KMT'S MA YING-JEOU IN THE HOME STRETCH,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000375 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2023 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: KMT'S MA YING-JEOU IN THE HOME STRETCH, U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS UNDER A MA ADMINISTRATION Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou is taking nothing for granted in the run-up to the March 22 presidential election. He told Director Young in a March 15 meeting that only the deepest-blue cities and counties are "safe," and that he will campaign to the end. Ma conceded that his campaign has been hurt by recent KMT missteps, including the March 12 attempt by four KMT legislators to barge into the campaign office of DPP presidential opponent Frank Hsieh. Farmers in the south, moreover, have embraced Hsieh's criticism of Ma's "one China market" proposal, though Ma is hopeful that pragmatic "swing" voters would ignore rhetoric and focus on the economic boost liberalized cross-Strait trade could bring. The PRC crackdown in Tibet hasn't helped either, Ma admitted, and is helping Hsieh to paint the PRC as cruel and untrustworthy. Ma said he will continue to support the KMT's UN referendum, but predicted that both referenda will fail. Although President Chen isn't a graceful loser, Ma intoned, Chen will respect the democratic process and hand over power if Hsieh is defeated. In a private pull-aside at the end of this session, the Director reminded Ma that, if elected, he would be addressing many audiences in his first public remarks, including those in Beijing and Washington. Ma promised that under his administration, Taiwan will not sacrifice its relationship with the U.S. for closer ties to China. Taiwan must negotiate with the PRC from a position of strength, he added, something that is only possible if the U.S. and Taiwan maintain close defense ties. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Director and Deputy Director met with KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou and campaign foreign policy adviser John Feng at Ma's campaign headquarters early on Saturday, March 15. Ma seemed relaxed, but somewhat fatigued by the stress of the campaign. He talked freely about campaign strategy, recent setbacks, the UN referenda, and U.S.-Taiwan relations under a potential Ma administration. Down to the Wire -------------- ¶3. (C) Ma told the Director that he will spend the closing days of the campaign in western Taiwan, where the bulk of the voters live. Ma explained that in these final days, only Taidong and Hualien Counties, and the small islands of Kinmen and Matsu are "problem free" blue strongholds; every other county "has its strong and weak points." Ma acknowledged that he would be participating in the large KMT rally scheduled in Tainan the next day, Sunday, March 16. The Director asked whether Ma expected Tainan, or central Taiwan, to be the decisive battleground. The DPP believes the critical fight will be in Taichung, replied Ma, but it could very well be in KMT-governed Taipei County, where DPP vice presidential candidate Su Tseng-chang was once magistrate. The race is close enough, Ma continued, that the KMT cannot safely ignore cities and counties headed by KMT mayors or magistrates. One Party Dominance -------------- ¶4. (C) Ma acknowledged that the March 12 foray by four KMT legislators into the campaign offices of DPP candidate Frank Hsieh had hurt his campaign. One measure of the extent of the damage would be the turnout at the DPP rallies scheduled on March 16. (Note: DPP supporters turned out in respectable, but not unexpectedly high numbers on March 16. End note.) Hsieh is is urging the public to install a DPP president to check and balance the KMT's legislative majority and "one party dominance." Ma insisted Hsieh's argument is anti-democratic, for there are many instances (U.S., France, Japan) where one party dominated all branches of democratic government, but governed well. Ma conceded that Hsieh's "checks and balances" theme may win over some swing voters, but expressed confidence the majority would stick with him and the KMT. (Note: Campaign adviser John Feng told the Deputy Director separately that his guess is that the Hsieh campaign office incident could increase DPP turnout by 300 thousand -- voters who otherwise might have stayed home. End TAIPEI 00000375 002 OF 003 note.) ¶5. (C) At the same time, Ma told the Director the Hsieh campaign office incident would increase his ability to control KMT legislators. The KMT had already made an example of the four legislators involved, suspending their party membership and stripping the leader, Alex Fai, of his position as KMT LY majority whip. That should keep the rest of the KMT caucus in line at least until the presidential election on March 22, suggested Ma. Ma noted that he has "a different style" than many in the KMT. If he is elected, Ma continued, he will use the prestige of the presidential office to enforce discipline within the party, including the KMT LY caucus. ¶6. (C) The KMT could use its overwhelming majority in the LY to marginalize the small block of DPP legislators who managed to get elected, the Director observed. If DPP legislators become frustrated, he continued, they could resort to extreme tactics to bring the LY to a halt. The KMT caucus offered the DPP four committee convener seats, replied Ma, but the DPP, eager to maintain its image as the "repressed minority" for presidential campaign purposes, declined. Ma said personal experience had taught him it was better to share power with adversaries than to try to exclude them. When the presidential election is no longer at stake, Ma said, he will encourage, and the DPP may be more willing to accept, further KMT overtures to share legislative power. "One China Market" -------------- ¶7. (C) Hsieh's recent attacks on the "One China Market" had scored points with farmers and laborers in southern Taiwan, conceded Ma, who hoped that more practical-minded swing voters in the rest of Taiwan would focus on the economic benefits open trade with China could bring. A prominent Taiwan business magazine recently criticized Hsieh for harboring "naive" views about the cross-Strait market and its possibilities, noted Ma. The KMT has mobilized its propaganda machine to counter DPP accusations that Ma would allow Chinese products and laborers to flood Taiwan's markets. The Hsieh campaign has alleged that Ma and the KMT are outspending the DPP on advertising ten-to-one. In reality, Ma argued, he and the KMT are at a disadvantage because Hsieh can exploit government resources, including the Government Information Office (GIO),to get his message across. Tibet Crackdown Echoes in Taiwan -------------- ¶8. (C) The Director asked Ma's view on recent disturbances in Tibet. Was this affecting his campaign? Until now, Ma began, Beijing has largely avoided giving Hsieh and the DPP ammunition to use against the Ma campaign. However, he continued, the DPP will certainly exploit the crackdown in Tibet to denounce the PRC as both cruel and untrustworthy. (Note: At the DPP rally on March 16, Hsieh charged that Taiwan would become the next Tibet if Ma were to be elected. End note.) Ma stated he would continue to voice his support for Tibetan autonomy, and to denounce all human rights atrocities, including the KMT's own 2/28 Incident. Ma Backs KMT Referendum, Predicts Both Will Fail -------------- --- ¶9. (C) How will the KMT decision to call for a boycott of the DPP UN referendum affect Ma's chances of getting elected, asked the Director. Ma sidestepped the question, replying only that he would continue to support the KMT version of the UN referendum. In any event, Ma predicted, both the KMT and DPP referenda will fail. After the Election -------------- ¶10. (C) The Director asked Ma whether he or others in the KMT were concerned that President Chen would spring a surprise after the election and refuse to hand over power to a KMT TAIPEI 00000375 003 OF 003 administration. Ma recalled that, after he defeated Chen in the 1998 Taipei mayoral race, Chen refused to give him the keys to the office until the day before his inauguration, weeks later. Chen did not accept his defeat gracefully, but he did step down. Ma noted that if he wins the presidential election, it will be the second time Chen will have to surrender power to him. Chen probably won't be a gracious loser this time around either, predicted Ma, but he will honor his public promises to respect the will of the people. Private Meeting with Director -------------- ¶11. (C) At the close of the meeting, the Director asked to speak privately with Ma. Noting that this was their last meeting before the election, the Director encouraged Ma, if elected, to bear in mind the many audiences, including Beijing and Washington, that would be listening to his acceptance speech and to his remarks during subsequent appearances as president-elect. How the new president-elect characterized the UN referenda, especially if one or both passed, was sensitive in the eyes of both China and the U.S. So too was the question of Taiwan's defense policy. Some in the U.S. are concerned that a KMT administration might accept increased distance between Taipei and Washington to get closer to Beijing. Ma expressed his understanding of and appreciation for this guidance. He insisted that no relationship is more important to Taiwan than the one with the U.S., a position he promised to clearly express in his acceptance remarks. Ma also pledged that Taiwan would not sacrifice the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship to placate China. Taiwan must negotiate with China from a position of strength, Ma argued, an impossibility without close defense ties with the U.S. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Candidate Ma is not taking anything for granted in this race, cognizant of the DPP's history of come-from-behind victories. That said, he has seemed defensive as Frank Hsieh has bombarded his campaign with attacks in recent weeks, on everything from his possible green card to cross-Strait ties. These attacks have clearly rattled the KMT candidate, making it harder for him to stay on message. Ma's camp continues to believe the DPP has a last-minute "surprise" or "dirty trick" up its sleeve. If so, the final test for Ma will be to convince the electorate in the final days of this nasty campaign that he is the better choice to lead Taiwan over the next four years. YOUNG