UZBEKISTAN: SCENESETTER FOR 21-24 OCTOBER NGLOC

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001140 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018 TAGS: PREL ASEC EAID ECON KTIA MARR MASS MOPS OVIP PGOV, PINS, PTER, SNAR, UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: SCENESETTER FOR 21-24 OCTOBER NGLOC SENIOR-LEVEL FACT-FINDING VISIT TO UZBEKISTAN REF: A. DAO IIR 6 939 0073 08 ¶B. TASHKENT 1124 ¶C. DAO IIR 6 939 0113 08 ¶D. TASHKENT 1113 ¶E. DAO IIR 6 939 0114 08 Classified By: Defense Attache Jeff Hartman for reasons 1.4 (b, d). Scenesetter for 21-24 October NGLOC Senior-Level Fact-Finding Visit to Uzbekistan Led by RADM Mark Harnitchek, DCDR TRANSCOM, and BG Peter Lennon, Deputy J4, CENTCOM ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Tashkent welcomes you to Uzbekistan for what will be a very important step toward realizing a new Northern Ground Line of Communication (NGLOC). This initiative's significance is increasingly important due to pending USG decisions concerning strengthening our military presence in Afghanistan by several brigades concurrent with heightening danger to the USG's primary lines of communication through Pakistan. In the past year, Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) officials have repeatedly stated that they want the United States and NATO to succeed in Afghanistan. These officials, including President Islom Karimov, have voiced their grave concerns over the deterioriating security situation in Afghanistan and the dangerous rise in heroin trafficking emanating from Afghanistan. Your discussions and observations, on the heels of successful visits by the Acting Commander of CENTCOM, LTG Dempsey, and the Commander of ARCENT, LTG Lovelace, and following the much-appreciated USG assistance to the ammunition depot explosions at Kagan, will provide the GOU an opportunity to improve its assistance to the USG's mission in Afghanistan at a key point for both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the overall USG-GOU relationship. (C) Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC), Murod Atayev, will likely be the key GOU official with whom you will meet. By GOU custom, this office call will probably be your final scheduled meeting. Atayev will probably relay his impressions to President Islom Karimov before any final GOU decisions or proposals are made in regard to NGLOC. Your trip is being presented as a NGLOC Senior-Level Facting-Finding Trip to investigate and discuss the logistical, diplomatic, and legal challenges and options for opening a new NGLOC. We envision some DOD logisticians working in Uzbekistan as purchasing officials, contracting agents and other liaisons to facilitate commercial movement of goods through Uzbekistan, but we want to advertise this initiative as primarily a civilian and contractor transit operation in support to Afghanistan. Any decision to put "boots on the ground" will be controversial in both the U.S. and Uzbekistan and would require senior-level interagency approval in Washington. The transit of military cargo and materials laden by foreign militaries is currently illegal in Uzbekistan and these laws are strictly enforced. NGLOC will require changes to GOU law and new instructions to GOU offices. German and NATO transit efforts may have started a new path to such arrangements. We do not recommend passing draft diplomatic notes or proposed transit agreements prior to or during this visit. (C) As incentive for the GOU, we should be ready to provide more robust counter-narcotics assistance while also pressing for the DEA's return to Uzbekistan as the lead agency for USG counternarcotics efforts. Increased container traffic between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan will overwhelm an already over-burdened GOU Customs inspection process at Termez. Local purchase should reduce overall NGLOC transit volume and can also serve as an incentive for the Uzbeks. There are several U.S. companies manufacturing and providing services in Uzbekistan that may be of interest for NGLOC. Local purchase will help Uzbekistan's economy and is a big selling point for GOU support. (C) Recently, the GOU tendered the operating contract at the new Navoi International Airport to KAL's cargo operation, a strong USG partner. There are many advantages to Navoi airport and KAL's partnership with Uzbekistan Airways. The city of Navoi is now a rail hub for commerce in central Uzbekistan. In contrast, the German-Uzbek Airbase at Termez's civilian airport has been reduced to just 100 airmen. While Termez has obvious geographic advantages, there are runway and tarmac issues that would limit maximum NGLOC usage. (U) We highly recommend that your delegation deliver the remaining balance of EOD equipment bound for Kagan, to Navoi and that if possible you broach other important issues connected with NGLOC through Uzbekistan. These include the return of the DEA, a final determination from the GOU on USG personnel transiting the German Air-bridge, emergency diverty procedures into Uzbekistan, and road transit of DOD goods to Manas Airbase. (C) If NGLOC through Uzbekistan is to progress, it will need to be simultaneously carefully shaped and communicated in the USG and across the Inter-Agency community. The current planned dates for a follow-on visit by the Commanding General, TRANSCOM, on 18 and 19 November 2008, are optimal. However, we recommend that the decision on a follow-on visit by the TRANSCOM Commander remain situational dependent. If your visit is successful, we propose that RADM Harnitchek himself, after consultation with Ambassador Norland, discuss a proposed visit by the TRANSCOM Commander directly with Secretary of the NSC Atayev at their final meeting. End summary. Concept of the NGLOC Senior-Level Fact-Finding Visit to Uzbekistan -------------- - ¶2. (U) Your trip itinerary will be based on the GOU's preference of visitors seeing first-hand the subject matter of discussion, in this case transportation infrastructure, followed by your meeting with relevant GOU officials from junior to senior. For this visit, Secretary of the NSC, Murod Atayev, will likely be the senior GOU official with whom you will meet. As is GOU custom, the office call with Atayev will probably be the very last meeting of the trip. All other GOU officials with who you meet will report to Atayev's office on your preceding meetings in order to prepare Atayev. After your visit, NSC Secretary Atayev will relay his impressions to the highest level of the GOU including President Islom Karimov. This process is necessary before any final GOU decisions or proposals are made in regard to NGLOC. We expect that the results of your visit will also be discussed at a separate GOU NSC meeting which normally occurs monthly. The NSC Chairman is President Karimov. In the first two days of your visit, we have asked the GOU that you visit the new Navoi International Airport, the Uzbek-German Airbase at Termez Airport, railroad and barge operations at Termez, the Freedom Bridge and see the new rail lines that connect Termez with central Uzbekistan. GOU officials are very proud of the recent infrastructure improvements completed since independence, including Navoi International Airport and the Guzar-Komkurgan rail line. You will also probably meet with officials from the GOU Customs Service, Korean Air Cargo (KAL Cargo),Uzbekistan Airways (HY),Uzbekistan Railroad (UTI),the Ministry of Economic Development and Foreign Investment, the American Chamber of Commerce and representatives from other US companies in Uzbekistan, the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry. Expectation Management, Part 1, NGLOC Senior-Level Fact-Finding Visit -------------- ¶3. (C) This trip is being presented to the GOU as a NGLOC Senior-Leval Fact-Finding Trip to investigate and discuss the logistical, diplomatic and legal challenges and options for opening a new NGLOC through Uzbekistan. We are telling the GOU that your trip will result in recommendations to the USG concerning (1) whether we should do NGLOC through Uzbekistan and (2) then how we should do it, should the USG decide to request transit through Uzbekistan. If the trip is successful, we recommend passing draft proposals after the October 2008 visit and scheduling a Commanding General of TRANSCOM visit to Uzbekistan on or after 18 November 2008 in order to advance an arrangement based on this Senior-Level Fact-Finding Team's recommendations. However, if NGLOC through Uzbekistan is to progress, it will need to be simultaneously carefully shaped and communicated in the USG and across the Inter-Agency community. Expectation Management, Part 2, NGLOC Through Uzbekistan -------------- ¶4. (C) Within the NGLOC concept, we envision some DOD logisticians working in Uzbekistan as purchasing, contracting agents and other liaisons to facilitate commercial movement of goods through Uzbekistan. We want to advertise NGLOC through Uzbekistan as primarily a civilian and commercial contractor operation with the least uniformed DOD presence possible. NGLOC will be, and should be characterized as, support ot Afghanistan via "logistical transit through Uzbekistan." We do not want military bases, but rather transit arrangements possibly at Navoi and Termez in order to facilitate transit through Uzbekistan. DAO Tashkent will require permanent augmentation in order to deal with the increased bureaucratic challenges of DOD logistical transit. But overall, we think there is great promise for NGLOC in the interests of both the USG and GOU. Expectation Management, Part 3, the GOU -------------- ¶5. (C) Some hard feelings remain within the GOU about the deterioration of the relationship from 2003-2007 that resulted in the US departure from K2 in 2005. There is also Russian influence to contend with within the GOU. Some GOU offices are encouraging NGLOC development and are even confused by USG delays in establishing a new transit corridor. However, other GOU officials may seek to slow or hinder NGLOC within their government. The GOU is slow and bureaucratic. The transit of military cargo and materials laden by any foreign military is illegal without prior clearance from the Uzbek government. This includes non-military and non-lethal goods shipped by foreign militaries. GOU laws against transit of military goods through Uzbekistan originated in the 1990s with the intent of preventing transit of supplies to the various warring factions in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. These laws are still in effect and are strictly enforced by GOU offices. NGLOC will require changes to GOU law and new instructions to offices within the GOU. All GOU decisions involving the USG are made at the highest levels. Those in the GOU who wish to slow or prevent NGLOC can exploit the GOU's already cumbersome mechanisms and the necessary changes to GOU law. However, German and NATO efforts to arrange transit through Uzbekistan may have started a new path of lesser resistance to such transit arrangements. (C) That being said, the USG already does benefit from some contractor-driven transit of DOD cargo across Uzbekistan. At present, about 65 percent of JP-8 U.S.-grade aviation fuel for U.S. forces in Afghanistan transits Uzbekistan. In addition, about 99 percent of TS1 Russian-grade aviation fuel for the Afghan National Army and other users of Russian-made helicopters in Afghanistan also crosses Uzbekistan. A large quantity of bottled water for U.S. forces originates at Nestle's plant in Namangan. (C) However, we believe that there is probably enough plausible deniability for the GOU concerning the real end-user of this fuel and water, and there is enough profit for Uzbekistan Railroad and a valued foreign employer (Nestle) that GOU officials knowingly ignore the current transit of fuel and water. The fact that the fuel originates in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan may also help explain the GOU's reluctance to interrupt the aviation fuel's transit. Some GOU officials have privately acknowledged the transit of fuel but these same officials have never boasted about this among other claims of GOU assistance to US or NATO efforts in Afghanistan such as over-flight and hosting the Uzbek-German base at Termez. (C) During the same time that this transit continued, at least seven truckloads of DOD-laden non-military/non-lethal materials bound for Manas were stopped and returned to their point of origin as well as a separate non-lethal shipment headed to Tajikistan which has been held in Tashkent since December 2007. Each of these contractor-controlled shipments was arrrested because it was laden by a foreign military, in this case U.S. DOD, without prior permission. Interestingly, six of the truckloads containing construction materials for a new hospital at Manas actually crossed Iran twice, en route to Uzbekistan and back to Turkey, without interference. Embassy Tashkent is very doubtful that GOU officials would ignore containers of DOD-laden non-lethal and/or non-military goods headed to Termez without some sort of pre-arranged permission. Diplomatic Notes and Transit Agreements -------------- ¶6. (C) We do NOT recommend passing draft diplomatic notes or proposed transit agreements to the GOU prior to or during this visit to include draft treaties. As stated in reporting, the German transit agreement is flawed (reftel A). Your delegation will likely get a chance to meet with German Embassy officials to discuss this matter. NATO's delegation was in Tashkent 24-26 September 2008 and continued their transit negotiations. This NATO delegation reported problems with the German agreement and termed it "unusable." Feedback form the NATO-GOU discussions has already been published (reftels B and C). Any dip note passed before or during this trip would be premature--we need to learn from your visit what will work best. In addition, pressing on GOU officials demonstrates weakness. This is a "bazaar-barter culture." One whiff of desperation or anxiousness and we may have upped the price politically and financially several fold. Interestingly, there are hints of moderate desperation on the GOU side due to narcotics-trafficking concerns and other GOU concerns about the deterioriating situation in Afghanistan. The GOU wants the USG and NATO to succeed in Afghanistan (reftel D). Counter-Narcotics Assistance -------------- ¶7. (C) NGLOC will not be free, nor should it be. Uzbekistan needs jobs, and the GOU needs counter-narcotics assistance. Be prepared to tell GOU officials how the USG can help Uzbekistan and the GOU. Most conveniently, at his first meeting with USG officials, new Minister of Defense Kabul Berdiyev announced that counter-narcotics is now an MOD priority mission. This was 180 degrees contrary to previous statements from the MOD. Knowing the GOU, the change probably originated with President Karimov or elsewhere in the GOU's highest circles. We should be ready to provide more robust counter-narcotics assistance while also pressing for the DEA's return to Uzbekistan as the lead agency for USG counter-narcotics efforts. USG transit through Uzbekistan will create new counter-narcotics problems just due to increased container volume. The GOU will have difficulty screening additional container traffic without counter-narcotics assistance to their Customs Service. The GOU needs equipment and training for counter-narcotics inspections of containers coming back from Afghanistan and pre-cursor checks on containers headed into Afghanistan. It is in both the USG and GOU's mutual interest to control drug and pre-cursor movements across Uzbekistan's borders. Local Purchase -------------- ¶8. (C) Be prepared to discuss local purchase from US and partner companies in Uzbekistan manufacturing goods and providing services that the USG needs for Afghanistan. Logistically, local purchase should reduce overall NGLOC transit volume. Politically and diplomatically, it will help stabilize Uzbekistan's economy, which needs to create more jobs fast. It would probably be prudent if we were more fully vested in our GWOT partners' economies. A long-term economically viable and stable Uzbekistan is in all our interests, to include NGLOC's success and success of the USG's overall goals in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Among the biggest threats to Uzbekistan are (1) its stagnant economy, and (2) the growing narcotics trafficking problem. If the two problems converge, it will be bad for both GOU and USG interests. Local purchase from US companies or other local manufacturers will help reduce NGLOC traffic and will be a big selling point for GOU support. Coca-Cola (sodas, water, juices),Procter and Gamble, Texaco (lubricants), General Motors, LG and Western building material suppliers all produce here in Uzbekistan. We will arrange meetings here with the American Chamber of Commerce plus other US, Western, Japanese, Korean, or Australian businesses manufacturing or providing services in Uzbekistan. The New Navoi International Airport -------------- ¶9. (C) This former Soviet bomber base is one of President Karimov's personal pet projects to attract international businesses and cargo carriers to use Uzbekistan as an East Asia - Middle East - Southeast Asia - Europe air hub. Recently, the GOU tendered the operating contract to Korean Air's (KAL's) cargo operation. This is good news for the USG since KAL already has a strong relationship with the USG. The GOU wants to get this operation moving and attract other private companies to use Navoi (UPS, DHL, etc.). The airfield itself is AN-124 and C-5 capable. In an encouraging sign, the GOU responded to our request to survey the newly-constructed Navoi International Airport in record time, just two days. KAL has a partnership with Uzbekistan Airways (HY) which is significant because HY has blanket over-flight rights over Afghanistan and HY maintains a large fleet of IL-76s. There are other advantages to the new airport and the KAL-HY partnership. HY's maintenance operation, Uzbekistan Airways Technics, is now certified to do C-check inspections and maintenance on Boeing 767 aircraft (reftel E). The refinery in nearby Bukhara recently finished certification for JET A1 air fuel production and will be a supplier for Navoi International Airport. Overall, due to other rail infrastructure improvements in the 1990s, the city of Navoi is now the hub for rail commerce in central Uzbekistan which includes traffic from Kazakhstan. There is great potential for possible USG air-to-rail transit options as well as air cargo transfer to HY flights to Afghanistan based from Navoi. In discussions with the GOU about International Navoi Airport, anticipate that the GOU may want the USG to supply it with material-handling equipment (MHE) just as it requested from the Germans as part of their compensation for use of Termez Airport. Officials from KAL and HY are well-aware of the GOU's transit prohibitions concerning any materials laden by foreign militaries. Both companies are interested in how we can resolve this obstacle with the GOU. Termez International Airport -------------- ¶10. (C) The other airfield we recommend looking at is Termez Airport. The German-Uzbek Airbase is at that same civilian airport. With their shift to Mazar-e-Sharif, the German operation is now just a skeleton crew of 100 airmen and an occasional Airbus and/or C-160. The Germans will maintain their smaller operation at Termez, but the bulk of their air transport efforts were recently moved into Afghanistan. Earlier USG inquiries about Termez expressed concern about air traffic and tarmac parking limitations. The GOU has hinted several times that it wants a new tenant to augment German operations at Termez. But, while Termez Airport has obvious geographic advantages, there are runway issues. Although, in theory, the airfield is AN-124 and C-5 capable, the German Luftwaffe Command has stopped clearing AN-124 landings due to deterioration of the main runway and uneven weight-bearing conditions on the tarmac. A key question at Termez will be the safe use of IL-76s with regard to runway and tarmac conditions. Minimum Footprint -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite pressure on other available transit options, there will be political sensitivities to NGLOC transit of Uzbekistan. For these reasons, Embassy Tashkent advises that as much as possible we stress this operation as civilian and commercial/contractor-heavy operation with a minimum "boots on the ground" footprint. We also recommend no mention of bases or basing, but instead transit support activities or other terms which correctly describe the USG operation here as supporting transit through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan along NGLOC. We further recommend no use of the word "hub" in connection with NGLOC through Uzbekistan as that term has other connotations with regard to policy in various parts of the USG. Subject to interagency concurrence in Washington, we envision DLA representatives, contracting and purchasing agents, and other mostly civilian DOD officials working here in Uzbekistan to facilitate commercial movement of goods along NGLOC through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Remaining Kagan Response Equipment -------------- ¶12. (U) Visitors with gifts will be more richly received. We highly recommend that your delegation deliver the remaining balance of EOD equipment bound for Kagan to Navoi. The equipment should be ready in mid-October 2008. It will not take a great amount of space on a C-130. Navoi International Airport is about one hour from Kagan. The GOU would truly appreciate it if this delegation were to arrive with the EOD aprons, remaining mine detection equipment and batteries. The possible addition of two ARCENT personnel for training for a five-day period will be coordinated separately between DAO Tashkent and ARCENT. Important Issues Connected with NGLOC Through Uzbekistan -------------- ¶13. a. (U) We should press for the complete return of the DEA as part of USG counter-narcotics assistance to the GOU in support of NGLOC. GOU pleas for assistance can only be viewed as half-hearted until the GOU fully accredits the USG's lead counter-narcotics agency. b. (U) We need a final determination from the GOU on USG personnel transiting the German Air-bridge through Termez to or from Afghanistan, preferably under the same conditions as other NATO partners. Currently, USG personnel transit is limited to a case-by-case basis. In May 2008, the German government formally asked for the United States' inclusion on the list of NATO partners with blanket transit rights through Termez. The GOU has not yet answered the German government's diplomatic note. The United States is the only NATO partner with restrictive transit rights through Termez. This current case-by-case arrangement is taxing on the US NATO mission, the German DAO, the German Luftwaffe and Embassy Tashkent. c. (U) We should discuss eventually arranging emergency divert procedures into Uzbekistan as part of Manas operations. This issue becomes critical in winter since the eastbound divert airfield for Manas is at Almaty. However, Almaty normally suffers the same weather conditions as Manas. In such an emergency, we would need contingencies for care of 200 plus armed soldiers. d. (U) We should discuss road transit of DOD goods to Manas Airbase in addition to road/rail transit to Afghanistan. Proposed Follow-On Visit by Commanding General, TRANSCOM -------------- - ¶14. (C) A follow-on visit by the Commanding General, TRANSCOM, General McNabb, is tentatively projected for 18 and 19 November 2008. Those proposed dates are optimal. The GOU will need time to digest the October 2008 NGLOC Senior-Level Fact-Finding discussions and report their impressions higher within the GOU. For those reasons, we do not recommend proposing a visit by the TRANSCOM Commander any earlier than 18 November 2008. However, we recommend that we avoid any CG visit after the first week in December. (C) If 18-19 November is too soon for the GOU, their officials will likely politely tell the USG, as they did NATO this past summer, that the GOU is "not ready." This was the truth and the GOU has since welcomed NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General Bob Simmons' NATO group and concluded their most recent negotiations on a draft NATO transit agreement. We recommend, however, that the decision on a follow-on visit by the TRANSCOM Commander remain situational dependent. (C) It would probably be best if RADM Harnitchek himself, after a final consultation with Ambassador Norland, discussed such a proposed visit by the TRANSCOM Commanding General directly with Secretary Atayev at their concluding meeting. If Atayev does not reply immediately, it would likely mean that he must confer first with President Karimov, to whom he has direct access. If we go forward with a follow-on visit by the Commander of TRANSCOM, we would recommend the addition of USG representatives who can provide concrete proposals for counter-narcotics cooperation and local purchase. General McNabb would most likely meet with President Karimov. We believe that the GOU Presidential Apparat's highest concerns at present are counter-narcotics and Uzbekistan's stagnant economy. Ability to discuss counter-narcotics and local purchase proposals will be very advantageous to the USG and our overall goals in the region. NORLAND