KMT CHAIRMAN WU POH-HSIUNG ON MA YING-JEOU'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000452

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: KMT CHAIRMAN WU POH-HSIUNG ON MA YING-JEOU'S
ELECTION AND U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Director Young on March 27,
KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung conceded that president-elect Ma
Ying-jeou had jumped the gun by publicly announcing his
desire to visit the U.S. before consulting AIT first. To
avoid embarrassment, Wu expressed hope the U.S. would allow
the visit as a "personal gesture" to Ma. On domestic
politics, Wu pledged the KMT would not abuse its power, and
would strive to retain the voters' trust. Wu said he and
other KMT leaders are not involved in Ma's personnel
decisions, but would offer advice if asked. The Ma
administration and the KMT will work with the U.S. to resolve
outstanding economic and security issues once Ma takes office
on May 20. Wu expressed hope that the U.S. will show its
support by sending a high-profile delegation to Ma's
inauguration. End Summary.

Ma's Victory
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2. (C) In a meeting with the Director on March 27, a jovial
KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung "congratulated" the U.S. on
achieving a 100 percent "victory", with Ma's election and the
defeat of both UN referenda. The Director replied that Ma's
victory was not a victory for the U.S. or a particular
candidate, but rather a victory for Taiwan and its democracy.
As for the referenda, the U.S. position had always been that
the people of Taiwan must decide for themselves. Wu agreed,
but insisted it was impossible to deny that voters had
considered the U.S. position and the importance of
U.S.-Taiwan relations when they cast (or didn't cast) their
ballots.

Ma's Hope to Visit U.S.
--------------


3. (C) Wu conceded that Ma had erred by publicly announcing
his desire to visit the U.S. before consulting AIT on the
matter. According to Wu, Ma was simply caught up in the
euphoria of his hard-fought victory and, "in a gesture of
goodwill to the U.S.," spoke too soon. Unfortunately, Wu
said, it now has become an issue of face for Ma and the KMT.
Wu also emphasized the importance of the U.S. sending a
high-profile delegation to Ma's May 20 inauguration. The
Director responded that there are other ways for the U.S. to
express its support for Ma besides a U.S. visit, and he
assured Chairman Wu that the Washington intends to send an
appropriate delegation to Ma's inauguration. The group will
consist of private citizens, but they will have close ties to
the Bush administration, and will underscore the importance
Washington places on U.S.-Taiwan relations. Although Taiwan
is only one issue in U.S.-China relations, the U.S. has
repeatedly emphasized to Beijing that it needs to respect the
Taiwan people's choice of leaders, and take advantage of the
opportunities Ma's election brings for improved cross-Strait
relations, the Director added.

Wu: Taiwan Identity a Dead Issue
--------------


4. (C) Wu claimed Ma's wide margin of victory proved that
"Taiwan identity" is now a dead issue. DPP presidential
candidate Frank Hsieh built his campaign around symbols of
Taiwan identity, but voters were focused on the economy and
other practical concerns. Ma won because he offered voters
the best hope to improve their lives.

DPP Down But Not Out
--------------


5. (C) Ma won the presidential election by 600,000 more votes
than KMT polls had predicted, said Wu. Ma scored unexpected
victories in several cities in southern Taiwan, and was even
competitive in southern counties considered to be DPP
strongholds. However, Ma's overwhelming victory has not
caused the KMT to dismiss the DPP, insisted Wu, noting that
Hsieh still won over five million votes. The DPP will have

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to make some important decisions before President Chen steps
down. If this process is unsuccessful, the DPP could fold,
although Wu thinks this unlikely.

A Reformed KMT?
--------------


6. (C) Some observers, the Director noted, have suggested the
KMT too must change to dispel concerns of "one-party
dominance." The KMT will try to conduct its affairs with
modesty, to root out corruption within the party, and to
deliver tangible economic improvements, replied Wu. Many of
these goals will take time to reach, however.

Cross-Strait Progress Could Be Sow
--------------


7. (C) The Director cautioned the KMT not to expect too much
too soon in cross-Strait relations. China has come under
fire from Western governments following the Tibet crisis, and
has begun to dig in. Ma may need to move slowly with the PRC
in the initial period after his May 20 inauguration, as
Beijing will have its hands full with the Olympics and other
domestic security issues. The Director expressed hope that,
in the short-term, progress could be made on direct flights
and increased access to Taiwan for PRC tourists.

Ma Will Choose His Own People
--------------


8. (C) The Director suggested many KMT office seekers will
vie for posts in Ma's administration and asked if Wu would
play a role in the process. Wu answered that Ma and his team
would make their own personnel decisions, but that he and the
KMT leadership would offer Ma advice should he seek it. The
party does not intend to take a position on Ma's appointments
unless they result in a backlash of popular opinion. Wu
explained that many positions are held by civil servants, who
have passed examinations and cannot be removed in most
circumstances. Using the Foreign Ministry as an example, he
noted most of its staff are part of a professional diplomatic
corps, as in the U.S., and while their jobs may not be
terminated, Ma could decide to "shift" them around.

KMT Pledges Cooperation with U.S. on Trade, Security Issues
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The Director noted that there now remains a small
window of opportunity for the U.S. and Taiwan to solve
several important economic issues, particularly beef and pork
imports and common security concerns. The Director expressed
hope Ma and his team would begin to actively discuss these
issues, so as to hit the ground running after his May 20
inauguration. Wu pledged KMT cooperation with the U.S. to
resolve these matters.

Anticipating a Smooth Transition
--------------


10. (C) DIR asked Wu about his expectations regarding the
transfer of power between President Chen and Ma Ying-jeou's
incoming administration. Wu replied that he thought the
transfer would go without a hitch. He is very familiar with
the civil service staff of the presidential office, and
asserted that 70 percent of them voted for Ma.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Wu represents several important constituencies within
the KMT that President Ma needs to handle with care. He is
old-school (Wu was Taoyuan magistrate in the early 1970s),
Taiwanese and Hakka. He also controls assets within the
party as Chairman. Whether party unity can be maintained as
Ma moves into power and the euphoria over the KMT's election
sweep wears off will be an important indication of the new
government's long-term prospects.
YOUNG