KMT CHAIRMAN WU POH-HSIUNG ON MA YING-JEOU'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000452 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: KMT CHAIRMAN WU POH-HSIUNG ON MA YING-JEOU'S ELECTION AND U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Director Young on March 27, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung conceded that president-elect Ma Ying-jeou had jumped the gun by publicly announcing his desire to visit the U.S. before consulting AIT first. To avoid embarrassment, Wu expressed hope the U.S. would allow the visit as a "personal gesture" to Ma. On domestic politics, Wu pledged the KMT would not abuse its power, and would strive to retain the voters' trust. Wu said he and other KMT leaders are not involved in Ma's personnel decisions, but would offer advice if asked. The Ma administration and the KMT will work with the U.S. to resolve outstanding economic and security issues once Ma takes office on May 20. Wu expressed hope that the U.S. will show its support by sending a high-profile delegation to Ma's inauguration. End Summary. Ma's Victory -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Director on March 27, a jovial KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung "congratulated" the U.S. on achieving a 100 percent "victory", with Ma's election and the defeat of both UN referenda. The Director replied that Ma's victory was not a victory for the U.S. or a particular candidate, but rather a victory for Taiwan and its democracy. As for the referenda, the U.S. position had always been that the people of Taiwan must decide for themselves. Wu agreed, but insisted it was impossible to deny that voters had considered the U.S. position and the importance of U.S.-Taiwan relations when they cast (or didn't cast) their ballots. Ma's Hope to Visit U.S. -------------- ¶3. (C) Wu conceded that Ma had erred by publicly announcing his desire to visit the U.S. before consulting AIT on the matter. According to Wu, Ma was simply caught up in the euphoria of his hard-fought victory and, "in a gesture of goodwill to the U.S.," spoke too soon. Unfortunately, Wu said, it now has become an issue of face for Ma and the KMT. Wu also emphasized the importance of the U.S. sending a high-profile delegation to Ma's May 20 inauguration. The Director responded that there are other ways for the U.S. to express its support for Ma besides a U.S. visit, and he assured Chairman Wu that the Washington intends to send an appropriate delegation to Ma's inauguration. The group will consist of private citizens, but they will have close ties to the Bush administration, and will underscore the importance Washington places on U.S.-Taiwan relations. Although Taiwan is only one issue in U.S.-China relations, the U.S. has repeatedly emphasized to Beijing that it needs to respect the Taiwan people's choice of leaders, and take advantage of the opportunities Ma's election brings for improved cross-Strait relations, the Director added. Wu: Taiwan Identity a Dead Issue -------------- ¶4. (C) Wu claimed Ma's wide margin of victory proved that "Taiwan identity" is now a dead issue. DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh built his campaign around symbols of Taiwan identity, but voters were focused on the economy and other practical concerns. Ma won because he offered voters the best hope to improve their lives. DPP Down But Not Out -------------- ¶5. (C) Ma won the presidential election by 600,000 more votes than KMT polls had predicted, said Wu. Ma scored unexpected victories in several cities in southern Taiwan, and was even competitive in southern counties considered to be DPP strongholds. However, Ma's overwhelming victory has not caused the KMT to dismiss the DPP, insisted Wu, noting that Hsieh still won over five million votes. The DPP will have TAIPEI 00000452 002 OF 002 to make some important decisions before President Chen steps down. If this process is unsuccessful, the DPP could fold, although Wu thinks this unlikely. A Reformed KMT? -------------- ¶6. (C) Some observers, the Director noted, have suggested the KMT too must change to dispel concerns of "one-party dominance." The KMT will try to conduct its affairs with modesty, to root out corruption within the party, and to deliver tangible economic improvements, replied Wu. Many of these goals will take time to reach, however. Cross-Strait Progress Could Be Sow -------------- ¶7. (C) The Director cautioned the KMT not to expect too much too soon in cross-Strait relations. China has come under fire from Western governments following the Tibet crisis, and has begun to dig in. Ma may need to move slowly with the PRC in the initial period after his May 20 inauguration, as Beijing will have its hands full with the Olympics and other domestic security issues. The Director expressed hope that, in the short-term, progress could be made on direct flights and increased access to Taiwan for PRC tourists. Ma Will Choose His Own People -------------- ¶8. (C) The Director suggested many KMT office seekers will vie for posts in Ma's administration and asked if Wu would play a role in the process. Wu answered that Ma and his team would make their own personnel decisions, but that he and the KMT leadership would offer Ma advice should he seek it. The party does not intend to take a position on Ma's appointments unless they result in a backlash of popular opinion. Wu explained that many positions are held by civil servants, who have passed examinations and cannot be removed in most circumstances. Using the Foreign Ministry as an example, he noted most of its staff are part of a professional diplomatic corps, as in the U.S., and while their jobs may not be terminated, Ma could decide to "shift" them around. KMT Pledges Cooperation with U.S. on Trade, Security Issues -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The Director noted that there now remains a small window of opportunity for the U.S. and Taiwan to solve several important economic issues, particularly beef and pork imports and common security concerns. The Director expressed hope Ma and his team would begin to actively discuss these issues, so as to hit the ground running after his May 20 inauguration. Wu pledged KMT cooperation with the U.S. to resolve these matters. Anticipating a Smooth Transition -------------- ¶10. (C) DIR asked Wu about his expectations regarding the transfer of power between President Chen and Ma Ying-jeou's incoming administration. Wu replied that he thought the transfer would go without a hitch. He is very familiar with the civil service staff of the presidential office, and asserted that 70 percent of them voted for Ma. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Wu represents several important constituencies within the KMT that President Ma needs to handle with care. He is old-school (Wu was Taoyuan magistrate in the early 1970s), Taiwanese and Hakka. He also controls assets within the party as Chairman. Whether party unity can be maintained as Ma moves into power and the euphoria over the KMT's election sweep wears off will be an important indication of the new government's long-term prospects. YOUNG