Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TAIPEI864
2008-06-19 06:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

NSC CHAIRMAN SU CHI: PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU'S TOP

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR CH TW 
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000864 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: NSC CHAIRMAN SU CHI: PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU'S TOP
CROSS-STRAIT AND FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR

REF: A. 07 TAIPEI 2607

B. 05 TAIPEI 3284

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000864

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: NSC CHAIRMAN SU CHI: PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU'S TOP
CROSS-STRAIT AND FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR

REF: A. 07 TAIPEI 2607

B. 05 TAIPEI 3284

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: NSC Secretary-General Su Chi is a longtime
friend and advisor to President Ma Ying-jeou, having served
most recently as a speechwriter and deputy campaign manager
for Ma. NSC colleagues predict Su's NSC will play an
advisory role, and will not oversee or manage cross-Strait,
foreign, or defense policy. A former chairman of the
Mainland Affairs Council (1999-2000),Su is well-known for
having coined the term "1992 Consensus" when the DPP came
into power in 2000 in an effort to facilitate cross-Strait
dialogue. At times controversial, Su Chi as a legislator led
politically motivated efforts by the KMT to block missile
defense upgrades for several years, and he also made
unsubstantiated claims that President Chen Shui-bian had
ordered the development of nuclear weapons. Despite
extensive experience in government, Su seems at heart more an
academic than an official. He is one of the KMT's top
experts on foreign policy, including the U.S., and on
cross-Strait relations. End Summary.


2. (SBU) President Ma Ying-jeou's appointment of Su Chi to
head the National Security Council came as no surprise since
Su has long been Ma's chief advisor on foreign policy and
cross-Strait issues. Su has regularly accompanied Ma on his
international trips, written key policy papers, and served as
deputy manager for Ma's presidential campaign. Su Chi also
serves as one of Ma's principal intermediaries with AIT, and
he often accompanies Ma in meetings with Americans. Prior to
his new assignment, Su was a KMT at-large legislator from
2004-2008, playing a leading role in the Legislative Yuan's
(LY) Defense Committee. Previously, Su Chi was Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman from 1999-2000.


3. (SBU) Prior to becoming well acquainted with Su Chi, Ma
Ying-jeou had already developed a friendship with Su's
younger brother Su Yeong-chin while in high school in Taipei.
The two went on to study law together at National Taiwan
University and Su Yeong-chin, now chairman of the National

Communications Commission (NCC),has been a close advisor to
Ma on constitutional issues. Su Chi, who studied
international relations, developed a rapport with Ma when
both, while studying in the U.S., became involved in the
1970's Diaoyutai student movement (disputing Japan's claim to
the Diaoyutai or Senkaku Islands). Ma and Su Chi were also
members of the "Anti-Communist Patriotic Alliance," a student
group opposed to the mainland communist government, whose
ranks included individuals from high-ranking KMT families.
Once these students returned to Taiwan, a number became the
core of the KMT's next generation of leaders and officials.

NSC As Thinktank, Not Policymaker
--------------


4. (C) NSC Deputy-Secretary General Kao Chang told AIT
recently that the NSC under Su Chi will function strictly as
an advisory council on cross-Strait, foreign, and defense
policy, and will not serve as a policy coordination office.
Kao stressed that he and fellow NSC Deputy Secretary-General
Ho Sze-yin and NSC Counselor Chen De-sheng are all academics
with little or no policy-making experience. The NSC will
research pressing and long-term policy questions and provide
President Ma with recommendations, said Kao, and will not
oversee or coordinate policy decisions and their
implementation by the Foreign or Defense ministries or the
Mainland Affairs Council. Other NSC leaders, including Ho
Sze-yin and Senior Advisor Mignonne Chan, however, have told
AIT that the NSC will seek to coordinate among Taiwan
government agencies, but more on the order of mediating
differences than orchestrating policy.

Optimistic About Cross-Strait, U.S.-Taiwan Relations
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Prior to the presidential election, Su Chi told acting

TAIPEI 00000864 002 OF 003


EAP/TC Desk Director Doug Spelman in December 2007 that the
KMT experience with China during the late-80's to early-90's
suggested that Beijing would be more tolerant of U.S.-Taiwan
arms sales with a KMT administration in place (ref a).
During that period, Su explained, Taiwan purchased some 150
F-16's and several Knox-class frigates from the U.S., as well
as Mirage fighters and Lafayette frigates from France. It
was during this period, he pointed out, that Taiwan and PRC
counterparts held 16 public and 27 secret rounds of talks,
culminating in what is now known as the "1992 consensus."


6. (C) During the same period, Taiwan also managed to enhance
its participation in international organizations and to
increase the number of its diplomatic allies, Su told
Spelman. According to Su, Beijing was willing to tolerate
Taiwan's efforts to enlarge its diplomatic and international
circles and to improve its defensive capability so long as
Taipei and Beijing were talking to each other, and Taiwan did
not push for independence. China is much stronger and more
confident today than it was 15 years ago, Su acknowledged,
though it is preoccupied with its own problems of internal
unrest resulting from growing economic disparities. The PRC
leadership, thus, would welcome a chance to put aside the
"Taiwan problem" for the time being, Su argued. For its
part, a KMT government would drop the push for independence,
and seek a "modus vivendi" with China. In exchange for
taking independence off the table, Su argued, a KMT
government could demand, and China would be willing to allow
increased international space for Taiwan.

Sometimes Controversial
--------------


7. (C) Su has been controversial on occasion. A book
published in 2005 asserted that Su Chi coined the term "92
consensus" in April 2000, just after DPP President Chen
Shui-bian's victory, in an effort to break the impasse over
one China and give the two sides "room for detente." In
February 2006, Su Chi acknowledged that this information was
accurate. In explaining why he had invented the term "92
consensus," Su said he wanted to repackage the negotiating
position of "one China, separate interpretations" that Taiwan
adopted in 1992 in a way that would facilitate dialogue
between the two sides, which the PRC had suspended after
President Lee Teng-hui announced his "two-state theory" in

1999. Although the DPP subsequently rejected the "92
consensus," the new KMT government and the PRC both now
accept the "92 consensus" as a basis for the resumption of
cross-Strait dialogue beginning June 11.


8. (C) Su Chi also devised the KMT canard that the failure of
President Chen's "missile defense referendum" in 2004
constituted a legal obstacle to the purchase of Patriot-2
missile upgrades and new Patriot-3 batteries until the
three-year "ban" expired in March 2007 (ref b). The KMT used
Su's argument to justify withholding KMT legislative caucus
support for new missile systems and upgrades until December
2007, raising concerns at the time about the KMT's commitment
to strengthening Taiwan's defenses. Subsequently, Su and the
KMT have taken a more positive attitude toward defense
modernization.


9. (C) In October 2007, Su made the quite startling claim in
the LY that President Chen Shui-bian had secretly ordered the
Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology to develop
nuclear weapons. Su further claimed that Chen was developing
nuclear weapons and offensive missiles to stir up tensions
with China and with the U.S. for political purposes,
including blackmailing the U.S. into granting him political
asylum. Su asserted his information came (indirectly) from a
high-ranking DPP legislator. Su's unsubstantiated and
implausible claims raised some questions at the time about
his credibility.

Personal Information
--------------


10. (SBU) Su Chi is married to former Chinese Television
System (CTS) news anchor Grace Yueh-ching Chen. Although,

TAIPEI 00000864 003 OF 003


Chen has herself harbored political ambitions in the past,
she has so far stayed out of the fray due to a series of life
circumstances including the birth of her two children and the
illness of her husband. At 42 years old, Su Chi was
diagnosed with liver cancer. Following a successful
operation to remove an eight-centimeter tumor, Su relied on
his wife to help him through his convalescence. Chen has
recently written a best-selling book on healthy living based
on her experience.


11. (SBU) Su reports he has adopted a more health conscious
lifestyle since his operation, giving up alcohol and smoking
while getting sufficient rest and going for regular physical
checkups. He also says his new lease on life has instilled
in him a new outlook that focuses less on acquiring
recognition and more on acting according to his conscience,
regardless of how others may react. Su has repeatedly stated
in interviews that he will exit the political stage if his
cancer relapses.


12. (C) In mid-2007, Su informed AIT that he would not seek
re-election to the Legislative Yuan, and would instead focus
his energies on Ma Ying-jeou's presidential campaign. Su
confided that he did not enjoy the rough-and-tumble politics
of the LY. If Ma did not win the presidency, Su, a former
professor, said he would gladly return to academia.

Appendix: Curriculum Vitae
--------------


13. (U) Present Position: Secretary General, National
Security Council, May 2008-present.


14. (U) Previous Positions: KMT at-large legislator,
2004-2008; Concurrent Professor, Mainland Research Institute,
Tamkang University, 2000-2008; Convener, National Security
Division, KMT National Policy Foundation, Taipei, May
2000-2004; Council Member, National Unification Council,
Presidential Office, March 1999-2000; Chairman, Mainland
Affairs Council, Executive Yuan (EY),January 1999-2000;
Research Fellow, National Unification Council, Presidential
Office, 1997-1999; Deputy Secretary General, Presidential
Office, 1997-1999; Minister without Portfolio, May-October
1997; Director-General, Government Information Office,
1996-1997; Vice Chairman, Mainland Affairs Council, EY,
1993-1996; Member, Research, Development and Evaluation
Commission, EY, 1993-1994; Deputy Director, Mainland
Operation Department, KMT Central Committee, 1992-1993;
Deputy Director, Institute of International Relations (IIR),
National Chengchi University (NCCU),1990-1993; Secretary
General, Taiwan Chinese Political Science Association, 1991;
Associate Professor (1984-1989)& Professor (1990-1993),NCCU;
Associate Research Fellow, IIR, NCCU, 1984-1989.


15. (U) Political Affiliation: Member, KMT Central Advisory
Committee, 1997-present.


16. (U) Education: Ph.D., Political Science, Columbia
University, 1984; M.A., Political Science, Columbia
University, 1980; M.A., International relations, Johns
Hopkins University, 1975; B.A., Diplomacy, National Chengchi
University, 1971.


17. (U) DPOB: October 1, 1949, Taichung, Taiwan. Family:
married to Grace Yueh-ching Chen; one daughter (14) and one
son (11),both living in Taiwan. Language Proficiencies:
English, highly proficient (S-4).
YOUNG