SFRC SENIOR STAFF MEMBER JANNUZI DISCUSSES TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000787 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW SUBJECT: SFRC SENIOR STAFF MEMBER JANNUZI DISCUSSES TAIWAN POLITICS AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS WITH DPP PARTY OFFICIALS Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Two senior DPP party officials told SFRC senior staff member Frank Jannuzi on June 2 that Tsai Ing-wen's election as DPP chairperson would help the party get back on its feet following a series of defeats at the polls. Bikhim Hsiao cited internal divisions and perceived loss of idealism as problems that hurt the former ruling party. Hsiao and Lin Chen-wei (new International Affairs Director for the DPP) expressed concerns that the KMT administration is yielding too much to Beijing in its effort to produce quick progress in cross-Strait relations. They also expressed skepticism that Beijing would yeld ground on the issue of Taiwan's quest for "international space." Acknowledging Jannuzi's point that the KMT's embrace of Taiwan identity has reduced its effectiveness to the DPP as a campaign issue, Hsiao explained that the party has debated this issue internally. Some advocate a more open and inclusive Taiwan identity, while others, arguing that the KMT embrace of the concept was merely a sham election ploy, believe the DPP should stick to the original anti-China, anti-KMT version of Taiwan identity. End Summary. DPP Working to Get Back on Its Feet -------------- ¶2. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee senior staff member Frank Jannuzi discussed Taiwan politics with Lin Chen-wei, DPP International Affairs Director, and Bikhim Hsiao, special assistant to party Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, in a meeting at DPP headquarters on June 2. Jannuzi suggested that the DPP's recent election defeats, though painful, would provide the party an opportunity to refine its message and articulate its vision. Hsiao noted that the DPP's primaries last year had been very divisive, and the divisions within the party had continued through the elections earlier this year. Moreover, Hsiao explained, DPP supporters had lost faith in the party, which had compromised its ideals while in power. Following the election defeats, the DPP is now trying to get back on its feet. Former Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen's election as chairperson will be very good for the DPP, Hsiao maintained, adding that Tsai has a strong team in place to support her at party headquarters. Cross-Strait Relations -------------- 
 ¶3. (C) Jannuzi asked whether the public might have too high expectations about the improvement of cross-Strait relations under President Ma Ying-jeou. Hsiao responded that many in Taiwan are skeptical about the seeming warming of cross-Strait relations. KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung said he "felt" China would not launch missiles against Taiwan. Despite such feelings of detente, also fostered by Chinese gratitude for Taiwan's earthquake assistance, there are still underlying uncertainties in the relationship as well as concerns that China will not deliver on its promises. ¶4. (C) Hsiao voiced reservations about President Ma's use of the term "Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu)" in his May 20 inaugural address, a term which, in her opinion, the KMT had inaccurately translated into English as "common Chinese heritage." According to Hsiao, Beijing is very grateful to Ma for using "Chinese nation," which has now become popular in China. For Beijing, Lin observed, "Chinese nation" applies to all inhabitants within its territory, including minorities. However, there is no consensus about this term within Taiwan. For example, the DPP objects to the concept, and "Chinese nation" clearly does not include Taiwan's indigenous peoples. Ma's use of "Chinese nation" will gradually become an issue in Taiwan, producing resistance to the term, Lin predicted. Jannuzi pointed out that Ma had used the word "minzu," which means "nation" in the sense of "nationality," which is different than the Chinese word for state (guojia). ¶5. (C) Lin noted that the Ma administration's early and quick movement on initiatives with China had taken place TAIPEI 00000787 002 OF 003 under the auspices of the party rather than the government. After the recent meeting between KMT and CCP party leaders, some cross-Strait issues were suddenly resolved, but where was the Taiwan government in this process, Lin asked. How can KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, who does not have a popular mandate, represent the people of Taiwan? Lin also pointed out that the Ma administration has left cargo charter flights out of the package of three agreements the DPP administration had been negotiating with China. Cargo charter flights are important to Taiwan, Lin said; the KMT government is yielding too much by moving only on passenger charter flights and bringing PRC tourists to Taiwan. International Space and Cross-Strait Relations -------------- - ¶6. (C) Jannuzi suggested that the real test for Ma's cross-Strait policies will be whether Beijing is willing to make concessions on Taiwan's international space, including agreeing to a "truce" in the battle to poach diplomatic allies and dropping objections to Taiwan's participation in international organizations such as WHO. Hsiao said she was "rather skeptical" that Ma would succeed in his efforts to expand Taiwan's "international space." The DPP is giving Ma some room by not being overly critical. This allows Ma to make compromises, for example, on nomenclature, but he will be hurt politically if Beijing does not respond well. Ma has said he will use "Chinese Taipei" in international settings, but China will be enjoying a free concession if it does not choose to reciprocate his gesture by easing its pressure on Taiwan's international space. One day after the KMT victory in the January legislative elections, Hsiao recalled, Malawi switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. This Chinese "response" to the KMT victory sent a very negative message to the people of Taiwan. ¶7. (C) Lin was "very pessimistic" that Beijing would be willing to give more international space to Taiwan. Compared to the DPP, Lin argued, the KMT has been giving away more in return for less in its dealings with Beijing. For example, the KMT has progressively shifted Taiwan's status from "one China one Taiwan" to "one China, different interpretations," and now simply to the "92 consensus" (i.e., with no indication that the "92 consensus" means "one China, different interpretations"). ¶8. (C) During the election campaign, Lin noted, the KMT supported the idea of self-determination for Taiwan, a long-standing DPP plank and a concept that enjoys strong public support. Since the campaign, however, Ma and the KMT have stopped talking about self-determination. Rather, the KMT now is asking the PRC for its approval, for example, on the issue of international space. Lin expressed concern that the practice of seeking PRC approval will gradually erode the concept of self determination. ¶9. (C) Jannuzi pointed out that Ma may be in a good position if he can deliver results, even though imperfect, by enhancing cross-Strait economic ties and Taiwan's international space. Ma can argue that, in contrast to Chen Shui-bian, he produced results. Hsiao responded she did not expect a lot from President Ma because she doubted his capabilities. Despite his popularity, Ma has not demonstrated an ability to deliver results over the years. Moreover, an increase in cross-Strait economic ties will have mixed effects, negative as well as positive. The economy was actually not doing poorly under the DPP administration, Lin added. However, Ma was able to persuade voters that the economic situation was bad and that enhanced cross-strait ties would boost the economy. Taiwan Identity -------------- ¶10. (C) Jannuzi asked whether the KMT embrace of Taiwan identity in the election campaign undermined the DPP's claim to be the only party defending Taiwan's identity. Jannuzi wondered whether the Taiwan identity issue has been settled and is no longer useful as a campaign theme. Following the TAIPEI 00000787 003 OF 003 presidential election, Hsiao responded, the DPP held a debate on the Taiwan identity issue. All participants agreed that Taiwan identity has been strengthened over the past eight years, as reflected in the fact that about 80 percent of the people now consider themselves Taiwanese. The DPP success in promoting Taiwan identity has compelled the KMT also to embrace Taiwan identity, which is why Ma supported self determination during the campaign. Clearly, Hsiao acknowledged, the KMT shift has reduced the effectiveness of Taiwan identity as a campaign issue for the DPP. ¶11. (C) In the party's recent internal debate on Taiwan identity, there were two different views, Hsiao noted. One group expressed the opinion that the party has succeeded in establishing, and must continue to promote, Taiwan identity. However, the party should promote a more open, inclusive, and tolerant concept of Taiwan identity than it advocated in the past. The second group in the DPP debate argued that Ma's embrace of Taiwan identity was simply a sham ploy for election purposes and should not be trusted. In their view, the party should continue to promote the original anti-China, anti-foreign regime, and anti-KMT content of the Taiwan identity issue. ¶12. (C) According to Lin, the concept of Taiwan identity has been evolving. In the past, Taiwan identity referred to Taiwan independence and ethnic politics. Now, however, Taiwan identity means accepting the principle of Taiwan self determination. Because the Taiwan people already know the DPP supports self determination, the party now needs to turn its focus to convincing voters that the DPP will represent their interests. ¶13. (U) SFRC senior staff member Jannuzi did not have an opportunity to review this cable. WANG