UZBEKISTAN: EU DIPLOMATS EXPECT SANCTIONS TO BE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001155

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018
TAGS: PHUM EUN PGOV PREL UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: EU DIPLOMATS EXPECT SANCTIONS TO BE
WEAKENED

REF: SECSTATE 108064

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During a six-day visit to Uzbekistan, DRL
Foreign Affairs Officer Rachel Waldstein on September 23
participated in an informal roundtable at the Embassy with
diplomats from the German, French, Italian, and Latvian
Embassies in Tashkent. The diplomats reported that the EU
would most likely decide at its Foreign Ministers' General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting (GAERC) in
Luxembourg on October 13 to weaken sanctions against
Uzbekistan by either eliminating or shortening a visa ban
against selected Uzbek officials (Note: More recent reports
from Brussels indicate that EU may also decide to maintain
but "downsize" its arms embargo. End note.) The diplomats
also expressed their view that engagement and offers of
assistance, rather than sanctions and isolation, would be
more likely to encourage further progress of human rights
from Uzbekistan. The diplomats also explained that the EU
had completed its dialogue with the Uzbek government on the
2005 Andijon events, with the German representative adding
that it was time for the West to "get over Andijon." We
share the view that engagement, not isolation, is the most
effective way to achieve our goals in Uzbekistan -- but such
engagement needs to also include a focus on Andijon.
Waldstein's visit sets the stage for higher-level DRL contact
with the government on human rights issues, and we would
encourage a visit by the DRL Assistant Secretary or PDAS
before the end of the year. End summary.

BACKGROUND ON EU SANCTIONS
--------------


2. (U) In response to the killing by Uzbek forces of a large
but indeterminate number of civilians in the context of a
jail break and hostage taking that occurred in the city of
Andijon in May 2005, and the refusal of the Uzbek authorities
to allow an impartial investigation of the incident, the EU
imposed a visa ban on senior Uzbek officials - including the
defense minister and national security chief - involved in
human rights abuses in the country. In October 2007, EU
Foreign Ministers, facing pressure from Germany and other
member states, agreed to suspend the sanctions for six
months, provided that certain benchmarks demonstrating
progress in human rights standards and democracy were met.
"With a view to encouraging the Uzbek authorities to take
substantive steps to improve the human rights situation and
taking into account their commitments," EU Foreign Ministers
in April 2008 noted progress on human rights and extended the
ban for another six months. The October 13 GAERC will again
take up the extension of the visa ban. Reports from Brussels
indicate that the GAERC may drop the visa ban against
Uzbekistan and maintain but "downsize" its arms embargo to
get rid of prohibitions on selling equipment and other
non-lethal items (reftel).

THE VIEW FROM TASHKENT ON EU SANCTIONS
--------------


3. (C) On September 23, Waldstein participated in an
informal roundtable at the Embassy with French DCM Christophe
Le Rigoleur, Italian DCM Fabrizio Bovino, German Political
Officer Uwe Berndt, and Latvian Political Officer Peteris
Ancans. The diplomats explained that the consensus among EU
Embassies in Tashkent was that sanctions had outlived their
usefulness and now was the time to send a positive signal to
the Uzbeks by weakening or removing them, a recommendation
they reported was made in the most recent EU Heads of Mission
report on Uzbekistan. While the diplomats were careful to
note that their respective Foreign Ministries had not yet

made any firm commitments on sanctions, they expected that
the EU would decide at its GAERC in Luxembourg on October 13
to ease sanctions against Uzbekistan. They explained that
all 27-member states of the EU need to reach consensus on
sanctions, or they would automatically expire. The diplomats
noted that there were still differences of opinion with a few
member states (none of whom have Embassies in Tashkent),and
for this reason, they expected a compromise to be reached
whereby a visa ban list against selected Uzbek officials
would be eliminated or shortened, and an arms embargo would
be kept in place. The diplomats also believed that the arms
embargo itself might be weakened.

UZBEKS MET SOME, BUT NOT ALL, EU HUMAN RIGHTS BENCHMARKS
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Le Rigoleur allowed that the Uzbeks had not achieved
all the human rights benchmarks the EU had laid out for them
- namely failing to grant accreditation to Human Rights Watch
(HRW) Tashkent director Igor Vorontsov or to invite back the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture (who last
visited Uzbekistan in 2003) - but he observed that Uzbekistan
had achieved progress in the past year, including by
releasing political prisoners, abolishing the death penalty,
and adopting a law on habeas corpus. Bovino cited other
positive steps the Uzbeks had taken in the past year,
including allowing the restart of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) prison visits and adopting
International Labor Organization (ILO) child labor
conventions and a National Action Plan on their
implementation.

EU DIPLOMATS FAVOR ENGAGEMENT, ASSISTANCE OVER SANCTIONS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Berndt argued that sanctions were a poor instrument
for achieving human rights progress in Uzbekistan and that
keeping sanctions would be counterproductive and likely lead
to a break in dialogue with the Uzbeks. Berndt was also
critical of the EU visa ban itself. He noted that with the
exception of National Security Service Chairman Inoyatov,
most of the other officials on the list already have been
removed from their posts.


6. (C) Instead, Berndt thought greater long-term sustainable
progress on human rights could be achieved through engagement
and offering assistance to the government, such as training
for law enforcement officials. As an example, he cited the
German government's recent funding of a 40,000 Euro project
that offers seminars and trainings for judges and prosecutors
on the new habeas corpus law, which he said has already been
carried out in 8 of Uzbekistan's 14 regions. Le Rigoleur
added that the EU planned to begin a 10 million Euro judicial
reform project in January 2009, which would be regional in
nature but still focus on Uzbekistan. In addition to the
habeas corpus law, the EU diplomats also believed two other
possible areas of cooperation were education exchanges and
water management.


7. (C) Ancans added that all EU member states wanted to
continue to see progress on human rights in Uzbekistan, but
their opinions differed on what approach would work best. He
maintained that constructive dialogue was most likely to
succeed, but he also believed that the threat of renewed
sanctions could be invoked at some point in the future if
Uzbekistan failed to make further progress.

EU DIPLOMATS ARGUE UZBEKS DO NOT RESPOND TO PRESSURE
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Berndt noted that human rights defenders within

Uzbekistan were split on the issue of sanctions. He observed
that, unlike diplomats, local activists had almost no contact
with the government, and therefore they had unrealistic
expectations of what the West could achieve on human rights
in Uzbekistan. Berndt and Bovino noted that the Uzbeks were
very stubborn and proud and did not respond well to outside
pressure. Instead, they observed that the Uzbeks desired to
be seen as equals, not lectured as children.


9. (C) As an example of how the Uzbeks do not respond well
to outside pressure, Le Rigoleur recounted a conversation
that he had last spring with former HRW Tashkent director
Vorontsov, where he warned Vorontsov that the Uzbeks would
never grant him accreditation if it was included as one of
the benchmarks the EU submitted to the government. Despite
his warning, HRW continued to lobby the EU, which agreed to
include Vorontsov's accreditation as a benchmark. Le
Rigoleur was then not surprised when the Uzbeks ultimately
refused to grant accreditation to Vorontsov.


10. (C) Berndt also argued that the Uzbek government was
"not monolithic," but made of competing groups, some of who
were more orientated towards the West and reform. He
believed that it was important to support the hand of such
reformers, which could be achieved through greater
engagement, and not weaken them by pushing too hard on the
government.

GERMAN DIPLOMAT CRITICIZES ACTIVISTS
--------------


11. (C) Berndt also suggested that much human rights
reporting by independent activists was biased and
exaggerated. In particular, he referred to the case of
imprisoned political opposition figure Sanjar Umarov, who,
according to his relatives, has been mistreated in prison
this year and remains in dire health. Berndt, however,
reported hearing from another local activist, Mothers Against
the Death Penalty and Torture Chairman Tamara Chikunova, that
Umarov in fact is treated better than a majority of inmates
in Uzbek prisons and is not ill (Note: We are unable to
confirm Chikunova's allegation about Umarov. In a recent
email, Umarov's son reported to poloff that his aunt recently
visited Umarov in prison and found that his condition appears
to have improved. End note.) Berndt also reported being
told by Chikunova that prison conditions have improved in the
last few months and that inmates have been granted greater
access to medical assistance.

THE UZBEKS DON'T WANT MUCH FROM THE WEST
--------------


12. (C) Le Rigoleur noted that the West had limited leverage
over Uzbekistan, as its leaders did not want much from the
West. He noted that Uzbeks were interested in some increased
security cooperation, especially in regards to Afghanistan.
He also believed that the Uzbeks were interested in improving
their international image to a certain degree. Berndt
believed that if the EU sent a positive signal to the Uzbeks
and "gave them some respect," they may "learn to value that
respect and become afraid to lose it."


13. (C) Le Rigoleur argued that EU influence in Central Asia
was much weaker than in Eastern Europe or the Caucasus. He
noted that the EU was competing for influence with large
regional powers - including Russia, Japan, South Korea,
India, and Pakistan. If the EU wished to retain what
influence it had in the region, Le Rigoleur believed it
needed to stay engaged with the local governments. On the
other hand, if the EU kept its sanctions against Uzbekistan
in place, he feared that the EU's influence in the region

would diminish. Le Rigoleur also observed that while the
United States held some economic leverage over Uzbekistan,
particularly in regards to the use of child labor during the
cotton harvest, otherwise its leverage in the region was also
limited (Note: Walmart recently ordered its suppliers to stop
sourcing Uzbek cotton, citing child labor concerns. End
note.)

"WEST NEEDS TO GET OVER ANDIJON..."
--------------


14. (C) In regards to the violent Andijon events from 2005,
Berndt believed that it was time for the West "to get over
Andijon." Berndt was adamant that if the United States
insisted that the Uzbeks allow an international investigation
into the Andijon events, it would "get no support from the EU
for such a demand." Berndt pointed out that two EU expert
groups already visited Uzbekistan and held direct talks with
the government over Andijon in 2006 and 2007. In contrast to
the popular perception that Uzbek soldiers fired upon unarmed
protestors at Andijon, Berndt noted that the expert groups
were shown film proving that the Andijon protestors were
armed and had taken hostages (Note: We also have seen such
footage, which, at least for a time, was available on the
internet. End note.) Le Rigoleur added that the first EU
expert group to visit Uzbekistan "was ill-prepared," but said
that second expert group "was better prepared" and had "all
of their questions" answered by the Uzbeks. According to
him, the only piece of evidence which the Uzbeks did not
share with the EU expert groups is footage of the shooting
itself. Le Rigoleur echoed Berndt's thoughts, noting that
discussions between the EU and the Uzbeks over Andijon "were
finished."


15. (C) Both Berndt and Le Rigoleur believed that the
ultimate cause of most civilian deaths at Andijon was the
poor training of Uzbek law enforcement officials, who
demonstrated their utter ineptitude at handling crisis
situations. They believe that the only way forward on the
Andijon issue was to offer the Uzbeks training for law
enforcement officials, with the goal of trying to prevent
such a tragedy from reoccurring.

VIEW FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY
--------------


16. (C) A representative from the British Embassy in
Tashkent, which has generally been seen as taking a harder
line with the Uzbeks on human rights over the years than the
other EU Embassies, was not able to attend the roundtable on
September 23. However, the EU diplomats present at the
roundtable reported that the British Ambassador in Tashkent
agreed with their sentiments and had signed off on the EU
Heads of Mission report on Uzbekistan. On October 8, poloff
met with new British Embassy Political Officer Richard Pike,
who also reported that he expected EU sanctions to be
weakened on October 13 and suggested that the British Embassy
in Tashkent favored such an approach.

REMARKS BY LATVIAN PRESIDENT IN TASHKENT
--------------


17. (U) According to press reports, Latvian President
Zatlers, publicly took sides in the EU debate on sanctions by
telling reporters on his way to Tashkent that Latvia believed
sanctions had played themselves out and isolation of
Uzbekistan was counterproductive.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORTEDLY REACHES OUT TO KOUCHNER
-------------- --------------


18. (C) On October 7, the French Ambassador (protect) told
the Ambassador that he was running into some wrinkles with
Paris regarding the EU sanctions decision. According to the
French Ambassador, HRW had weighed in with a strong letter to
FM Kouchner, which was apparently causing some last minute
jitters in Paris with regard to plans to ease the sanctions
regime by lifting the visa ban while keeping an arms embargo
in place.

COMMENT
--------------


19. (C) We agree with the EU diplomats that prolonging
sanctions against Uzbekistan at this point is
counterproductive. As the refusal of the Uzbeks to grant
accreditation to HRW's Tashkent director demonstrated, the
Uzbeks do not respond well to outside pressure. While HRW
and other human rights groups might disagree, we continue to
believe that more systemic and sustainable progress on human
rights could be achieved through greater engagement with the
government and offers of assistance. Right now, our priority
is to continue to encourage the government to work closely
with the ICRC on its prison monitoring program, which
Chikunova and others have pointed out has resulted in some
improvement in prison conditions this year. In regards to
the 2005 Andijon events, we also agree with the EU diplomats
that our priority should not be to demand that the Uzbeks
allow an independent investigation into what occurred, which
they will never allow. Instead, we believe our focus should
be on trying to avoid a repeat of those events by reviewing
all accounts of the incident with appropriate government
officials and offering assistance, such as training for law
enforcement officials in appropriate crowd-control tactics.


20. (C) Waldstein's visit sets the stage for higher-level
DRL contact with the government on human rights issues, and
we would encourage a visit by the DRL Assistant Secretary or
PDAS before the end of the year.
NORLAND