Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TAIPEI524
2008-04-15 10:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:
DPP CHAIRMAN FRANK HSIEH ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
VZCZCXRO7747 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH DE RUEHIN #0524/01 1061026 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 151026Z APR 08 FM AIT TAIPEI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8690 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8164 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9518 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9829 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2613 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1174 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9400 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1991 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6580 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000524
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2023
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: DPP CHAIRMAN FRANK HSIEH ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
DPP POLITICS, AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000524
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2023
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: DPP CHAIRMAN FRANK HSIEH ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
DPP POLITICS, AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary: DPP Chairman Frank Hsieh told the Director
on April 14 that his presidential campaign proved unable to
reverse the long-term declining performance of the DPP at the
polls. The "burden" of President Chen's unpopularity, rather
than any flawed campaign strategy, has underpinned DPP
electoral losses since 2005. U.S. public opposition to the
UN referendum ensured its failure and also cost Hsieh some
support because a majority of Taiwanese take the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship seriously. Hsieh said the DPP needs time to
recover from its electoral setbacks, which could continue
into local elections in 2009 if reform is not properly
managed. Hsieh emphasized that DPP colleagues should not be
overly critical of Vice President-elect Vincent Siew's trip
to the Boao Forum, noting that the Siew-Hu meeting was a
"good start." End Summary.
Presidential Election: Unable to "Turn the Tide"
-------------- ---
2. (C) DPP Chairman Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting) and the
Director met on April 14 to discuss the March presidential
election, DPP party politics, and the future of cross-Strait
relations. The Director commended Hsieh for a well-run and
hard-fought campaign, noting that his graceful concession
speech on March 22 and the second upcoming transfer of power
between political parties in the island's history underscore
the maturity of Taiwan's democracy. Hsieh thanked the
Director, adding that as long as Taiwan holds elections,
leaders like President Chen or president-elect Ma Ying-jeou
are unlikely to go against the majority's desire to maintain
cross-Strait peace, stability, and the "status quo" by taking
radical steps toward independence or unification.
3. (C) Assessing the election outcome, Hsieh said that he
had been unable to reverse the long-term declining
performance of the DPP at the polls, which started with the
party's defeat in the 2005 local city and county elections
and deepened with the January 2008 legislative election rout.
Hsieh suggested that the "burden" of President Chen's
unpopularity, rather than any flawed campaign strategy,
underpinned the DPP's recent electoral losses. The KMT
successfully managed to equate a vote for Hsieh and other DPP
candidates as support for the unpopular president and a
referendum on government corruption. Other factors, such as
the KMT's vast financial resources and Ma's clean image and
popularity, also contributed to KMT success.
4. (C) Although over 60 percent of voters opposed some of
Ma's policies, such as the "one-China common market," Hsieh
said dissatisfaction with particular issues did not weaken
overall support for Ma. The KMT focus on perceived worsening
economic conditions prompted working-class and professionals
aged 30-50 to vote overwhelmingly for the KMT candidate. The
one bright spot for the DPP, Hsieh noted, was winning back
the youth vote (20-29 year olds) in the final few weeks of
the election so that the vote in this demographic was about
evenly split.
5. (C) Hsieh argued that U.S. public opposition to the UN
referendum ensured its failure. He did not push the issue
aggressively during the campaign in part because U.S. public
statements against the measure affected his own support
ratings. As Taiwan's most important friend, the U.S. is
taken seriously by the majority of Taiwanese, who have little
tolerance for measures that undermine the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship, added Hsieh. The Director responded that the
U.S. had urged President Chen in a private, low-key manner to
reconsider the referendum before deciding to make our stance
public.
Whither the DPP?
--------------
6. (C) Hsieh told the Director that the DPP will need some
time to recover from the recent string of electoral setbacks.
If the party handles the review of its election performance
and implements reforms properly, it may stem further losses
TAIPEI 00000524 002 OF 002
in the 2009 local city and county elections. Holding its own
then, the party may be able to win at least one-third of the
legislative seats in 2012. If reform falters, however, Hsieh
worries the DPP could split into several smaller opposition
parties, a development highly advantageous to the KMT.
7. (C) Going back into opposition with little
administrative or legislative resources, the DPP has little
need or room to see factions compete for power. Hsieh hopes
his generation will retire from leadership positions, making
room for the next generation. The next party chairman is
unlikely to be the DPP's future presidential candidate and
will need to lead party reforms, a task which will almost
certainly offend some members. For now, it is unclear who
the next chairman will be and how he/she will be selected.
Hsieh joked that if deep-green pro-independence legislator
Trong Tsai wins election as chairman, the DPP will devolve
into a "referendum party." He suggested that as the
opposition the DPP will need to have effective oversight of
the KMT and form a "shadow government," adding that he will
support setting up a website to monitor KMT policies and
programs.
Siew-Hu Meeting: Give the KMT a Chance
--------------
8. (C) Turning to recent cross-Strait developments, Hsieh
told the Director that the DPP should not be overly critical
of Vice President-elect Vincent Siew's trip to the Boao Forum
in Hainan, China. The Siew-Hu meeting, he acknowledged, was
a "good start." The two sides need to keep talking, although
the KMT needs to be wary of reaching a "hasty" conclusion on
important political matters which could harm the island.
Progress on economic issues such as weekend charter flights
and expanding Chinese tourism do not represent a real
"breakthrough," Hsieh argued, because Beijing had already
entered into those discussions with the DPP administration.
Despite economic concessions, Hsieh added, Beijing will never
give up on its ultimate aim of unification for the island.
9. (C) Hsieh dismissed the criticisms of some of his DPP
colleagues who argue that the KMT will "sell out" Taiwan.
Perhaps one of the DPP's greatest achievements has been
forming an island-wide consensus on the question of Taiwan
identity, pushing the KMT to accept the position that
Taiwan's future must be determined by its 23 million
inhabitants. Over 65 percent of the population supports
maintaining the "status quo" rather than independence or
unification, he noted, pointing out that Ma and the KMT
realize and accept this. The DPP and KMT now differ mainly
on how, rather than if, to proceed with closer cross-Strait
economic ties. Ma's "no war" pledge, however, raises the
question of whether his administration will reduce or cease
purchasing advanced weapons from the U.S. to avoid
antagonizing Beijing, Hsieh added.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Relaxed and in good spirits, Hsieh nevertheless
betrayed a sense of unease about the DPP's future as a viable
opposition party. He clearly attributed his and the DPP's
electoral woes in large measure to President Chen's
unpopularity, though he did not belabor the point and did not
make it personal, despite his long history of competition
with Chen. The next generation of DPP leaders, if it
emerges, faces the daunting task of rebuilding the party and
will need to work with stalwarts like Chen and Hsieh, who are
likely to maintain some influence within the Green camp.
YOUNG
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2023
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: DPP CHAIRMAN FRANK HSIEH ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
DPP POLITICS, AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary: DPP Chairman Frank Hsieh told the Director
on April 14 that his presidential campaign proved unable to
reverse the long-term declining performance of the DPP at the
polls. The "burden" of President Chen's unpopularity, rather
than any flawed campaign strategy, has underpinned DPP
electoral losses since 2005. U.S. public opposition to the
UN referendum ensured its failure and also cost Hsieh some
support because a majority of Taiwanese take the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship seriously. Hsieh said the DPP needs time to
recover from its electoral setbacks, which could continue
into local elections in 2009 if reform is not properly
managed. Hsieh emphasized that DPP colleagues should not be
overly critical of Vice President-elect Vincent Siew's trip
to the Boao Forum, noting that the Siew-Hu meeting was a
"good start." End Summary.
Presidential Election: Unable to "Turn the Tide"
-------------- ---
2. (C) DPP Chairman Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting) and the
Director met on April 14 to discuss the March presidential
election, DPP party politics, and the future of cross-Strait
relations. The Director commended Hsieh for a well-run and
hard-fought campaign, noting that his graceful concession
speech on March 22 and the second upcoming transfer of power
between political parties in the island's history underscore
the maturity of Taiwan's democracy. Hsieh thanked the
Director, adding that as long as Taiwan holds elections,
leaders like President Chen or president-elect Ma Ying-jeou
are unlikely to go against the majority's desire to maintain
cross-Strait peace, stability, and the "status quo" by taking
radical steps toward independence or unification.
3. (C) Assessing the election outcome, Hsieh said that he
had been unable to reverse the long-term declining
performance of the DPP at the polls, which started with the
party's defeat in the 2005 local city and county elections
and deepened with the January 2008 legislative election rout.
Hsieh suggested that the "burden" of President Chen's
unpopularity, rather than any flawed campaign strategy,
underpinned the DPP's recent electoral losses. The KMT
successfully managed to equate a vote for Hsieh and other DPP
candidates as support for the unpopular president and a
referendum on government corruption. Other factors, such as
the KMT's vast financial resources and Ma's clean image and
popularity, also contributed to KMT success.
4. (C) Although over 60 percent of voters opposed some of
Ma's policies, such as the "one-China common market," Hsieh
said dissatisfaction with particular issues did not weaken
overall support for Ma. The KMT focus on perceived worsening
economic conditions prompted working-class and professionals
aged 30-50 to vote overwhelmingly for the KMT candidate. The
one bright spot for the DPP, Hsieh noted, was winning back
the youth vote (20-29 year olds) in the final few weeks of
the election so that the vote in this demographic was about
evenly split.
5. (C) Hsieh argued that U.S. public opposition to the UN
referendum ensured its failure. He did not push the issue
aggressively during the campaign in part because U.S. public
statements against the measure affected his own support
ratings. As Taiwan's most important friend, the U.S. is
taken seriously by the majority of Taiwanese, who have little
tolerance for measures that undermine the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship, added Hsieh. The Director responded that the
U.S. had urged President Chen in a private, low-key manner to
reconsider the referendum before deciding to make our stance
public.
Whither the DPP?
--------------
6. (C) Hsieh told the Director that the DPP will need some
time to recover from the recent string of electoral setbacks.
If the party handles the review of its election performance
and implements reforms properly, it may stem further losses
TAIPEI 00000524 002 OF 002
in the 2009 local city and county elections. Holding its own
then, the party may be able to win at least one-third of the
legislative seats in 2012. If reform falters, however, Hsieh
worries the DPP could split into several smaller opposition
parties, a development highly advantageous to the KMT.
7. (C) Going back into opposition with little
administrative or legislative resources, the DPP has little
need or room to see factions compete for power. Hsieh hopes
his generation will retire from leadership positions, making
room for the next generation. The next party chairman is
unlikely to be the DPP's future presidential candidate and
will need to lead party reforms, a task which will almost
certainly offend some members. For now, it is unclear who
the next chairman will be and how he/she will be selected.
Hsieh joked that if deep-green pro-independence legislator
Trong Tsai wins election as chairman, the DPP will devolve
into a "referendum party." He suggested that as the
opposition the DPP will need to have effective oversight of
the KMT and form a "shadow government," adding that he will
support setting up a website to monitor KMT policies and
programs.
Siew-Hu Meeting: Give the KMT a Chance
--------------
8. (C) Turning to recent cross-Strait developments, Hsieh
told the Director that the DPP should not be overly critical
of Vice President-elect Vincent Siew's trip to the Boao Forum
in Hainan, China. The Siew-Hu meeting, he acknowledged, was
a "good start." The two sides need to keep talking, although
the KMT needs to be wary of reaching a "hasty" conclusion on
important political matters which could harm the island.
Progress on economic issues such as weekend charter flights
and expanding Chinese tourism do not represent a real
"breakthrough," Hsieh argued, because Beijing had already
entered into those discussions with the DPP administration.
Despite economic concessions, Hsieh added, Beijing will never
give up on its ultimate aim of unification for the island.
9. (C) Hsieh dismissed the criticisms of some of his DPP
colleagues who argue that the KMT will "sell out" Taiwan.
Perhaps one of the DPP's greatest achievements has been
forming an island-wide consensus on the question of Taiwan
identity, pushing the KMT to accept the position that
Taiwan's future must be determined by its 23 million
inhabitants. Over 65 percent of the population supports
maintaining the "status quo" rather than independence or
unification, he noted, pointing out that Ma and the KMT
realize and accept this. The DPP and KMT now differ mainly
on how, rather than if, to proceed with closer cross-Strait
economic ties. Ma's "no war" pledge, however, raises the
question of whether his administration will reduce or cease
purchasing advanced weapons from the U.S. to avoid
antagonizing Beijing, Hsieh added.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Relaxed and in good spirits, Hsieh nevertheless
betrayed a sense of unease about the DPP's future as a viable
opposition party. He clearly attributed his and the DPP's
electoral woes in large measure to President Chen's
unpopularity, though he did not belabor the point and did not
make it personal, despite his long history of competition
with Chen. The next generation of DPP leaders, if it
emerges, faces the daunting task of rebuilding the party and
will need to work with stalwarts like Chen and Hsieh, who are
likely to maintain some influence within the Green camp.
YOUNG