Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08TAIPEI732 | 2008-05-28 10:22:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
VZCZCXRO4760 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH DE RUEHIN #0732/01 1491022 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 281022Z MAY 08 FM AIT TAIPEI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9012 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 8306 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 9617 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 9953 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU PRIORITY 2701 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 1270 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 9548 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 2086 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 6669 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000732 |
1. (C) Summary. President Ma Ying-jeou,s foreign policy will focus on Taiwan,s most important economic and security partners rather than continuing the diplomatic numbers game, according to National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary-General Ho Szu-yin. This more pragmatic approach to diplomacy will extend to participating in international organizations, emphasizing those of greatest benefit to Taiwan, such as WHO. Finally, under Secretary-General Su Chi, the NSC will limit itself to advising the president through a greater emphasis on research and planning, and coordinating with, rather than managing, ministries and government agencies. End Summary. 2. (C) Ho Szu-yin, who took office last week as NSC Deputy Secretary-General in charge of foreign policy and international organizations, gave AIT Acting Director Robert Wang an overview of the Ma administration,s foreign policy priorities. Ho is one of three Deputy Secretaries-General, the other two being Kao Chang (cross-Strait economic and trade relations) and Lee Hai-tung (military and security issues). Kao Chang,s role in cross-Strait relations, Ho explained, will be limited to economic and trade issues, while his own responsibility for international organizations will necessarily involve cross-Strait relations. Restyling the NSC -------------------------- 3. (C) Ho pointed out that most of the new NSC leadership consists of scholars with limited experience in government affairs. This, he told ADIR, accords with Secretary-General Su Chi,s desire that the NSC should focus on long-term strategy and carry out more research than it did under former Secretary-General Chiou I-jen. The new NSC will coordinate among ministries and agencies rather than manage them and run policy as it did under Chiou. Chiou, Ho said, dispatched officers to sit in on agency internal meetings, issuing instructions and reporting back to him, which created ill will and fear among ministries and agencies. The people Ma has appointed, however, are more scholarly and cooperatively oriented, and less competitive, than officials in the previous administration. &No one in the new NSC,8 he said, will try to undercut or trump MOFA, for Foreign Minister Ou Hung-lian and Su Chi are on good terms and both of a cooperative bent. 4. (SBU) (Note: On May 11, following the announcement of his appointment as Secretary-General, Su Chi announced that the NSC would fulfill its statutory role as an advisory body to the president. It would provide the president with "information, research and options for his decision" and would not command other government agencies. Nor, he pledged, would it get involved in "things that the NSC recently did," referring to a diplomatic fraud scandal involving payment for establishment of relations with Papua New Guinea.) 5. (C) The important role the NSC will occupy under Ma, Ho continued, was indicative in Ma,s first two directives following his inauguration on May 20. Ma first swore in Premier Liu Chao-hsuan and NSC Secretary-General Su Chi. Then he directed Su to coordinate among the ministries and other government agencies. He noted, however, that he and the two other deputies are vice-ministerial level officals and would not have authority over the various ministries and agencies. Foreign Policy: Security, Not Numbers -------------------------- 6. (C) Turning to his own NSC portfolio, foreign policy and international organizations, Ho told ADIR that Ma,s foreign policy will focus on Taiwan security -- ¬ on small countries, but on our actual security needs.8 He pointed TAIPEI 00000732 002 OF 004 disapprovingly to the &more than forty diplomats8 assigned to the Taiwan Embassy in Santo Domingo as a &waste of resources.8 Rather, Taiwan should pursue a foreign policy of &realpolitic8 emphasizing, not the number of diplomatic allies, but achieving real economic and security benefits for Taiwan. Substantive support from nations like Australia, for example, would be preferable to more diplomatic partners like the many small countries with which Taiwan now has relations. Sovereignty, he said, does not equal the number of diplomatic partners, and Taiwan must be prepared to lose more countries, perhaps even down to zero, depending, he hastened to add, on the Taiwan political situation and gaining domestic political acceptance. 7. (C) Sovereignty, Ho Szu-yin continued, should be defined by realpolitic )- a realistic assessment of Taiwan,s security and economic needs and interests. Sovereignty means the ability to maintain Taiwan security such as, for example, strengthening U.S. support for Taiwan defense. Perhaps the greatest challenge to this rational approach to foreign policy, Ho acknowledged, is the PRC Foreign Ministry,s "bureaucratic imperative8 to continue &grabbing countries8 and playing the numbers game, which could undermine its maneuvering room on foreign policy. He expressed the hope that Beijing would understand and be willing to give Taiwan greater international space. Dealing with IO,s -------------------------- 8. (C) In Ho,s other area of responsibility, international organizations, this new foreign policy will concentrate on those IO,s of greatest importance to Taiwan, such as WHO. WHO is "a human rights issue8 for the people of Taiwan, Ho argued, which Taiwan can turn to its advantage. PRC scholars and diplomats whom Ho regularly meets have told him that the WHO issue is an embarrassment for the PRC, which dreads the WHA each year, because it puts China in a bad light: big China beating up on little Taiwan and keeping its people in the dark. Other nations, they lament, cannot understand why the PRC blocks Taiwan participation in WHO, which is important to the health and well-being of the people of Taiwan and the world. With ingenuity, Ho told ADIR, Taiwan can lever this PRC discomfiture to its advantage. Strength From Weakness -------------------------- 9. (C) WHO is an example, Ho continued, of how the Ma administration will try to use Taiwan weakness to leverage positive responses from Beijing. Operating from a position of relative weakness compared to the PRC, he said, Taiwan must pursue a policy very different from that of the U.S., which operates from a position of strength and military balance. Explaining that he had closely studied the experiences of Finland with the USSR and of the Netherlands in the European Community, as well as the writings of Thomas Schelling, Ho argued that small states must use strategems rather than direct bargaining to gain advantage in international politics. For Taiwan, this means &a game of chicken8 with the PRC to lever weakness into strength. Taiwan must "show sincerity" (i.e., determination that stems from a lack of choice) and, thus, put the onus on the PRC in hopes this will elicit a positive PRC response. PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Chairman Chen Yunlin's very positive public comments last week regarding Ma Yingjeou,s inaugural speech, Ho said, are a case in point. At the same time, however, Ho acknowledged, the NSC has also begun to analyze whether and how Beijing might one day try to exploit Taiwan,s growing economic dependency on China. 10. (C) Taiwan identity and "green" pressure actually provide Ma with an important bargaining chip to push the PRC into concessions, Ho argued. The new DPP Chair Tsai Ying-wen, who devised former President Lee Teng-hui,s &two states theory,8 gives Ma another bargaining chip with Beijing. So, Ho said, Ma,s deliberately putting all his cards on the table serves to put Beijing on the spot and )- TAIPEI 00000732 003 OF 004 hopefully -) force it to respond positively to Ma,s public offerings. 11. (C) On the other hand, he mused, the Ma administration would not really want to see too-rapid improvement. Removal of the missiles across the Strait, for example, would actually reduce Taiwan's influence levers with Beijing, both by removing the onus from Beijing and by reducing the pressure from Taiwan's "green" side. Ma,s seeming weakness, his hands tied by the greens, is actually a useful bargaining chip for Ma. U.S.-Taiwan -------------------------- 12. (C) ADIR noted that one of the points U.S. inaugural delegation leader Andrew Card had sought to make during his Taipei visit was that the Ma administration should carefully manage expectations of the U.S. Ho responded that Ma is &realistic8 about ties with the U.S. He acknowledged that Ma's uncoordinated public announcement of his plan to visit the U.S. before his inauguration had been a poorly concieved surprise. However, the Ma team, he said, consists of a large dose of scholars "who learn quickly from errors.8 Ma himself, Ho continued, now understands the limits on relations with the U.S. and will act accordingly. 13. (C) The greatest damage former President Chen Shui-bian had perpetrated on Taiwan, Ho argued, was damaging its relations with the U.S. Chen &caused trouble and upset the status quo8 which, Ho said, explained why the U.S. relegated Chen,s final transits to Alaska. For Ma to be similarly assigned an Alaska transit, Ho stressed, would be deeply damaging to him and undermine his efforts to build a rational foreign policy. Ma,s Cross-Strait Collegium -------------------------- 14. (C) Ho told ADIR that Ma will personally direct Taiwan's cross-Strait policy. To deal with cross-Strait issues, Ma plans to meet each week with an unofficial five-person national affairs group consisting of himself, Vice President Vincent Hsiao, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, and KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. On cross-Strait issues, they will be joined by NSC Secretary-General Su Chi, Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) head PK Chiang, and Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairperson Lai Shin-yuan. Ho expressed confidence that the green (independence)-leaning Lai Shin-yuan would not pose a problem for cross-Strait progress, because the consensus will rule and she &must abide by the majority." "This is how Ma operates,8 Ho noted succinctly. Lai's appointment of three MAC Deputy Chairs from within MAC, Ho pointed out, indicated she has gotten the message and will be a team player by giving MAC an administrative, rather than policymaking, focus. 15. (C) The ruling KMT will also play an &important role8 in cross-Strait relations, Ho told ADIR, in part through its function coordinating the KMT legislative caucus. The KMT, he noted, has good relations with the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and will be able to discuss difficult political issues of international space and participation in IO's in ways the SEF-ARATS channel may not be able. Thus, this "Track II" party-to-party channel, currently visible in KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's visit to Beijing (reftel), gives the Ma administration further channels of influence and leverage with China. Ho told ADIR he did not expect the KMT to be anything but helpful on cross-Strait relations, because Chairman Wu has "very friendly relations with the President,8 and Ma and his administration leaders all come out of the KMT and are close to Wu. Comment -------------------------- 16. (C) Shifting Taiwan foreign policy from the diplomatic TAIPEI 00000732 004 OF 004 numbers game to a &realpolitik8 calculus of interests will be a tall order. Deputy Secretary-General Ho is not the first Taiwan government official to announce a shift away from "dollar diplomacy.8 Numerous government officials and diplomats, including James Huang before he took over as Foreign Minister in 2006, have told AIT of their hope to move Taiwan from a fixation with numbers to playing up Taiwan,s comparative advantage. In each case, however, the exigencies of government office and domestic Taiwan politics -- not to mention Beijing's incessant pressures -- have repeatedly waylaid those best-laid plans. Non-cooperation from the PRC, or another spate of recognition shifts, could undermine the Ma administration,s ability to make what is essentially a diplomatic leap of faith into a new cross-Strait order. Biographical Note -------------------------- 17. (SBU) Ho Szu-yin is well known among U.S. scholars of East Asian, PRC and Taiwan studies. Ho has been a member of the National Chengchi University Institute of International Relations (IIR) since 1994, serving as its Director from 1999 to 2003. From 2003 until last week, Ho also served as Director of the KMT Overseas Affairs Department. 18. (C) Ho was born in Taiwan on November 1, 1956, of parents who immigrated to Taiwan from Mainland China. He earned his B.A. in English Literature at National Taiwan University (1978) and his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science (1983, 1986) from the University of California at Santa Barbara. Ho and his wife have three children -- a son and a daughter studying in the U.S. (New York and California) and a daughter just completing high school in Taipei, who will begin her freshman year at the University of British Columbia this fall. Ho had long been excited about his yearlong sabbatical next year at UBC, until Ma Ying-jeou and Su Chi persuaded him to remain in Taiwan as NSC Deputy Secretary-General. WANG |