TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: EXPLAINING MA'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000440 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: EXPLAINING MA'S VICTORY REF: TAIPEI 00421 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The KMT's Ma Ying-jeou won a record-breaking 58.4 percent of the votes in Taiwan's presidential election on March 22, beating the ruling DPP candidate Frank Hsieh, who took 41.6 percent of the vote (Reftel). Most observers here place the major responsibility for the defeat on President Chen, whose family and some high officials have been embroiled in corruption controversies since 2005. Some experts caution against viewing the results as a rejection of Taiwan independence or as an affirmation of Ma's accommodating cross-strait policies. The outcome also represents a genuine "victory" for Ma, who capitalized on personal popularity and a strengthened KMT campaign performance that focused on the economy. The DPP is expected to enter into a struggle over leadership, party line and future direction, while the KMT has an opportunity to offer reconciliation and try to heal the social divisions resulting from a hard fought campaign. Most are hopeful Ma's victory will lead to cross-Strait progress, but note it is up to Beijing to decide how to respond to Ma's moderate overtures. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) A broad range of prominent local and international experts analyzed the results and implications of Taiwan's March 22 presidential election at several post-election panel discussions attended by AIT. The following summarizes some of the more interesting views that experts expressed about the reasons for Ma's decisive victory and the implications for DOMESTIC politics, cross-Strait relations, and U.S.-Taiwan relations. A Referendum on President Chen... -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The KMT's Ma Ying-jeou scored a decisive victory over DPP candidate Frank Hsieh in the Taiwan presidential election on March 22, winning by a margin of 58.4 - 41.6 percent of the votes (Reftel). Observers here note that this election is the latest in a string of defeats for the DPP since 2005, when President Chen's family and some senior DPP officials first became embroiled in corruption cases. They place the major responsibility on Chen for the DPP defeats, including Hsieh's electoral loss. In their view, the balloting on March 22 was a clear repudiation of the president by a public dissatisfied with the government's management of the economy and promotion of ideologically-charged partisan politics. However, many local commentators, especially those with pro-Green views, caution against viewing the election as a rejection of Taiwan identity or independence, or as an affirmation of Ma's more accommodating cross-Strait policies, noting this was more a vote against the DPP than a vote for the KMT and its policies. ¶4. (SBU) Hsieh, who faced an uphill battle, is generally seen as doing as well as could be expected under very unfavorable circumstances. Under Chen the DPP failed to enlarge its base of support. In part because of the corruption problems and KMT attempts to recall or force him to resign, Chen moved away from the political mainstream to embrace more extreme pro-independence initiatives. This damaged the attractiveness of the party to many voters by giving the impression that the administration was not taking seriously their genuine economic and social-welfare concerns. A normally unified party, moreover, was racked by fissures resulting from a highly contentious primary campaign in the spring of last year. Some also fault Hsieh for running an overly negative campaign and point out he was not a very proactive campaigner, making many fewer public appearances than Chen did when he was the candidate. ...And a Vote of Confidence for Ma -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The election outcome also represents a genuine TAIPEI 00000440 002 OF 004 "victory" for Ma, who was able to capitalize on his personal popularity and a strengthened campaign performance by the KMT focused on the economy. Some experts say the KMT led by Ma has changed in some key aspects from what it was eight years ago. It has successfully moved away from core pro-unification ideals to accommodate the preferences of the mainstream Taiwan majority, effectively neutralizing the DPP's efforts to play the Taiwan-identity card. Ma, with widespread personal appeal as a clean and moderate politician, is a much stronger candidate than Lien Chan was in 2000 and 2004. After 15 years of division, the pan-Blue camp learned that disunity helped only the DPP, and it fully unified behind Ma. The KMT also ran a well-organized, effective campaign that showed creativity and reduced the advantage previously held by the DPP in this area. Political Trends Underpinning the Results -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ma won by an impressively large margin, which had already been presaged in the results of local and legislative elections since 2005. Those elections showed overall support for the KMT had risen from approximately 50 percent to perhaps slightly under 60 percent. Some argue the shift began with Ma's election as KMT chairman in 2005 and accelerated when corruption scandals involving Chen's family and staffers that began to surface later that year. The overall vote share for the DPP dropped from about 50 percent in 2004 to around 40 percent in the 2005 local and 2008 legislative elections, a decline of 8-10 percent. Much of that decline shifted to the KMT, but some was a result of light Green voters sitting out elections. ¶7. (SBU) The independent voters that largely have swung in support of the KMT over the past few election cycles are a heterogeneous group, ranging from white-collar middle class professionals who vote on issues to working class people who lack strong party identification and are more susceptible to mobilization. One scholar suggested many of these independent voters live in central Taiwan, a key battleground where the KMT made large gains. Compared to 2004 when Chen narrowly won central Taiwan, Hsieh lost this area by an overwhelming number of votes. Also notable was Ma's ability to erode the DPP's vote share in southern Taiwan, winning the larger cities of Kaohsiung, Tainan, and Chiayi and reducing the DPP majority in the five largely agricultural counties of Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung, which Hsieh won by only a small margin. Referenda Concerns -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The failure of the two UN referenda to meet the participation threshold required for validation (50 percent of all eligible voters) is seen by some as detrimental to Taiwan's democratic development because it diminishes the effectiveness of national referenda as one of the important tools for determining public policy. The DPP's politicization of referenda degrades their value. In addition, some are concerned that the international community may misinterpret the failure of the UN referenda. Implications for Taiwan Democracy -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The free, fair and clean election showcased Taiwan's vibrant democracy, experts agree. Some invoke Harvard professor Sam Huntington to suggest that the second transfer of power between political parties signifies Taiwan is transitioning from a young to a "mature" democracy. Independent voters played a pivotal, healthy role, and chose to vote based on the issues and their everyday concerns, rather than the more partisan ideological politics and agenda setting by the political parties and media. Hsieh and the DPP, furthermore, took the loss graciously, affirming the results as the will of the people and a personal failure for Hsieh but a success of the democratic process. Ma's wide margin of victory and the KMT's earlier overwhelming victory TAIPEI 00000440 003 OF 004 in the January legislative elections give Ma a strong mandate, but the public will now hold the KMT fully accountable for the future performance of the government. Implications for DOMESTIC Politics -------------- ¶10. (SBU) After experiencing the latest in a string of electoral defeats, the DPP will undergo a period of introspection and, perhaps, reform, several experts believe. While the breakup of the party remains only a remote possibility, the coming months are likely to see a heated debate over party line between moderates and independence fundamentalists and also a power struggle as the party prepares to hold an election in late May for party chairman. In the short-term, some say, the deep Green could hold the upper hand and the DPP may move to consolidate its base before attempting to move back toward the center to prepare for the next local elections slated for late 2009. Some point out the DPP still represents 42 percent of the voters and the party could return to power in four years if the KMT runs into corruption problems or Ma's cross-Strait policies do not win support from the Taiwanese majority. ¶11. (SBU) Ma has an opportunity to lead Taiwan toward national reconciliation, putting in the past the highly charged politics of the Chen era. Some say Ma could help this process by reaching out to the DPP and independents, offering positions in the next administration and pardoning Chen if he is indicted and convicted after leaving office. The public will expect Ma and his administration to be more transparent in conducting business and deals with Beijing. Perhaps Ma's greatest challenge will be managing and balancing the competing interests of the party bureaucracy, the KMT Legislative Yuan (LY) caucus, and the executive branch. Key tests for Ma will be his ability to check corruption and whether he follows through on pledges to appoint some politically independent professionals to positions in supervisory institutions such as the Control Yuan, Examination Yuan, and the Council of Grand Justices. Implications for Cross-Strait Relations -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Most local observers agree it is now up to Beijing to decide how to respond to Ma's moderate cross-Strait policies and statements. Challenges Ma may face in dealing with China could include possible attempts by Beijing to further limit Taiwan's international space, conflicting signals from Beijing, reflecting differences within the Chinese leadership over how to engage Taipei, and Chinese reactions to Ma's criticisms of Beijing's poor human rights record. The weakened position of the DPP could lead Beijing to think it will have greater leverage over Ma. Several experts suggest Ma cannot fulfill his cross-Strait promises without serious concessions and flexibility from Beijing. China needs to react positively to Ma's overtures to show the Taiwan public that a more moderate approach can bring benefits to Taiwan. Ma will also have to be careful to reassure the Taiwanese that moves to improve relations with Beijing will not "sell out" Taiwan to China. Several experts suggest a unified front would strengthen Ma's bargaining position and hope he will consider the DPP's views while also balancing competing cross-Strait strategies from within his own party. Others note that a stronger relationship with the U.S. and other "unofficial" partners would also improve Taiwan's position vis-a-vis Beijing. ¶13. (SBU) Experts suggest that if Beijing is unable to move on cross-Strait relations with a Ma administration, then future prospects for progress will be even dimmer. Regional and international politics, however, could complicate the process leading to a cross-Strait rapprochement. Some note that U.S. arm sales to Taipei, the possibility of a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement, and the improvement of U.S-Taiwan ties could make it more difficult for Beijing to make concessions. Others argue that this would increase Taiwan's leverage but not necessarily block progress, a view TAIPEI 00000440 004 OF 004 Ma and his closest advisers have favored. Implications for U.S.-Taiwan Relations -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Ma's victory could usher in an era of greater stability in northeast Asia, which would be welcomed by the U.S., most observers agree. Ma could turn the triangular Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship from a "zero sum" into a "positive sum" game. The key is restoring trust, credibility, stability, and continuity to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, which some suggested could be advanced by a Ma visit to Washington prior to inauguration. If packaged as a move to enhance stability in the Taiwan Strait and a step to lay groundwork for future cross-Strait dialogue, Beijing may pull its punches in objecting to such travel by the president-elect, the experts maintain. YOUNG