UZBEKISTAN, 2007 INL END USE MONITORING REPORT

UNCLAS TASHKENT 000133 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR INL/AAE ANDREW BUHLER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR PREL ASEC AFIN EAID UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN, 2007 INL END USE MONITORING REPORT REF: 07 STATE 163708 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - Please protect accordingly. ¶1. (U) Per instructions in reftel, Embassy Tashkent presents the required annual End Use Monitoring Report to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) for calendar year 2007. -------------- PROCEDURES -------------- ¶2. (U) Embassy Tashkent requires the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) to sign an End User Certificate upon receipt of all INL-funded equipment. This document requires relevant GOU agencies to provide the Embassy information regarding each donated item, including product description, serial number, and geographical location where the equipment is deployed. Post submitted a diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as required, to request access to the equipment for monitoring purposes. It is not possible to conduct random, surprise inspections at Uzbek installations where our equipment is located. ¶3. (U) Post has one full-time Locally Engaged Staff (LES) position to support INL initiatives in Uzbekistan. The Embassy continues to improve procedures for INL equipment monitoring. During 2007 we created an INL equipment database containing records of all equipment provided to the GOU and records of previous inspections. The database includes all equipment-related information and supports dozens of different queries. INL equipment has been distributed throughout all 12 provinces of Uzbekistan. -------------- STATUS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) During the first half of 2007 the bilateral relationship was particularly strained and Embassy travel outside of Tashkent was limited. However, in recent months the situation improved and post made a concerted effort to make field visits to check the status of key INL-funded equipment. We prioritized major equipment such as vehicles, laboratory instruments, and the extensive equipment provided to the counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). ¶5. (U) Poloffs and INL LES visited customs posts in Termez, Bukhara, Navoi, and Tashkent; the explosives laboratory of the Ministry of Interior; the main laboratory of the Ministry of Health; and the counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The following major equipment, purchased during previous fiscal years, is included on our end-use monitoring inventory. ¶6. (U) Computers to Border Guards -- In December 2002 post delivered 27 laptop computers for use by border guards at 12 remote railroad border checkpoints along the borders with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. We did not check the computers this year due to strained relations with the host country and difficulty in accessing border posts, however the equipment is believed to be at the end of its useful lifespan after years of productive use. ¶7. (SBU) Computers to SIU -- In January 2004, Embassy delivered 25 workstations to the counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive Investigative Unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of Uzbekistan. On our inspection visit it was clear that the computer equipment is in good condition and is being actively used by law enforcement officers for its intended purpose. Extra equipment is carefully packaged and stored on the premises. ¶8. (U) Communications Equipment to SIU -- In July 2003, 30 cellular telephones, 30 Motorola GP-360 handheld radios, and four Thuraya satellite phones were provided to the SIU within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. An officer has been designated as responsible for maintaining and tracking the inventory, and all equipment is accounted for and in good condition given the timeframe of use. The cell phones are now obsolete but many are still in use; in other cases officers have returned the phones for inventory purposes and prefer to use their personal phones instead. The satellite phones are not in use due to the high cost of the service, which the SIU could no longer afford when the Government of Uzbekistan suspended cooperation with the DEA. ¶9. (U) Vehicles to Customs -- In August 2000, the Uzbek State Customs Committee received nine 4-wheel-drive Jeep Cherokees and spare parts. Uzbek Customs assigned three vehicles to counter-smuggling units in Tashkent Province (which includes rugged mountain terrain in its territory) as well as one each to Bukhara, Navoi, Karakalpakstan and Ferghana Provinces. Customs officers have clearly done the best they can to maintain the vehicles, although the government has not provided resources to make repairs. Thus, the vehicles in Buhkara and Navoi are inoperable and awaiting repairs. However, they are securely stored and officers were able to explain how they use the vehicles to support their operations. We did not visit Karakalpakstan or Ferghana during this review cycle. ¶10. (SBU) Vehicles to Customs continued -- In contradiction to the intended purpose, one Jeep was transferred to the State Prosecutor's Office, but we were given access to it and confirmed it is in excellent condition and being used for law enforcement purposes. Another was requisitioned by the National Security Service (NSS) and, despite requesting access via diplomatic note, we were not able to inspect the vehicle. ¶11. (SBU) Vehicles to SIU -- In December 2003, INL delivered 28 vehicles to the SIU. INL Tashkent conducted a thorough check and found all vehicles in good condition and used by police officers of the current unit. The fleet is intentionally mixed, including several local models, to allow undercover units to blend in with their surroundings. The local models are much easier for the SIU to maintain since there is ready availability of spare parts and mechanical expertise. Two Opel Astras require approximately USD 2,000 of repairs that the SIU has no funds to complete; however, the vehicles are kept in a secure garage and otherwise appear to be in good condition. ¶12. (U) Laboratory Equipment - In July 2004, post delivered and finished installation of laboratory equipment to enhance the GOU's capabilities to perform forensic analysis of explosives and narcotic substances. Equipment donated to the explosives laboratory at the Ministry of Internal Affairs included a Sabre-2000 portable explosive detector, five digital scales, and an Agilent Electrophoresis system. A Nicolet IR Spectrometer system was previously delivered to the lab in 1999. The main forensic laboratory at the Ministry of Health (which analyzes narcotic substances) received an Agilent Gas Chromatograph and Mass Spectrometer System, which greatly supported evidence processing in criminal drug cases. At both laboratories, poloff was extremely impressed by the professionalism of the staff and the obvious pride they have in carefully maintaining their scientific instruments. ¶13. (SBU) Miscellaneous Equipment to Border Guards -- In October 2001, INL provided the then Committee for State Border Protection document examination equipment to improve passport control activities at border checkpoints. Donated equipment included: 100 Universal Desktop Magnifiers and spare lamps, 200 Hand-Held UV-spot detectors and spare UV lamps, eight Multifunctional Passport Readers, and one set of Passport computer software with samples of more than 2,000 different passports and identification documents. The equipment was distributed to more than 40 border posts and the computer software was donated to the Border Guard Academy. We did not specifically inspect this equipment during this reporting cycle, but poloffs noted the equipment was utilized at the recently constructed modern border checkpoint on the Afghan border at Termez. ¶14. (SBU) Miscellaneous Equipment to SIU - Basic investigative equipment was distributed to the Counter Drug Department of the Uzbek Ministry of Internal Affairs. The equipment transferred included 21 digital video cameras, 68 portable digital audio recorders, 36 digital cameras, and 19 TV sets and VCRs. Transfer of this equipment helped the MVD outfit their counter-narcotics units with basic equipment they previously did not possess. It is all maintained in excellent condition, and a full-time technician helps officers utilize the equipment; they even made their own creative modification to use local handbags that make hidden cameras more discreet. ¶15. (SBU) INL supported a joint border project with the Embassy Export Control and Related Border Security Program by providing modular shelters for Uzbek Border Guards. They were placed in rural areas of the Uzbek borders with Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. INL Tashkent purchased, delivered, and installed custom-made furniture for the shelters at a cost of USD 56,000. We did not visit these border posts during this review cycle. ¶16. (U) There are no INL-funded vessels, aircrafts, weapons, or canine programs to monitor in Uzbekistan. -------------- PROBLEMS -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Many of the laptop computers delivered to the Border Guards are now broken after years of extensive use. The products have now exceeded their useful expected life span. We have had difficulty accessing border posts, but we expect to discontinue monitoring the equipment in the near future. ¶18. (U) One of the computers delivered to the SIU arrived without a hard drive several years ago and it has never been utilized. SIU staff continue to carefully store and keep track of the hardware for possible future use. Other computers are in active use at the facility. ¶19. (SBU) Since the Government of Uzbekistan suspended cooperation with the DEA, the SIU has not been able to utilize the satellite phones due to insufficient operational funding to pay the expensive monthly bills. However, officers have placed the equipment back in its original packaging and carefully keep track of it for possible future use. ¶20. (SBU) Several years ago, nine Jeep Cherokees were provided with INL funds for the exclusive use of the State Customs Committee. However, soon thereafter one vehicle was transferred to the office of the Prosecutor General and one was taken by the National Security Service. There was apparently a loophole in the paperwork at that time that allowed these powerful agencies to requisition the vehicles, and the State Customs Committee accepted this as an internal cost of doing business. The Prosecutor's Office cheerfully accommodated our request to inspect the vehicle, and it is in the best condition of any vehicle we checked. The Prosecutor's Office in Tashkent clearly has more financial resources to do maintenance than their colleagues in remote customs posts. However, we were unable to gain timely access to the vehicle in the possession of the NSS. We will attempt to do so during the 2008 inspection period. ¶21. (SBU) We discovered that due to the low quality of the fuel in the Uzbekistan retail market, the majority of vehicles require replacement of the fuel systems. The counter-smuggling unit in Tashkent city already replaced the engine on its Jeep Cherokee, and the Navoi counter-smuggling department is currently trying to identify the resources to replace its system. The vehicle in Bukhara has not worked in well over a year after sustaining engine damage in a collision with a smuggler's truck. They do not have the funds at this office to repair it and greatly miss the contribution the Jeep made in remote stretches of desert. Jeep parts are also not available in Uzbekistan, nor do mechanics know how to work on this American model. ¶22. (SBU) The Nicolet IR spectrometer and portable Sabre-2000 explosive detector have long since broken and require replacement. Poloff noted the staff at the lab are very professional and have nonetheless taken excellent care of all equipment, but their effectiveness would be enhanced by the repair of these instruments. The gas chromatograph at the main forensic laboratory requires a replacement hydrogen gas pump. -------------- IMPACT -------------- ¶23. (U) During the end-use monitoring inspection visits, poloff was favorably impressed by the amount of goodwill that INL contributions have generated among rank-and-file law enforcement officials. Customs and border posts throughout the country have benefited from U.S. Government-funded equipment and, equally important, numerous training programs. Uzbek officials still proudly recall their participation in previous training events, especially ones that took place in the United States. Uzbeks also enjoyed programs in which their field counterparts from the United States personally came and conducted trainings, providing a chance for counterpart professionals to discuss their field of expertise. Many veterans of these programs have been promoted and now occupy more senior positions at field posts or in Tashkent headquarters. They have requested more training programs on a variety of topics, which we support. ¶24. (U) Border Guard officials reported that the laptops enabled officers to more efficiently process train passengers transiting the borders. Officers can register passengers and identify wanted criminals using the database loaded onto the laptop computers. Previously, border guards used paper notepads to record passport data and submit it to headquarters for criminal check analysis. SIU officers actively use their computers for investigative work in counter-narcotics cases. The workstations are well-maintained and a dedicated technical officer provides support services, such as camera uploads and multimedia assistance, to help officers document evidence. ¶25. (SBU) On all of the inspection visits, poloff was satisfied that local customs officials did their best to take care of the equipment despite a lack of resources from the Government of Uzbekistan. Embassy Tashkent recommends approximately USD 20,000 of additional funds to purchase miscellaneous spare parts for Jeep Cherokees at customs posts. While the Government of Uzbekistan needs to take more responsibility, this small investment will generate more goodwill with local officials and enhance the overall utility of the investment in these vehicles. Local officials described how effective the Jeeps are in supporting operations in rugged desert and mountain terrain; however it is difficult to find spare parts for foreign models, especially given the lack of resources provided by the Government of Uzbekistan. ¶26. (U) As a vivid example of increased capability paying dividends, sophisticated laboratory equipment (and corresponding training) enabled the Ministry of Internal Affairs explosive laboratory to identify the explosive substances used by the suicide bomber who attacked Embassy Tashkent in July 2004. ¶27. (U) Border guards have the ability to more thoroughly and confidently check passports and other documents right in the border checkpoints without having to consult with officials in Tashkent or make ill-informed spot decisions. -------------- PROGRAM CHANGES -------------- ¶28. (SBU) The budget for new INL projects dropped as the bilateral relationship deteriorated. However, now that relations are steadily improving, we expect that will be easier to implement border security and law enforcement assistance projects in Uzbekistan. The Government of Uzbekistan has indicated that it welcomes the resumption of cooperation on these areas of mutual interest. The Government of Uzbekistan is also keenly aware of the growing threat posed by record drug production in Afghanistan, which has been well documented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Uzbekistan is a major transit country for drugs heading north from Afghanistan (especially via Tajikistan),and counter-narcotics will be a major priority and an opportunity for collaboration. -------------- POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶29. (U) Timothy Buckley is responsible for the INL Tashkent program. He can be reached by telephone at: 998-71-120-5450; fax: 998-71-120-6335; or unclassified email: BuckleyTP@state.gov. INL LES Dmitriy Dogovorov can be reached by office telephone: 998-71-120-5450; fax: 998-71-120-5400; or unclassified email: dogovorovd@state.gov. NORLAND