Uzbekistan Supportive on Afghanistan Transit Concepts

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001382


DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
USTRANSCOM FOR JOHNSON-CASARES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-11-26
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR EINT UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan Supportive on Afghanistan Transit Concepts

REF: a) TASHKENT 1351, b) TASHKENT 1287, c) TASHKENT 1260

CLASSIFIED BY: BERLINER, NICHOLAS; (A),(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: The Commander of U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) General Duncan McNabb visited Uzbekistan November 18-20
to discuss possible modalities of establishing commercial transit of
non-lethal supplies for U.S. forces in Afghanistan (Northern
Distribution Network -NDN). The Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) gave
its support in principle to the concept under the following
conditions: 1) Arrangements would need to be strictly commercial and
economically beneficial for Uzbekistan; 2) No transit of military
cargo; 3) Air only as far as Navoi -i.e. no follow-on air to
Afghanistan by Uzbekistan Airways (HY) or any other carrier; 4) No
military aircraft should transit Navoi. Regarding possible
mechanisms, Deputy Prime Minister Azimov indicated that the GOU
expects separate commercial agreements (i.e. contracts) covering
each element - air cargo, rail and road transport and local
purchase. Gen. McNabb communicated to the GOU that the U.S.
envisions only a small part (approximately 10%) of all NDN cargo
possibly transiting by air via Navoi, with the balance transiting
Uzbekistan by rail (this appeared to surprise the Uzbek side,
although Azimov did not reject it). Key questions following from
this visit are: a) Whether or not a separate bilateral
inter-governmental agreement is necessary to cover rail transit or
if the proposed NATO agreement would suffice for this purpose; b) At
what point DoD should empower its commercial contractors to approach
Uzbek counterparts on the issue of contracts; c) How to exercise
sufficient oversight of these commercial relationships so as not
unwittingly to abet the interests of Uzbekistan's ruling family; and
d) Under what conditions DoD could instruct its contractors to
increase rail transit volumes through Uzbekistan. Although there are
tough discussions ahead, the Uzbeks are supportive of our efforts.
With various transit options available and the need for more routes
increasingly evident, this cable outlines a number of issues
requiring Washington decision. End Summary.


GOU Supports Afghanistan Transit "In Principle"
-------------- --


2. (C) During his visit to Tashkent, TRANSCOM Commander General
McNabb met with Uzbek First Deputy Prime Minister Azimov, Foreign
Minister Norov and Defense Minister Berdiyev to discuss Uzbek
support for Afghanistan transit. Gen. McNabb discussed the transit
of commercial cargo that would move throughout the region like any
normal commercial goods on established commercial transit routes. He
stressed that the sustainment cargo would be non-military in nature.
All three GOU interlocutors told Gen. McNabb that Uzbekistan shares
U.S. goals of peace and stability in Afghanistan and is prepared "in
principle" to support this effort. As articulated by Azimov, GOU
support comes with four conditions: 1) That all arrangements be made
on a commercial basis and that they be economically beneficial for
Uzbekistan; 2) That there be no transit of military cargo; 3) That
commercial cargo flights can use Navoi airport, but that there be no
air transport from Navoi to Afghanistan by any carrier; 4) That no
military aircraft transit Navoi airport.


3. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Azimov said that Uzbek companies are
ready to assist and could begin immediately. He noted that Korean
Airlines (KAL) will take over operations at Navoi in a joint venture
set to be signed on December 10 and that the Uzbeks, together with
KAL, are in the process of setting up a trucking company that could
transport cargo from Navoi to Afghanistan. He asserted that the
joint venture is set to purchase 500 trucks and noted that Navoi is
only 6 hours from the border with Afghanistan. Both Azimov and
Foreign Minister Norov emphasized the element of local purchase,
saying that Uzbekistan had a number of companies in various sectors
that could meet the most stringent quality standards at a cost
savings. Azimov said that, if the U.S. decides on local purchase,
the GOU would designate a government supply agent as a single point
of contact in Uzbekistan, a service for which it would charge a
"modest commission."


Commercial Contracts
--------------


4. (C) Addressing the question of the type of agreement the GOU
would expect, Azimov said that the Uzbeks would expect commercial
contracts between the parties involved. He noted that this would
mean a contract with KAL as the operator of Navoi, contracts with
Uzbekistan Railways and with a trucking company (preferably, it
seems with the KAL-Uzbek joint venture),and a contract for local
procurement with a state supplier as the sole Uzbek point of
contact. No GOU interlocutor made mention of an inter-governmental
agreement being necessary for commercial transit (although we should
not exclude the possibility that some sort of "chapeau" agreement
may be necessary, and we are seeking clarification from the GOU on
this point). Gen. McNabb explained that TRANSCOM partners with
contractors around the world via commercial contracts.


Developing Navoi Still Front and Center
--------------


5. (C) All GOU reps spoke at length about the development of Navoi,
referring to it several times as the "idea of President Karimov."
The GOU hopes to develop Navoi into a transcontinental cargo hub,
serving as a bridge between Asia and Europe. It has been clear for
some time that developing Navoi is a major factor motivating the GOU
to support Afghanistan transit, although Azimov was quick to point
out that this transit would represent only a small fraction of the
facility's future volume which, he said optimistically, would one
day exceed that of KAL's main facility at Inchon in Korea.


6. (C) Azimov's grandiose talk about Navoi was probably more for
internal consumption, given Karimov's involvement in the project.
Azimov could also have been trying to appear less eager in
discussion with the U.S. Whatever the case may be, later
conversations with representatives of KAL and Uzbekistan Airways
revealed that they view U.S. use of Navoi as very significant and
are eager to begin operations. Uzbek hopes for Navoi are a delicate
issue. Azimov did not respond when Gen. McNabb told him that the
U.S. envisions that only ten percent of cargo would transit by air
and the rest would come by rail along existing routes. However, he
was clearly surprised to hear this.


7. (C) In this vein, it was also somewhat unexpected to hear Uzbek
opposition to commercial charter flights between Navoi and points in
Afghanistan, as Minister of Defense Berdiyev had earlier indicated
air out of Navoi would be possible. Azimov was very specific in
saying that this prohibition applied not only to Uzbekistan Airways,
but to any carrier. Uzbekistan Airways, which has a large number of
idle Ilyushin 76s that would be well-suited to this purpose, was
also disappointed to learn this, as one of its reps revealed to us
later. It is unclear why the GOU set this red line, but could
reflect nervousness about appearing too closely associated with U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan, particularly in the event of an incident
involving an Uzbek aircraft on Afghan territory.


Big Plans for Rail Development
--------------


8. (C) Azimov and Norov went on at some length about Uzbek plans to
assist in the development of Afghanistan's rail network, noting that
agreement was imminent between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) to extend the rail line from Hairaton to
Mazar e Sharif. Azimov also noted that Iran was active in planning a
connection to its own rail network from Herat, plans that Uzbekistan
hopes will someday result in rail links from Central Asia through
Afghanistan to ports in Iran, shortening significantly the current
6,000 km route through Russia.


Next Steps
--------------


9. (C) The GOU could not have been clearer in its support for
commercial transit. The Uzbeks see both an opportunity to profit
from this and also to show that they are contributing to efforts in
Afghanistan. Gen. McNabb's visit provided additional clarity as to
what is possible with Uzbekistan and what the various modalities of
cooperation could look like. From our perspective, it appears the
following are the key issues requiring review in Washington in order
for expanded transit to get underway:

Nature of Agreements: Are commercial contracts and the pending NATO
rail agreement a sufficient basis to move forward, or will it be
necessary to have some sort of additional bilateral "chapeau"
agreement with the GOU to protect our interests? The Uzbeks did not
mention one to McNabb, but this may have reflected poor GOU
coordination and we should not exclude the possibility that such an
agreement may, in the end, be necessary to ensure that lines of
communication through Uzbekistan remain relatively free of
interference. (Ambassador met with Deputy Foreign Minister Nematov
on Nov. 26 to seek clarification; Nematov said the GOU would get
back to us in a few days.)

Rail Shipments: At what point should DOD begin utilizing the NATO
agreement (once it is finalized) to send cargo through Russia via
rail?

Engagement with Suppliers: Gen. McNabb raised the possibility of
sending a survey team from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
(perhaps in January 09) to identify possibilities for local
purchase. At what point should DOD engage with the GOU's procurement
agent?

Sequencing: How quickly should rail volumes increase in relation to
other modes, particularly use of Navoi? (The Uzbeks clearly see
Navoi as the quid pro quo for enhanced rail traffic, and may balk at
seeing the latter go up too fast.)

Unsavory Partners: Uzbekistan is a corrupt country whose First
Family and associates have business interests that extend throughout
the economy in ways that are frequently non-transparent. It will be
important for USG contractors to be vigilant to avoid deals with
entities controlled by these individuals.


Risks of Perception
--------------


10. (C) Gen. McNabb made clear in his meetings with GOU officials
that the U.S. views cooperation on transit and continued dialogue on
human rights as necessary and compatible issues. Indeed, the Uzbeks
themselves made a point of delivering a diplomatic note providing
information on a sensitive human rights case on the very night of
Gen. McNabb's arrival (ref. A). However, we must be cognizant of the
fact that, despite some modest steps forward, Uzbekistan is unlikely
to change in any fundamental way in the near future. As we move
forward on transit, it is probable that other activists will be
jailed or that some well-known figure could die in prison, all of
which could be used to cast cooperation on Afghanistan in a negative
light. Likewise, economic engagement, as in most countries of this
region, runs risks of inadvertent association with local potentates,
their families and their cronies. Commercial relationships mitigate,
but do not eliminate the association with the USG, which is, in the
end, the final customer. We need to be transparent about what we are
trying to do here and be able to respond effectively to public
perception.


Ambassador's Comment
--------------


11. (C) Both sides have an interest in expanding transit to
Afghanistan - and both are approaching it cautiously. The Uzbeks
basically do not believe the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan will
succeed and are hedging their bets by limiting cooperation to
strictly commercial arrangements which they believe they can defend
to a future Taliban government in Kabul if one emerged (which they
fear will be the case). For our part, the U.S. does not want to
repeat the difficult Karshi-Khanabad (K2) basing experience, nor do
we wish to be tagged with "ignoring" human rights abuses in the name
of security cooperation on Afghanistan. However, on balance, I
reject any view that we must choose between our interests in
Afghanistan and support for human rights in this instance. Transit
in support of our forces in Afghanistan will help to defeat the
enormous human rights threat represented to the entire region by the
Taliban. Commercial arrangements will distance us somewhat from the
perception of being too close to Karimov. Most importantly, we have
found increasingly over the past year that renewed engagement and
efforts to rebuild trust with the GOU can pay off on the human
rights front as well as in the security domain. I encourage the
Washington interagency community to review the proposed commercial
arrangements and, if they are found to meet U.S. requirements, to
move forward on them expeditiously.



12. (U) USTRANSCOM has cleared this cable.


NORLAND