CODEL CHABOT MEETS WITH DPP, KMT PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000046 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2033 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: CODEL CHABOT MEETS WITH DPP, KMT PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVISORS SU CHI AND BIKHIM HSIAO Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The PRC will cooperate with a KMT government because the KMT has accepted the "one China" principle and will not push for Taiwan independence, argued KMT legislator Su Chi to visiting Congressman Steve Chabot. However, the KMT will not seek unification with China now or in the foreseeable future. If China and Taiwan cannot reach an agreement on Taiwan's international living space while Ma is president, Su continued, the KMT will resort to "DPP-style tactics" to defend Taiwan's diplomatic allies and international participation. Congressman Chabot reassured Su that support for Taiwan within the U.S. Congress remained strong. ¶2. (C) In a separate conversation, DPP legislator Bikhim Hsiao told Congressman Chabot many DPP supporters fear that a KMT government would purchase better cross-Strait relations by sacrificing Taiwan's sovereignty to the "one China" principle. The DPP may not do as well as hoped in the upcoming legislative elections, Hsiao worried, after which President Chen may tender his resignation as DPP party chairman. Hsiao predicted the party would reject Chen's resignation in order to avoid a power struggle only months before the presidential election. A legislative defeat will almost certainly cause Chen to yield the DPP political spotlight to DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting). No one in the DPP expects a "honeymoon period" with China if Hsieh is elected, said Hsiao, but Hsieh is a moderate, and will be capable of managing cross-Strait relations if China will talk to him. Hsiao expressed hope that Congressional Democrats would come around to support an FTA with Taiwan. End Summary. ¶3. (U) Congressmen Steve Chabot (R-OH) and staff member Kevin Fitzpatrick met with KMT legislator and Ma foreign policy advisor Su Chi on January 9. Su was accompanied by Ma campaign advisor John Feng. Congressman Chabot met separately with DPP legislator and Hsieh campaign foreign policy director Bikhim Hsiao on January 10. Dr. C.T. Lee, a neurosurgeon from Cincinnati and former Chairman of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, accompanied the Congressman to both meetings. KMT: CHINA WILL WORK WITH US -------------- ¶4. (C) Chabot asked Su why the KMT expected China to be more willing to cooperate with a KMT government than with the current DPP administration. The KMT and CCP held numerous rounds of public and secret negotiations from the late-80's to early-90's, replied Su. During that time, Taiwan's number of diplomatic allies grew, and its participation in international organizations increased. Taiwan also strengthened its defensive capability through the purchase of U.S.-made fighter planes and frigates. Unlike the DPP, the KMT has accepted the "1992 Consensus" theory of "one China, different interpretations." Thus, Su argued, Beijing can rest assured that while in power, a KMT government will not push for Taiwan independence. The KMT experience has been that as long as Taiwan independence remains off the table, and the two sides continue dialogue, progress can be made. ¶5. (C) Su argued that PRC President Hu Jintao may also have personal reasons to move forward on cross-Strait relations. Hu's term of office will expire in 2012. Unlike Deng Xiaoping, who revolutionized China's economy, or Jiang Zemin, who reclaimed Hong Kong and Macau for China, Hu has yet to establish is own legacy. Although Hu cannot expect to resolve the Taiwan question before he leaves office, Su continued, Hu's legacy could be to make the Taiwan issue more manageable for his successor. NO TALK OF UNIFICATION -------------- ¶6. (C) The possibility of dialogue notwithstanding, Feng stated, a KMT government will not seek unification with China now or in the foreseeable future. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou has stated publicly that the KMT cross-strait TAIPEI 00000046 002 OF 003 policy is comprised of three parts: no independence, no unification, and no use of force. Ma has also promised, Feng added, that there will be no negotiation on the issue of unification while he is president. ¶7. (C) Moreover, the KMT too resents China's efforts to undermine Taiwan's diplomatic relations, and to exclude Taiwan from participation in international organizations, Su said. If the KMT is restored to power, it will seek a compromise with Beijing on Taiwan's international status. If Beijing refuses to reach a "modus vivendi" on Taiwan's international living space, Su continued, the KMT will resort to the same "guerrilla tactics" used by the DPP to preserve Taiwan's diplomatic relationships and to push for increased international participation. Beijing must realize that refusing to cooperate with a more flexible, cooperative KMT government will only hasten the return of someone like President Chen. DOES CONGRESS STILL CARE ABOUT TAIWAN? -------------- ¶8. (C) Su expressed concern that U.S. Congressional support for Taiwan was on the decline. Chabot assured Su that, although disagreement over the UN referenda had strained the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and the U.S. had been occupied by Iraq and other concerns, Congressional support for Taiwan remained strong. DPP: DON'T TRUST THE POLLS -------------- ¶9. (C) DPP legislator and Hsieh campaign advisor Bikhim Hsiao remarked that it was a good time to see Taiwan's democracy in action, with the January 12 Legislative Yuan (LY) elections only two days away. According to Hsiao, DPP polling center results suggest that 30 of the 79 district races are too close to call. Hsiao added that the smaller, single-member districts had made public opinion polling results even less reliable. In smaller districts, sample sizes are necessarily much smaller. Voters are also more likely to know each other, and are therefore less willing to take part in polls or to identify their preferences for fear of alienating neighbors. Only one-third of voters will agree to participate in polls, Hsiao continued, and only one third of those are willing to identify their preferred candidates. CHEN WON'T RESIGN AS CHAIRMAN -------------- ¶10. (C) The DPP officially still hopes to win at least 50 of the 113 legislative seats up for grabs on January 12, said Hsiao, but she conceded that anything more than 45 seats would be considered a victory. If the DPP fares significantly worse (winning only 35-40 seats),President Chen would probably follow DPP tradition and offer to resign as party chairman. It is highly unlikely that DPP party leaders would accept his resignation, Hsiao predicted, because Chen's departure could destabilize the party with only two months remaining before the presidential election. Chen will remain party chairman, Hsiao continued, but would be forced to yield the political limelight to DPP presidential candidate Hsieh. Hsiao quipped that Chen's unwillingness thus far to share the stage with Hsieh has caused many voters to "forget who the DPP candidate actually is." ¶11. (C) Hsiao acknowledged the KMT boycott of the upcoming legislative referenda will increase the probability that both the DPP-sponsored "party assets" and the KMT-sponsored "anti-corruption" referenda will fail. However, Hsiao added, the majority of those who do take part in the legislative referenda will vote in favor. PARTY VOTE COULD REVEAL SWING VOTE SUPPORT -------------- ¶12. (C) The outcome of the party vote from this weekend's LY elections will definitely help predict the victor in the March 22 presidential election, Hsiao opined. Thirty to TAIPEI 00000046 003 OF 003 forty percent of voters are "core" DPP supporters, and another 30-40 percent make up the KMT base, Hsiao explained. The remaining 20 percent are less ideological "swing" voters. In recent one-on-one elections at the local level, the winner has usually won by a large margin, not a bare majority. If the DPP wins 50 percent or more of the party vote, Hsiao concluded, it would suggest that the DPP enjoys strong support among swing voters, and that Frank Hsieh could win the presidency. A strong DPP showing in the party vote would also be a great boost for party morale, she added. ¶13. (C) Hsiao said she does not expect a "honeymoon" period between Taiwan and the PRC if Frank Hsieh is elected, but, she insisted, a Hsieh administration will be able to manage cross-Strait relations if China is a willing counterpart. The DPP is home to many pro-independence "radicals," Hsiao conceded, but Hsieh, who comes from the most "moderate" wing of the party, is not one of them. Hsieh favors direct transportation links, and liberalizing restrictions on cross-Strait trade. He will not compromise Taiwan's sovereignty to achieve these goals, however. If China cannot talk to Hsieh, Hsiao asked rhetorically, with whom within the DPP could they talk? TAIWANESE FEAR KMT SELL-OUT -------------- ¶14. (C) The KMT is able to promise improved cross-Strait relations, Hsiao argued, because it has adopted the PRC's doctrine of "one China." China naturally welcomed this concession from the KMT, which DPP opponents view as inimical to Taiwan's sovereignty. DPP supporters also have difficulty understanding how former KMT Chairman Lien Chan was willing to meet with PRC President Hu, but never President Chen, even though China has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan. The pro-China behavior of Lien and other KMT "mainlander" leaders causes many "Taiwanese" to fear that one day the KMT will "sell out" Taiwan to China. This is why "ethnic identity" still remains such a potent force in Taiwan politics, Hsiao concluded. FTA, PLEASE -------------- ¶15. (C) Hsiao said she and others in the DPP were hopeful that Democrats in the U.S. Congress would come around to favor a free trade agreement with Taiwan. Chabot remarked that many Democrats have close ties to DOMESTIC labor unions, which generally oppose such agreements. Congressman Chabot did not have an opportunity to clear this report. YOUNG