PRO-KMT ACADEMICS ON MA YING-JEOU'S CAMPAIGN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000340 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/04/2023 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: PRO-KMT ACADEMICS ON MA YING-JEOU'S CAMPAIGN AND POSSIBLE FUTURE ADMINISTRATION Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with AIT, several pro-KMT academics expressed confidence that KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou will win the March 22 presidential election. The academics cited dissatisfaction with the Chen administration, the importance of economic issues, and Ma's ability to connect to voters who have traditionally supported the DPP as key factors giving the advantage to Ma. If elected, Ma will be cautious in personnel appointments and probably staff his administration with experienced KMT veterans. Although Ma will focus on strengthening cross-Strait economic links, an early majr breakthrough in cross-Strait RELATIONS is unlikely. The continued influence of the party's old guard will limit Ma's control over policy formulation, and he will need to share some power with legislative speaker Wang Jyn-ping and KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. End Summary. Trends Helping the Ma Campaign -------------- ¶2. (C) In separate recent meetings with AIT, several pro-KMT academics suggested that the presidential contest is Ma's to lose, citing dissatisfaction with the Chen administration, the importance of economic issues, and Ma's ability to connect to voters who have traditionally supported the DPP as key factors boosting Ma's campaign. Ma adviser and Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation President Chu Yun-han, National Taipei University Professor Chiang Ming-chin, and National Taiwan University Professor Philip Yang separately told AIT that the results of the presidential election would reflect voters' disapproval of the Chen administration rather than their evaluation of the policies or abilities of Hsieh and Ma. ¶3. (C) The more significant role the economy is playing than in the previous two presidential elections is helping Ma gain support from important voting blocs, the scholars told AIT. Even though Ma and Hsieh's economic policies are generally similar, the average citizen is not making this comparison, Chu Yun-han said, adding that Hsieh has struggled to disassociate himself from the widespread public perception that the Chen administration has been bad for the economy. Compared to 2004, Chiang Ming-chin said there are 1.28 million new voters for this election. They are more concerned about economic stability, income, and job opportunities than national identity issues, making them more likely to vote for Ma. Chinese Cultural University Professor Spencer Yang maintained that Hsieh's attacks on Ma's character have backfired. Several scholars agreed that the presidential debates would have little impact on voters' decisions since most had already made up their minds. ¶4. (C) Changes in the preferences and voting behavior of certain voting blocs will also benefit Ma, the academics suggested. Spencer Yang told AIT that he expects a higher turnout rate for KMT than DPP supporters in this election, reversing a trend that helped the DPP in 2004. Spencer Yang and KMT Department of Overseas Affairs Director and National Chengchi University Professor Ho Szu-yin separately noted that larger numbers of overseas KMT supporters are returning to vote this time. Yang observed that this trend includes the Taiwan business people working in China, who tend to favor Ma. Ma also has succeeded in making inroads with younger voters and professionals. Ho told AIT that Ma's support among younger voters is outpacing Hsieh's by a two to one ratio and Spencer Yang said that Ma has gained more support from professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, who have traditionally supported the DPP but now are split between the two parties. Ma Administration: Wary of Putting the Cart Before the Horse? -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The academics suggested Ma, if elected, would take a cautious approach, emphasizing experience, in his personnel appointments. Several scholars cautioned that the entire focus now is on winning the election. Philip Yang said the KMT learned its lesson after 2004 when party members had been more concerned with competing for future-administration TAIPEI 00000340 002 OF 003 positions than with ensuring Lien Chan's victory. Chu said Ma would likely pick non-controversial figures with strong government experience for top posts, and Spencer Yang suggested Ma would also probably include several younger and ethnic minority officials. Several academics named Soochow University President Liu Chao-hsuan, who is close to Ma, and former Vice Premier Chiang Pin-kung as likely candidates for Premier. ¶6. (C) Ma's vulnerability to the demands of powerful figures within his party would probably affect his administration's staffing and policy formulation, the academics suggested. Spencer Yang predicted that party leaders, not Ma's campaign staff, would run the government if Ma wins. Chu Yun-han said that Ma's control over policy would depend on how large a victory he achieved in the election and how favorable a power sharing arrangement he worked out with legislative speaker (and rival) Wang Jyn-ping and KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung. Philip Yang said Ma probably would work to forge a consensus among all KMT factions for his first two years, and then would focus on his re-election, making it unlikely that he would push any controversial policies during his first term. Ma is not a micromanager like President Chen, Chu observed. Moreover, Chiang argued, lack of a decisive grip on power within the KMT might prompt Ma to delegate some sensitive responsibilities, such as cross-strait relations, to other people. The academics named close Ma advisers John (Chung) Kuan, and Su Yeong-chin and his brother Su Chi as senior party members likely to hold key positions in the administration. Chiang thought Su Chi might serve in a high-level position concerning foreign policy, especially U.S.-Taiwan relations. Constructive Not Confrontational Cross-Strait RELATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ma has said publicly that his cross-Strait policy will focus on strengthening economic links and AIT contacts agreed that this was the area Ma in which was likely to have the most success. While some contacts recognized that public pressure may push Ma to try to expand Taiwan's international space, most contacts agreed that Ma's primary goal would be to avoid controversy. Several contacts suggested that Ma's criticisms of Beijing's Anti-Secession Law and human rights violations would make quick breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations unlikely. While Beijing is probably deliberating on what carrots to offer Ma, Philip Yang said, he did not expect any major moves by the Mainland until and unless Ma is re-elected. Chiang, who has close ties to Wang Jyn-ping, predicted that Wang would take the lead in forging improved ties to China, adding that the KMT already had negotiated a deal with China for Wang to visit the Mainland after the election. (Comment: We expect Ma to keep a firm grip on cross-Strait policy, one of the most important planks of his platform.) The KMT Today - Still Your Father's Party -------------- ¶8. (C) The lingering primacy of the old guard and intra-party competition has hindered KMT reform and is likely to create difficulties for Ma both within his party and with the public, the scholars said. According to Chu Yun-han, the political culture of the KMT today is the same as eight years ago, and Chiang also stressed that party reform has been stagnant. The KMT also has been hurt, Philip Yang suggested, by its failure to recruit and groom younger party members during the 1990s. Whither the DPP and Taiwan Democracy? -------------- ¶9. (C) The academics believed that, if Frank Hsieh loses, he will be finished and it will probably be several election cycles before the DPP can again pose a serious threat to the KMT at the local or national levels. Chu suggested that a DPP loss in the presidential election coupled with the drubbing in the legislative elections would be the impetus for reform within the DPP, and he and Philip Yang posited TAIPEI 00000340 003 OF 003 that the party's future depends on the emergence of a younger generation of leaders. Philip Yang also argued that the paucity of moderate politicians within the DPP would hinder the party's ability to attract support beyond its core base, saying the party needs someone like Ma who could articulate and implement a moderate vision of Taiwan's future within the broader international context. ¶10. (C) The academics were divided over whether KMT victories in the presidential and legislative elections might represent a setback for Taiwan democracy. Philip Yang argued that a Ma victory would be a blow to democratic development. Conversely, Chu argued that a KMT win was not a setback for democracy because there were plenty of examples in western democracies where a single party held a majority in the legislature and also was the head of government. Rather, Chu said, impediments to Taiwan's future democratic development stem from its relationship with China and the United States, the divisive effects of the debate on Taiwan's national identity, POLITICAL clientelism, and the growing gap between the rich and the poor. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) While the KMT has been doing a fair job of maintaining an outward appearance of party unity in order to maximize chances for a Ma victory, these accounts highlight the latent tensions likely to emerge in a battle over the spoils of victory if they win. YOUNG