TAIWAN CROSS-STRAIT EXPERTS EXPECT CONTINUED FOCUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000969 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON CH TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN CROSS-STRAIT EXPERTS EXPECT CONTINUED FOCUS ON ECONOMIC LINKS, SLOW MOVEMENT ON POLITICAL ISSUES REF: TAIPEI 00831 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou,s inauguration and new cross-Strait agreements on weekend charter flights and Chinese tourism have raised expectations here of a cross-Strait thaw that will bring Taiwan substantial economic and political benefits. Several Taiwan cross-Strait experts tell AIT they are optimistic about continued economic cooperation, but less sanguine about how much Taiwan's economy will benefit. They believe Beijing is showing greater flexibility in its economic engagement with Taipei, but downplay the possibility of major breakthroughs on politically sensitive issues, such as increased international space for Taiwan. End Summary. Momentum Likely to Continue Amid Concerns -------------- ¶2. (C) National Chengchi University Institute of International Relations Professor Yen Chen-shen told AIT recently that the Ma administration is widely credited with having stabilized the cross-Strait relationship after several years of turbulence under President Chen Shui-bian. Following the start of cross-Strait weekend charter flights on July 4, both Taipei and Beijing will be eager to show continued progress on issues of mutual interest, Yen suggested. This should facilitate early movement on some other economic-related measures, such as direct sea transportation links and air cargo charter flights. For his part, Ma is under pressure to deliver on his campaign promise to boost Taiwan's economy by enhancing cross-Strait economic ties. Hence, Yen predicted, both sides but especially Taiwan will stay focused on economics in the coming months and avoid delving too deeply into political issues that could stall talks. ¶3. (C) Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies Vice President Chao Chien-min told AIT he expects the current positive momentum in cross-Strait relations to continue for one to two years as both sides work to build goodwill and show progress in the relationship. Public expectations are high that Taiwan will benefit from increased economic opportunities as a result of cross-Strait progress, but the extent of the economic boost remains unclear. At a minimum, however, reduced tensions across the Strait will help raise domestic and international confidence in Taiwan's economy and perhaps boost foreign investment. Despite the potential benefits of closer economic ties, Chao noted that many on Taiwan remain concerned that further economic integration with the mainland may give Beijing leverage to push in the future for unification on terms unfavorable to Taiwan. ¶4. (C) Professor Ou-yang Hsin-yi of the Graduate School of Mainland China Studies at Chinese Cultural University told AIT he sees the current pace and scope of development of cross-Strait economic exchanges continuing in the coming year. A major reason for optimism, Ou-yang noted, is that the Ma administration's "one-China" orientation allows Taipei to put sensitive sovereignty questions on the back burner. The economic benefits from direct charter flights and more Chinese tourists, however, may help Taiwan's economy only marginally since most of the benefits of closer economic ties have already been realized as a result of two decades of opening. Further opening will not necessarily result in a quick fix for Taiwan's economy, Ou-yang emphasized, because many current problems stem from long-term structural challenges posed by globalization and the rise of China as a manufacturing powerhouse. Beijing Showing Skill, Flexibility -------------- ¶5. (C) Professor Chao observed that President Hu Jintao has proven more skillful and confident than his predecessor (Jiang Zemin) in handling cross-Strait relations. Hu has shown flexibility by acknowledging the "1992 Consensus" as a basis for resuming cross-Strait talks without explicitly TAIPEI 00000969 002 OF 003 mentioning the one-China principle. Raising the latter would amount to a public repudiation of Ma's assertion that the consensus means "one China, different interpretations," opening Ma to attacks by domestic critics for appeasing Beijing. The electoral defeat of the pro-independence DPP appears to have given Hu some leeway to take a more flexible approach, but his hand may be constrained by hardliners who want him to take a tougher line with Taiwan, Chao added. ¶6. (C) Beijing's long-term strategy remains focused on working with the KMT, now the ruling party, in a way that advances cross-Strait exchanges and minimizes prospects for the DPP to return to power in the future. Chao said that means the CCP will work with the KMT to build trust between both sides and reduce the Taiwan public's suspicions of China. The Chinese leadership is capable of crafting such an approach, having developed a more sophisticated understanding of Taiwan democratic politics over the past decade. China's current leaders, Chao emphasized, are unlikely to repeat the costly errors of past moves that backfired and allowed pro-independence advocates on Taiwan to point to evidence of Chinese hostility. How Far Will China Go? -------------- ¶7. (C) According to Professor Yen, the cross-Strait ball is now in Beijing's court. KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and SEF Chairman P.K. Chiang both raised the issue of Taiwan's international space in meetings with Hu Jintao, and Hu's preliminary response seemed relatively positive. The Ma administration hopes Beijing can prove flexible in discussing ways to provide increased participation for Taiwan in the international arena. Key events to watch include Taiwan's annual UN campaign in September, the level of Taipei's participation in APEC, and Taiwan's bid for World HEALTH Assembly observer status next year. Yen predicted that the Ma administration will take a low-key approach on the UN bid this year in hopes of creating room for Beijing to show greater flexibility on other international organizations. Foreign Minister Ou told Director Young Taiwan's biggest focus is on paving the way for the island's participation in the World HEALTH Assembly, which meets in Geneva each spring. ¶8. (C) Nevertheless, Yen predicted that Chinese political inertia and competing bureaucratic interests will limit progress on the issues of greater international space for Taiwan and calling a truce in the battle for diplomatic recognition by small states. For example, rivalry between the Taiwan Affairs Office, relatively soft on Taiwan, and the Foreign Ministry, on the frontline of Beijing's efforts to restrict Taiwan's international activities, could impede progress on expanding Taiwan's international space. Moreover, Beijing would be hard pressed to turn away countries if they decide on their own accord to switch recognition in from Taiwan to China. ¶9. (C) Professor Chao stressed that the international space issue is very sensitive for the Chinese leadership because it touches on sovereignty. In his view, the most Beijing will be willing to concede to Taipei is some form of participation in WHO technical meetings, perhaps WHA observership, greater participation in regional economic forums, and a reduction of efforts to woo away Taipei's remaining diplomatic allies. Beijing will be reluctant to go farther, argued Chao, because of concerns that concessions could be used to advance the Taiwan independence cause should the DPP return to power in ¶2012. ¶10. (C) Many people on both sides of the Strait are "overly optimistic" about prospects for progress on politically sensitive issues, Chao suggested. The room for agreement remains small because sovereignty lies at the heart of the international space question. Nevertheless, Chao expects the Ma administration to continue raising international space on the sidelines of future talks to counter criticism that it is neglecting Taiwan's political interests for the sake of economic benefit. Chao added that the DPP's electoral defeat has reduced cross-Strait tension and therefore also the need TAIPEI 00000969 003 OF 003 for a cross-Strait peace agreement. Chao suggested that military-related confidence building measures would be needed to further reduce tensions and build trust before a peace agreement could be considered. YOUNG