KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON CROSS-STRAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000487

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON CROSS-STRAIT
RELATIONS, PARTY POLITICS


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan suggested to
the Director on April 3 that Ma Ying-jeou's victory is also a
win for the U.S., because Ma will restore stability and
predictability to cross-Strait relations, easing U.S.
security concerns. Lien expressed appreciation for President
Bush's efforts to "lay the foundation" for future
cross-Strait dialogue in his recent phone discussion with PRC
President Hu Jintao. According to Lien, Ma will now focus on
expanded cross-Strait economic links, reserving more
difficult questions for later. Lien surmised it may be too
early for Beijing to give ground on WHA observership, and he
worried about the possibility of further diplomatic losses to
China. Lien commended Ma for his commitment to democracy and
human rights, but added that Ma can sometimes be too rigid in
his approach to political problems. Lien said he will not
assume a high-profile role in the Ma administration, but will
do whatever President Ma deems helpful. End Summary.

Mandate Helps Smooth Transition
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2. (C) In a meeting on April 3, the Director congratulated
KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan on the party's successes in
the January 12 and March 22 legislative and presidential
elections. Although KMT polls predicted a landslide Ma
victory, Lien noted, the campaign staff feared late-breaking
"surprises" could tip the election in DPP candidate Frank
Hsieh's favor. The public has given Ma a clear mandate, the
Director continued, which, combined with Frank Hsieh's
gracious concession, should facilitate a calm and orderly
transition.


3. (C) The U.S. has encouraged Beijing to take advantage of
Ma's victory to improve cross-Strait relations, said DIR.
President Bush's congratulatory letter to President-elect Ma,
and his subsequent telephone call to PRC President Hu Jintao
were both intended to urge Beijing to take concrete steps.
Hu's recent affirmation of the "92 Consensus" was a positive
step, the Director added, and Washington will continue to
urge Beijing to be more flexible in reaching out to Taiwan
and its new president.

U.S. Deserves Credit for Taiwan's Democracy
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4. (C) The U.S. should also be congratulated on the result of
Taiwan's presidential election, Lien maintained. Many
political pundits in Taiwan have argued that, with Ma's
victory and the defeat of the two UN referenda, the U.S. was
the biggest winner on March 22. Taiwan's democracy is
patterned after the U.S. model, according to Lien. The
incident-free March presidential election will be followed in
May by Taiwan's second peaceful transition of power. The
U.S. can and should take credit for enabling Taiwan's
democratic evolution, Lien suggested. With Ma's victory,
Lien added, Taiwan will cease being a "troublemaker."
Cross-Strait relations should become more stable and
predictable, dramatically reducing the possibility of armed
conflict.

Way Forward on Cross-Strait
--------------


5. (C) President Bush's call to Hu Jintao and Hu's tacit
acceptance of the '92 Consensus have "laid the foundation"
for the future development of cross-Strait relations,
observed Lien. Ma understands his promise to restore
Taiwan's economic growth won him the election, and that
voters are expecting significant improvement soon. For this
reason, Ma will follow the step-by-step plan announced during
his campaign: cross-Strait chartered flights and expanded PRC
tourism, followed by regular direct flights, with significant
deregulation of cross-Strait investment, insurance, and
banking activity to come later. Only after these milestones
are achieved, Lien argued, will Taipei and Beijing be in a
position to focus on "sensitive" topics like Taiwan's
international participation and an eventual "peace
agreement."


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International Participation: Too Soon
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6. (C) The Director noted Taiwan's international
participation would become an issue at the WHA assembly
meeting scheduled to begin on May 19, the day before Ma's
inauguration. The international participation issue is the
"most difficult one in the whole (cross-Strait) process,"
replied Lien. Even if President Chen and the KMT agree to
seek observership instead of full membership, worried Lien,
Beijing "might not be ready" to let Taiwan into the WHA, even
though doing so would help build goodwill. On the contrary,
China's Foreign Ministry remains dedicated to stealing
Taiwan's diplomatic allies away. Lien expressed concern that
the loss of one or more diplomatic allies could undermine
public support for closer cross-Strait ties. To the best of
his knowledge, Lien added, no one from the KMT has been
urging Beijing to ease its pressure on Taiwan's diplomatic
partners.


7. (C) The PRC is typically cautious and slow to change, the
Director observed. Beijing may have been so preoccupied with
the possibility the DPP UN referendum would pass that it
neglected to plan its response to a Ma presidential victory.
The U.S. does not want to become directly involved, the
Director said, but will continue to use its contacts on both
sides to encourage Beijing and Taipei to talk to each other.

Ma Problem-Solving Too Legalistic
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8. (C) This time around, Lien, who in past meetings has
tended to be somewhat critical of Ma, took some credit for
Ma's victory. Lien recalled that he had nominated Ma to
become a KMT vice chairman, and had also appointed Ma to
serve as Justice Minister under President Lee Teng-hui. As
director of the KMT's Youth Supervision Committee, Ma's
father, Ma Ho-ling, reported to Lien. On this basis, Lien
claimed a "close relationship for many years" with Ma and his
family. At the same time, Lien observed, Ma has his
strengths, but also "weaknesses." Because Ma was raised and
educated by the KMT, Lien argued, he is a "nationalist" who
identifies with the ROC, not Taiwan. Ma is staunchly
anti-communist, but not anti-China, and his deep commitment
to freedom, democracy, and human rights is a product of his
legal studies in the U.S. Reverting to his usual self, Lien
suggested that Ma's problem-solving style is often too
legalistic and inflexible -- if you wish to know how Ma will
act, he quipped, "just look in the rule book."

Lien: DPP Can't Compete
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9. (C) Afte eight years of bitter conflict, the Director
suggested, it is now time for Taiwan's major political
parties to seek reconciliation. The DPP is acting rationally
after its recent string of defeats, trying to determine how
it must change to meet voters' expectations. As the ruling
party, the KMT should treat the opposition with respect, and
seek common ground on matters of importance to Taiwan's
future. Whether the DPP can survive its recent setbacks
remains an "open question," replied Lien. The DPP is riven
by factions which threaten to tear the party apart.
Moreover, only 13 of the DPP's 27 sitting legislators were
elected from geographic districts, some by only very slim
margins. The DPP can't compete against the KMT in the
Legislative Yuan (LY),Lien observed, especially with a KMT
president in power.


10. (C) Lien said he will not assume a high-profile role in
the Ma administration, but will do whatever President Ma
deems helpful. Lien noted that Beijing had recently invited
him to visit, but stressed he would travel to the mainland
only when the "timing was right." Lien added that he would
travel in his private capacity, and with only a small group,
in order to stave off DPP criticism that he and the KMT were
"selling out Taiwan."

Comment
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11. (C) Lingering friction between Ma and Lien is an open
secret in Taiwan politics. That said, Lien is wise to

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maintain party unity as the KMT looks to assumption of power
next month, since he and Ma both need one another. Lien
wants his proteges and ideas to be included in Ma's governing
circles and Ma doesn't want to alienate this key elder as he
launches his ambitious ruling agenda. Both also are
apparently agreed on the opportunity that Ma's election
victory presents for improving cross-Strait ties.
YOUNG