SFRC SENIOR STAFF MEMBER JANNUZI DISCUSSES TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000787

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: SFRC SENIOR STAFF MEMBER JANNUZI DISCUSSES TAIWAN
POLITICS AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS WITH DPP PARTY OFFICIALS


Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Two senior DPP party officials told SFRC
senior staff member Frank Jannuzi on June 2 that Tsai
Ing-wen's election as DPP chairperson would help the party
get back on its feet following a series of defeats at the
polls. Bikhim Hsiao cited internal divisions and perceived
loss of idealism as problems that hurt the former ruling
party. Hsiao and Lin Chen-wei (new International Affairs
Director for the DPP) expressed concerns that the KMT
administration is yielding too much to Beijing in its effort
to produce quick progress in cross-Strait relations. They
also expressed skepticism that Beijing would yeld ground on
the issue of Taiwan's quest for "international space."
Acknowledging Jannuzi's point that the KMT's embrace of
Taiwan identity has reduced its effectiveness to the DPP as a
campaign issue, Hsiao explained that the party has debated
this issue internally. Some advocate a more open and
inclusive Taiwan identity, while others, arguing that the KMT
embrace of the concept was merely a sham election ploy,
believe the DPP should stick to the original anti-China,
anti-KMT version of Taiwan identity. End Summary.

DPP Working to Get Back on Its Feet
--------------


2. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee senior staff
member Frank Jannuzi discussed Taiwan politics with Lin
Chen-wei, DPP International Affairs Director, and Bikhim
Hsiao, special assistant to party Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen,
in a meeting at DPP headquarters on June 2. Jannuzi
suggested that the DPP's recent election defeats, though
painful, would provide the party an opportunity to refine its
message and articulate its vision. Hsiao noted that the
DPP's primaries last year had been very divisive, and the
divisions within the party had continued through the
elections earlier this year. Moreover, Hsiao explained, DPP
supporters had lost faith in the party, which had compromised
its ideals while in power. Following the election defeats,
the DPP is now trying to get back on its feet. Former Vice
Premier Tsai Ing-wen's election as chairperson will be very
good for the DPP, Hsiao maintained, adding that Tsai has a
strong team in place to support her at party headquarters.

Cross-Strait Relations
--------------


3. (C) Jannuzi asked whether the public might have too high
expectations about the improvement of cross-Strait relations
under President Ma Ying-jeou. Hsiao responded that many in
Taiwan are skeptical about the seeming warming of
cross-Strait relations. KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung said he
"felt" CHINA would not launch missiles against Taiwan.
Despite such feelings of detente, also fostered by Chinese
gratitude for Taiwan's earthquake assistance, there are still
underlying uncertainties in the relationship as well as
concerns that CHINA will not deliver on its promises.


4. (C) Hsiao voiced reservations about President Ma's use of
the term "Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu)" in his May 20
inaugural address, a term which, in her opinion, the KMT had
inaccurately translated into English as "common Chinese
heritage." According to Hsiao, Beijing is very grateful to
Ma for using "Chinese nation," which has now become popular
in China. For Beijing, Lin observed, "Chinese nation"
applies to all inhabitants within its territory, including
minorities. However, there is no consensus about this term
within Taiwan. For example, the DPP objects to the concept,
and "Chinese nation" clearly does not include Taiwan's
indigenous peoples. Ma's use of "Chinese nation" will
gradually become an issue in Taiwan, producing resistance to
the term, Lin predicted. Jannuzi pointed out that Ma had
used the word "minzu," which means "nation" in the sense of
"nationality," which is different than the Chinese word for
state (guojia).


5. (C) Lin noted that the Ma administration's early and
quick movement on initiatives with CHINA had taken place

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under the auspices of the party rather than the government.
After the recent meeting between KMT and CCP party leaders,
some cross-Strait issues were suddenly resolved, but where
was the Taiwan government in this process, Lin asked. How
can KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, who does not have a popular
mandate, represent the people of Taiwan? Lin also pointed
out that the Ma administration has left cargo charter flights
out of the package of three agreements the DPP administration
had been negotiating with China. Cargo charter flights are
important to Taiwan, Lin said; the KMT government is yielding
too much by moving only on passenger charter flights and
bringing PRC tourists to Taiwan.

International Space and Cross-Strait Relations
-------------- -


6. (C) Jannuzi suggested that the real test for Ma's
cross-Strait policies will be whether Beijing is willing to
make concessions on Taiwan's international space, including
agreeing to a "truce" in the battle to poach diplomatic
allies and dropping objections to Taiwan's participation in
international organizations such as WHO. Hsiao said she was
"rather skeptical" that Ma would succeed in his efforts to
expand Taiwan's "international space." The DPP is giving Ma
some room by not being overly critical. This allows Ma to
make compromises, for example, on nomenclature, but he will
be hurt politically if Beijing does not respond well. Ma has
said he will use "Chinese Taipei" in international settings,
but CHINA will be enjoying a free concession if it does not
choose to reciprocate his gesture by easing its pressure on
Taiwan's international space. One day after the KMT victory
in the January legislative elections, Hsiao recalled, Malawi
switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. This
Chinese "response" to the KMT victory sent a very negative
message to the people of Taiwan.


7. (C) Lin was "very pessimistic" that Beijing would be
willing to give more international space to Taiwan. Compared
to the DPP, Lin argued, the KMT has been giving away more in
return for less in its dealings with Beijing. For example,
the KMT has progressively shifted Taiwan's status from "one
China one Taiwan" to "one China, different interpretations,"
and now simply to the "92 consensus" (i.e., with no
indication that the "92 consensus" means "one China,
different interpretations").


8. (C) During the election campaign, Lin noted, the KMT
supported the idea of self-determination for Taiwan, a
long-standing DPP plank and a concept that enjoys strong
public support. Since the campaign, however, Ma and the KMT
have stopped talking about self-determination. Rather, the
KMT now is asking the PRC for its approval, for example, on
the issue of international space. Lin expressed concern that
the practice of seeking PRC approval will gradually erode the
concept of self determination.


9. (C) Jannuzi pointed out that Ma may be in a good position
if he can deliver results, even though imperfect, by
enhancing cross-Strait economic ties and Taiwan's
international space. Ma can argue that, in contrast to Chen
Shui-bian, he produced results. Hsiao responded she did not
expect a lot from President Ma because she doubted his
capabilities. Despite his popularity, Ma has not
demonstrated an ability to deliver results over the years.
Moreover, an increase in cross-Strait economic ties will have
mixed effects, negative as well as positive. The economy was
actually not doing poorly under the DPP administration, Lin
added. However, Ma was able to persuade voters that the
economic situation was bad and that enhanced cross-strait
ties would boost the economy.

Taiwan Identity
--------------


10. (C) Jannuzi asked whether the KMT embrace of Taiwan
identity in the election campaign undermined the DPP's claim
to be the only party defending Taiwan's identity. Jannuzi
wondered whether the Taiwan identity issue has been settled
and is no longer useful as a campaign theme. Following the

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presidential election, Hsiao responded, the DPP held a debate
on the Taiwan identity issue. All participants agreed that
Taiwan identity has been strengthened over the past eight
years, as reflected in the fact that about 80 percent of the
people now consider themselves Taiwanese. The DPP success in
promoting Taiwan identity has compelled the KMT also to
embrace Taiwan identity, which is why Ma supported self
determination during the campaign. Clearly, Hsiao
acknowledged, the KMT shift has reduced the effectiveness of
Taiwan identity as a campaign issue for the DPP.


11. (C) In the party's recent internal debate on Taiwan
identity, there were two different views, Hsiao noted. One
group expressed the opinion that the party has succeeded in
establishing, and must continue to promote, Taiwan identity.
However, the party should promote a more open, inclusive, and
tolerant concept of Taiwan identity than it advocated in the
past. The second group in the DPP debate argued that Ma's
embrace of Taiwan identity was simply a sham ploy for
election purposes and should not be trusted. In their view,
the party should continue to promote the original anti-China,
anti-foreign regime, and anti-KMT content of the Taiwan
identity issue.


12. (C) According to Lin, the concept of Taiwan identity has
been evolving. In the past, Taiwan identity referred to
Taiwan independence and ethnic politics. Now, however,
Taiwan identity means accepting the principle of Taiwan self
determination. Because the Taiwan people already know the
DPP supports self determination, the party now needs to turn
its focus to convincing voters that the DPP will represent
their interests.


13. (U) SFRC senior staff member Jannuzi did not have an
opportunity to review this cable.

WANG