TAJIKISTAN OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000146 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, OES/ETC, OES/PCI, OES/STC, EUR/ACE DOE FOR NNSA, EPA FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018 TAGS: ENGR EAID PREL TI UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN TAKES ANOTHER SWIPE AT TAJIKISTAN OVER HYDROPOWER STATION REF: A. 07 TASHKENT 1853 ¶B. TASHKENT 114 Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The recent publication in Uzbekistan's state-run press of an article critical of Tajikistan's hydroelectric power projects, and flagged by President Karimov in his January 24 meeting with CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, is the latest move in Uzbekistan's longstanding efforts to derail the initiative, and is meant as a signal to international audiences. The article blamed Tajikistan for inefficient use of existing facilities and called for a mutually acceptable, environmentally-friendly solution that does not reduce water levels for downstream countries. In addition to articles in the press, Uzbekistan also has urged other countries including China, Russia, and Kazakhstan to steer clear of investment in Tajikistan's hydropower projects and threatened to withdraw from cooperation with the Asian Development Bank if the bank finances such projects. Uzbek officials have raised their displeasure with Tajikistan in meetings with U.S. officials repeatedly over the past two weeks. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) This cable includes data from official press reporting, Emboffs' meetings, Embassy files, and the regional ESTH LES, and has been coordinated with Embassy Dushanbe. ¶3. (C) In a January 24 article in the state-run newspaper "Pravda Vostoka," the Director of Uzbekistan's Hydroproject Institute, Sergey Zhigaryov, criticized Tajikistan's hydroelectric power projects in Uzbekistan's latest move to counter a project it perceives as dangerous to Uzbekistan's national interests. This follows on the heels of President Karimov's speech on the use of transboundary waters at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit on August 16 and Uzbekistan's September 4 accession to two United Nations conventions on the use of international watercourses (ref A). (Comment: There was no sign that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization would take up a mediation role on this issue. End comment.) ¶4. (SBU) The author noted that the test launch of the first power unit at the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan occurred recently with substantial assistance from Russia. While acknowledging that Tajikistan's efforts to expand power production were understandable given power supply problems in the winter, Zhigaryov cast the blame for power shortages mainly on Tajkistan's inefficient use of existing facilities and its increased exports of electricity to Afghanistan during periods of electricity shortage. (Note: Tajikistan actually curtails its export of power to Afghanistan in the winter relative to the summer. Sizable exports to Afghanistan have not taken place yet. End note.) Zhigaryov then criticized claims that Sangtuda-1 benefits all Central Asian nations, stated that 95 percent of Central Asians depend on farm irrigation, and said that discharging large amounts of water in the winter has a disastrous effect on the environment. He stressed the importance of coordination on hydroelectric projects, and that any agreement must not reduce the watercourse level for downstream countries (i.e. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan),and must not threaten the environmental safety of the region. ¶5. (SBU) Uzbekistan is the largest water user among the downstream countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and parts of Afghanistan),and some ninety percent of Uzbekistan's available water resources stem from neighboring countries. Uzbekistan's economy continues to depend heavily on agriculture, particularly cotton. Historically, Uzbekistan has argued that the discharge of water from upstream hydropower projects during the winter (when there are power shortages upstream) would be severely disruptive to agriculture in Uzbekistan. ¶6. (C) In addition to using the media, international law, and statements at multilateral summits, Uzbekistan has warned potential investors in Tajikistan's hydropower projects to stay away. A local Embassy employee reported that in a conversation with an Asian Development Bank official last November, the official indicated that then-Finance Minister (and now First Deputy Prime Minister) Rustam Azimov had approached a visiting Asian Development Bank official and warned that if the bank financed Tajikistan's hydropower project, Uzbekistan would withdraw from cooperation with the bank. Uzbekistan has actively steered other countries such as China, Russia, and Kazakhstan away from cooperating on upstream hydropower projects. ¶7. (C) Uzbek officials have raised Tajikistan's planned hydropower projects several times over the past two weeks with Embassy and USG officials. Ismat Faizullaev, Director of the MFA's USA Office, expressed his concern to P/E Chief on January 24, before a meeting with visiting CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon. President Karimov himself voiced strong endorsement of the views carried in the article when he meet with Admiral Fallon (ref B). Deputy Prime Minister (and Head of the Fuel and Energy Complex) Ergash Shaismatov and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Elyor Ganiev forcefully conveyed Uzbek objections in January 29 meetings with Ambassador Norland and visiting SCA Senior Advisor Bob Deutsch. All described the "disastrous" consequences of the planned hydroelectric cascade. All in effect said that the Tajik plans were "unacceptable" to Uzbekistan and must take into account the downstream needs of Uzbekistan's Amu Darya basin. Comment: -------------- ¶8. (C) Sangtuda-1 alone will have little downstream impact. If Tajkistan is able to realize its goal of completing multiple additional hydropower stations including Rogun, Shurob, Dashtijum, Sangtuda-2, and others, however, these stations could pose a serious threat to Uzbekistan's agriculture if they are not well-managed. Clearly, the Uzbeks make a convincing case that the Tajiks should take on board Uzbek concerns, particularly concerning winter water releases. The Uzbeks are aware that both CENTCOM and the Embassy have been paying attention to these issues, and they certainly would like to leverage our influence. We will continue to pursue a policy of encouraging all parties to work through existing mechanisms, such as environmental impact assessments and international conventions, and to pursue greater regional cooperation and integration on underlying issues. An upcoming opportunity to register U.S. views will be the UNDP-sponsored conference on the Aral Sea scheduled to take place on March 12-13 in Tashkent. NORLAND