FMF FUNDING FOR ESTONIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000022

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL EN
SUBJECT: FMF FUNDING FOR ESTONIA

REF: A. 06 TALLINN 768

B. 07 TALLINN 693

C. 07 TALLINN 802

Classified By: Classified By: CDA Karen Decker for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d
).


1. (C) Post understands the Department may cut the FY08
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocation for Estonia by
as much as 90 percent. While we understand that FMF
funding must be prioritized for developing countries and
not for full NATO members, a cut of this magnitude in a
single year will have political -- not just operational --
consequences here. It is our assessment that such a
drastic change in our assistance posture will negatively
impact both Estonia's operational capacity and its
political will to continue participating in critical
international military operations.


2. (C) Nearly eight percent of Estonia's Armed Forces are
deployed abroad without caveats in operations that we asked
them to support, including Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
and NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. In
addition, Estonian ships frequently support NATO naval
operations. The Estonian Defense Forces have effectively
used FMF both to enhance current operational capabilities
and to help transform EDF from a post-Soviet military to
one which meets international standards and Estonia's NATO
commitments (Ref A). Recent FMF financing has been used to
purchase critical hardware upgrades. For example, Estonian
troops supporting U.S. Forces in Camp Taji outside Baghdad
use night visions goggles EDF purchased with FMF funds in

2006. Additionally, FMF-financed communications equipment
is used by Estonian units deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
either directly in theater or while training for
deployment. Looking ahead, the Ministry of Defense plans
to use FMF funds over the next three years to support its
efforts to modernize Estonia's only operational airbase
(Amari),which would put it in a better position to support
NATO operations, including air policing.


3. (C) Such a large cut, coming without warning, and as a
fait accompli without the chance of at least a discussion
between trusted Allies, will be interpreted by Estonians as
a sign that the United States does not value Estonia's
contributions to international operations. This damage to
our bilateral relationship will impede our ability to
influence GOE decisions on procurement and force
modernization. It will also affect future GOE decisions
about foreign operations, particularly Iraq. While the
Prime Minister's support for Iraq is steadfast, there are
cracks in his coalition on this issue and significant
popular opposition. Parliament's December vote to extend
Estonia's mandate in Iraq passed by only 2 votes. Several
MPs from the government coalition voted against and
others abstained (Ref C). In October, for the first time,
Defense Minister Aaviksoo expressed doubt that Estonia will
stay in Iraq beyond 2008 (Ref B). Policy-makers
uncertainty about U.S. support for Estonia could become the
decisive factor when the GOE considers whether to remain in
Iraq in 2009.


4. (C) COMMENT: A decision to all-but-eliminate military
assistance to Estonia will not paralyze the MOD or
immediately prevent Estonia from participating in
international operations. We understand that global,
urgent priorities force us to make difficult choices. It
remains in the U.S. national interest, however, to have
international support -- in the form of foreign troops --
supporting us around the world. It seems we can best keep
these nations onside by giving a little something back to
them for the sacrifices they make -- in the form of respect
for their service and assistance that continues to motivate
them to strive to meet our standards. Cutting off the flow
all at once does neither. END COMMENT.
DECKER