SCENE SETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 23-24 ARCENT COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001089 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR UZ SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 23-24 ARCENT COMMANDER LTG LOVELACE VISIT TO UZBEKISTAN Classified By: DAO Jeff Hartman for reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Tashkent welcomes your visit to Uzbekistan and thanks you and your command for the quick response to the consequences of the Kagan Ammunition Depot explosions of 10 July 2008. The delivery of equipment and the subsequent training were very timely for relations between the Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) and United States Government (USG),especially in light of the Russia-Georgia crisis that ignited just as the CENTCOM, ARCENT, NAVCENT response operation was getting underway. The mission supported two key GoU officials, former Minister of Defense Ruslan Mirzayaev and former Commander of the Southwest Military District General-Major Kobil Berdiyev. Both are pro-US -- Minister Mirzayaev, privately; General-Major Berdiyev is known to be pro-US even within the GoU. Both were promoted on 17 September 2008, Ruslan Mirzayaev to the Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council, and General Berdiyev to Minister of Defense. Due to the ARCENT assistance mission to Kagan, your Branch Chief for Central and South Asia, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Derber, has met both these senior-level officers and is known to both of them. You will be the first foreign military dignitary to meet with General-Major Berdiyev in his new capacity as Minister of Defense. This is a key time in GoU - USG relations as the United States begins to pursue possible logistic transit options through Uzbekistan and discuss other possible GoU assistance to USG efforts in Afghanistan. On-going concerns about human rights mean that we will have to approach expanded military cooperation cautiously. End summary. Recent Modest Progress in Bilateral Relations -------------- ¶2. (C) USG - GoU relations have improved in the past year to a level of civility and a promising atmosphere where we believe there can be real effective progress in a number of areas of mutual interest in the near future. Relations, especially in the military and security spheres have gained new energy due, in large part, to Russia,s recent actions in Georgia, Russian attempts to invigorate the CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization,s (CSTO) role in Central Asia, and the continued worrisome situation in Afghanistan. Problems remain, particularly on human rights, but across the Government of Uzbekistan, contacts with the Embassy have increased and improved. Ambassador Norland has met privately with President Karimov four times in the last year (once with Central Command's Admiral Fallon). President Karimov has stressed "positive relations" and stated that we are gradually moving beyond merely "restoring relations." The GoU,s Ministry of Defense was extremely welcoming to Acting Commander of CENTCOM, Lieutenant General Dempsey. Issues of common concern included Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in a more general sense against what GoU officials commonly recite as the evils of our times: terrorism, extremism, narcotics-trafficking, and proliferation of nuclear technology or material. Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Relations, Northern Ground Lines of Communication -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan has expressed serious concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to dramatic increases in drug production, increasing Taliban activity, and the threat to Uzbekistan. Most senior GoU security officials have experience in Afghanistan during the Soviet War. They also recall the dangers of having the Taliban on their southern frontier from 1997 to 2001. While senior Government of Uzbekistan officials have repeatedly indicated their lack of faith in President Karzai, and are pessimistic about the results of international efforts thus far, they are clearly interested in seeing improved stability there. Uzbekistan has indicated that achieving this depends on a multi-faceted strategy encompassing socioeconomic development of the country and agreement among major stakeholders. ¶4. (C) Currently, some sixty percent of aviation fuel necessary for Coalition operations in Afghanistan passes by rail through Uzbekistan. Ninety-nine percent of all of the fuel that Afghanistan's aviation forces use, and tons of bottled water for our troops in Afghanistan each month, also transit Uzbekistan's territory. Uzbekistan is a vital and relatively secure logistical pipeline in support of operations in Afghanistan now and offers the potential of becoming even more important in the near term given its favorable geographic position and transportation infrastructure and given continued instability in Pakistan. The Government of Uzbekistan continues to invest considerable resources into improving and expanding its railroad infrastructure, and the state joint stock company Uzbekistan Railroad has upgraded many of its Soviet-inherited rail facilities and built new lines between Nukus and Navoi and between Karshi and Termez. Uzbekistan Railroad's lines terminate in Hayraton, Afghanistan in the northern Balkh Province, which provides easy and safe access to Bagram Airbase and other U.S./NATO operating points in eastern Afghanistan. ¶5. (SBU) On 29 January 2008, the Government of Uzbekistan approved the use of the Uzbek-German Termez Airbase as a transit point into Afghanistan for U.S. personnel assigned to NATO and/or International Security Assistance Force missions. Uzbekistan previously indicated that it is willing to expand the currently limited "case by case" permission granted in this initial agreement to a blanket one, like the one the Germans exercise now, and are considering a diplomatic note, already sent by the German government, to formalize the agreement. This effort is pending. This expansion of the current "Termez Bridge" agreement promises a much-needed alternate route for moving U.S. personnel supporting operations in Afghanistan. ¶6. (C) We are exploring ways to follow the German Government's and NATO's model and improve upon their transit agreements in order to transport critical non-lethal goods across Uzbekistan in support of operations in Afghanistan. The transit agreement, if one is concluded, which would provide an important alternate logistical route into Afghanistan. Recent transit problems with numerous contractor-controlled DOD shipments becoming stuck due to declaration issues with the State Customs Committee underscore the need for some form of codified bilateral understanding. ¶7. (C) Representatives from TRANSCOM and CENTCOM are proposing a senior-level fact-finding trip to Uzbekistan for three days around 20 October 2008. The proposed delegation would be led by Vice-Admiral Harnitchek, the Deputy Commander of TRANSCOM. The goal of the proposed visit would be to see selected transportation infrastructure and meet with key GoU officials in order to investigate the logistical, political and diplomatic challenges and make recommendations to the USG for potential transit of DoD cargo to Afghanistan as part of new Northern Lines of Communication (NGLOC). At this time, TRANSCOM and CENTCOM are emphasizing the possible transit of containerized building materials and food. We want to stress this initiative as a commercial and civilian operation. Any requirement for U.S. military personnel on the ground would require approval from senior policy levels in Washington D.C. ¶8. (C) In order to stimulate GoU interest in a new potential NGLOC, we recommend that this proposed delegation research local purchase from US companies manufacturing in Uzbekistan as well as production or services by other Uzbek-owned enterprises. This would help energize the stagnant Uzbek economy, create jobs and reinforce US influence. We also encourage proposals for USG counter-narcotics assistance to Uzbekistan as a means to compensate the GoU, help them expedite US DoD cargo movement through counter-narcotics inspections, and help the GoU combat overall narcotics smuggling emanating from Afghanistan (or transiting Tajikistan into Uzbekistan, if not coming directly across the Amudaryo). ¶9. (C) If the senior-level fact-finding trip to Uzbekistan led by Vice-Admiral Harnitchek is successful, we anticipate that General McNabb, the new TRANSCOM Commander will visit in mid-November 2008. Foreign Policy -------------- ¶10. (C) While Uzbekistan belongs to a variety of regional security organizations including the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),Uzbekistan's often half-hearted military participation in these organizations has actually decreased in the last month most likely due to the GoU,s displeasure with Russia,s military and diplomatic heavy-handedness toward Georgia, especially their unilateral partition of Georgia. In changes to plans in mid-August 2008, the former Minister of Defense Ruslan Mirzayaev skipped the late August 2008 summit in Dushanbe attended by SCO presidents, including President Karimov and Prime Minister Putin. Instead, Defense Minister Mirzayaev remained in Tashkent and, under robust coverage by the state-run media, hosted General Dempsey. Earlier that same week, the MoD sent the Chief of the MoD,s Department of International Cooperation, Colonel Rustamov, to a CSTO minister of defense summit in Yerevan. This was a step down even from Deputy Defense Minister Niyazov who was originally programmed to represent Uzbekistan. More interesting, Colonel Rustamov attended meetings at the CSTO summit in civilian clothes. Such signals about who represents the nation at various meetings and how are only decided at the highest level. Kagan Disaster, CENTCOM/ARCENT Assistance Efforts -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) The series of explosions that rocked the Kagan Ammunition Depot--which stored nearly 190,000,000 rounds of ammunition--occurred near Bukhara on July 10, 2008. President Karimov and other GoU senior officials have repeatedly conveyed appreciation to the Ambassador for the offer of USG assistance. MOD leaders have asserted that they need help dealing with the remaining 70-80 percent of the depot's unexploded munitions including projectiles tossed into surrounding canals. MoD has established a joint 300-man "Independent Sapper Battalion" from MoD and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. MoD projects that the site will require a clean-up effort lasting at least one year. CENTCOM, your headquarters and NAVCENT facilitated the delivery of over 150 land-based metal detectors and 26 underwater-capable detectors. A 5-man Military Training Team went to Kagan and helped train Uzbek sappers in detection techniques in late August 2008. The balance of 24 detectors and 20 EOD suits are expected to arrive in late October 2008. Your ARCENT staff engineers have recommended that the two EOD-related training events in FY09 concentrate solely on MoD,s Independent Sapper Battalion. Interestingly, the Kagan Depot disaster highlights the importance of such military-to-military events. A key reason for the success of this mission was the already strong relationship between your deputy ARCENT engineer, LTC Bolos, and MoD,s lead engineer, Lt.Col. Komilov based on the experiences in FY08 at Samarkand and Fort Irwin. Counter-narcotics and other Security Cooperation -------------- -- ¶12. (C) In Fall 2007, Uzbek officials began to hint that they would welcome the resumption of cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),which suspended its activities early in 2007 due to limited effectiveness in working with the host government. DEA officials traveled to Tashkent in April 2008 and had productive meetings with officials from several partner agencies. Following up on the positive signals, the Embassy submitted a diplomatic note formally proposing the reestablishment of a DEA office. Disappointingly, the response from the Government of Uzbekistan rejected the proposal; MFA officials, however, explained that up to three DEA special agents would be authorized to augment the Embassy staff, but only as "U.S. Diplomats" assigned to the Embassy Political Section. DEA is negotiating a more acceptable proposal, but the episode reflects ongoing concern within the GoU that U.S. "agents" might be trying to undermine the leadership of President Karimov. We ask that you follow up on the possibility of DEA returning during your meetings with the Government of Uzbekistan. Human Rights: Keeping Uzbekistan on Track -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Human rights issues continue to be the real thorn in our relations. Uzbekistan has taken several positive steps in the past year, including allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to restart prison visits; adopting new anti-human trafficking legislation which increases protections for victims; adopting two International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on child labor; abolishing the death penalty; increasing the independence of the judiciary by implementing a new "habeas corpus" law; and releasing several political prisoners. In addition, though repressive measures against suspected Muslim extremists continue, they seem to have abated somewhat. The Government of Uzbekistan appears to have recognized a need to encourage the growth of moderate Islam, and the result has been a predictable drop in the appeal of radical alternatives. ¶14. (SBU) The restart of ICRC prison visits was an especially important step forward, as a majority of the country's human rights abuses occur behind prison walls. Several human rights activists have since reported improving conditions at several prisons across the country. We believe that Admiral Fallon, who visited the ICRC while visiting Tashkent in February, was instrumental in convincing Uzbekistan to come to terms with the ICRC on restarting prison visits in March for an initial six-month trial period. ¶15. (SBU) Lately, however, Uzbekistan is threatening to backslide on human rights again, potentially complicating other aspects of the relationship as well. For example, in the past few months, Uzbekistan has run documentaries on state-television attacking Radio Free Europe reporters and religious minorities; imprisoned three Jehovah's Witnesses; and detained a prominent journalist and activist in Karakalpakstan. We also have seen a recent increase in harassment of activists and religious minorities in several regions of the country. ¶16. (SBU) Uzbekistan still seems to believe that it can isolate discussion of human rights from other areas of the relationship. Progress on security and other types of cooperation must go hand-in-hand with progress on human rights. Lieutenant General Dempsey did meet with the ICRC and did discuss human rights issues with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At this time, on this visit, with a new minister of defense, we do not propose that you discuss human rights unless GoU officials broach the topic, especially since General Dempsey,s visit was less than a month ago. Economy Strong, but Little Trickle-Down -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Uzbekistan's macroeconomic performance continues to be strong. According to official GOU figures, in 2007 the economy grew 9.5 percent, and the country had a large current account surplus corresponding to 19 percent of GDP. The balance of payments continued to be strong with a surplus of USD 7.5 billion. The official debt ratio is now 17-18 percent of GDP and is likely to fall below 15 percent in the next few years. Uzbekistan practices a policy of "import substitution" that helps to insulate it from international financial markets. ¶18. (SBU) In 2008, the Government of Uzbekistan hopes to maintain an eight percent growth rate, largely from exports and industrial production. Although assessing the Uzbekistani economy as strong, the International Monetary Fund believes Uzbekistan's predictions for economic growth in 2008 to be overly optimistic. ¶19. (SBU) The benefits of Uzbekistan's strong macroeconomic performance are slow to be seen in the lives of Uzbekistani citizens. Although gross national income per capita is growing, the official consumer price index of 6.5 percent contrasts with World Bank estimates that show the cost of living rising by 20 percent and more annually. Ranking among the five most corrupt countries in the world, Uzbekistan has a shadow economy that accounts for 20 percent of GDP by official estimates and by up to 45-50 percent of GDP in independent assessments. According to the World Bank, over a quarter of the population lives below the poverty line and is able to spend less than USD 1.1 per day. Nevertheless--largely due to underemployment--unemployment is a low 0.75 percent according to government figures and eight percent according to the International Labor Organization. As much as 9-18 percent of Uzbekistan's GDP comes in the form of remittances from workers who have migrated abroad, largely to Kazakhstan and Russia. ¶20. (SBU) Enhancing financial intermediation and confidence in the banking system, as well as improving the business climate--including through the liberalization of trade and payments--are crucial if Uzbekistan is to achieve the government's ambitious growth objectives and create much-needed jobs for this young population. Greater legal predictability is needed. Foreign investors have complained that Uzbekistani courts do not always honor contractual arbitration agreements. At the same time, the General Motors-UzAvtoprom joint venture is off to a good start, and GM is now considering a substantial expansion of its operations in Uzbekistan. As mentioned above, one of the main incentives that the mbassy promotes for NGLOC is the possibility of local purchase of goods produced and services rendered in Uzbekistan. Coca-Cola (bottled water, sodas and juices),Texaco (lubricants),Proctor & Gamble and GM are among the US companies manufacturing in Uzbekistan. ARCENT-hosted Land Forces Symposium -------------- ¶21. (C) MoD has the received the invitation and is considering it. This was discussed with the DAO on Thursday, 18 September 2008. In accordance with the GoU,s system, the invitation will need to be elevated above MoD for approval and then permission for the MoD- selected officer. Our expectation is that the GoU will send the highest-ranking available officer available depending on the competing demands of the GoU and MoD at that time. Action Summary -------------- ¶22. (C) We recommend that you raise the following issues during your meetings with GOU officials: (1) A proposed senior-level fact-finding trip to Uzbekistan by representatives from TRANSCOM and CENTCOM, led by Vice-Admiral Harnitchek, the Deputy Commander of TRANSCOM. The proposed three-day visit is requested between 20 and 24 October 2008. (2) At the MoD - CENTCOM Consultative Staff Talks (CSTs) in August 2008, MoD was told that CENTCOM needs letters of request (LoRs) from MoD regarding hospital supplies, patrol boat spare parts and training, and upgrades for the MoD Special Center for Modeling and Simulation. These LoRs are needed by 30 September 2008 in order for Uzbekistan to forfeit unspent FMF. (3) Additional EOD-related training events to complement the 2008 CENTCOM Uzbekistan Security Assistance Plan. (4) Establishment of a vigorous bilateral military intelligence exchange program focusing on Afghanistan. (5) The possibility of DEA returning to Uzbekistan officially as the DEA, and other joint counter-narcotics cooperation. (6) Possible counter-narcotics riverine patrol boat training in November 2008. This training can only take place with submission of the required LoRs mentioned above. (7) Verbal invitation for a senior MoD officer to attend the Land Forces Symposium. MoD has the original invitation and is considering it. NORLAND