PRO-KMT ACADEMICS ON MA YING-JEOU'S CAMPAIGN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000340

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/04/2023
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: PRO-KMT ACADEMICS ON MA YING-JEOU'S CAMPAIGN AND
POSSIBLE FUTURE ADMINISTRATION


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with AIT, several
pro-KMT academics expressed confidence that KMT candidate Ma
Ying-jeou will win the March 22 presidential election. The
academics cited dissatisfaction with the Chen administration,
the importance of economic issues, and Ma's ability to
connect to voters who have traditionally supported the DPP as
key factors giving the advantage to Ma. If elected, Ma will
be cautious in personnel appointments and probably staff his
administration with experienced KMT veterans. Although Ma
will focus on strengthening cross-Strait economic links, an
early majr breakthrough in cross-Strait relations is
unlikely. The continued influence of the party's old guard
will limit Ma's control over policy formulation, and he will
need to share some power with legislative speaker Wang
Jyn-ping and KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. End Summary.

Trends Helping the Ma Campaign
--------------


2. (C) In separate recent meetings with AIT, several pro-KMT
academics suggested that the presidential contest is Ma's to
lose, citing dissatisfaction with the Chen administration,
the importance of economic issues, and Ma's ability to
connect to voters who have traditionally supported the DPP as
key factors boosting Ma's campaign. Ma adviser and Chiang
Ching-kuo Foundation President Chu Yun-han, National Taipei
University Professor Chiang Ming-chin, and National Taiwan
University Professor Philip Yang separately told AIT that the
results of the presidential election would reflect voters'
disapproval of the Chen administration rather than their
evaluation of the policies or abilities of Hsieh and Ma.


3. (C) The more significant role the economy is playing than
in the previous two presidential elections is helping Ma gain
support from important voting blocs, the scholars told AIT.
Even though Ma and Hsieh's economic policies are generally
similar, the average citizen is not making this comparison,
Chu Yun-han said, adding that Hsieh has struggled to
disassociate himself from the widespread public perception
that the Chen administration has been bad for the economy.
Compared to 2004, Chiang Ming-chin said there are 1.28
million new voters for this election. They are more
concerned about economic stability, income, and job
opportunities than national identity issues, making them more
likely to vote for Ma. Chinese Cultural University Professor
Spencer Yang maintained that Hsieh's attacks on Ma's
character have backfired. Several scholars agreed that the
presidential debates would have little impact on voters'
decisions since most had already made up their minds.


4. (C) Changes in the preferences and voting behavior of
certain voting blocs will also benefit Ma, the academics
suggested. Spencer Yang told AIT that he expects a higher
turnout rate for KMT than DPP supporters in this election,
reversing a trend that helped the DPP in 2004. Spencer Yang
and KMT Department of Overseas Affairs Director and National
Chengchi University Professor Ho Szu-yin separately noted
that larger numbers of overseas KMT supporters are returning
to vote this time. Yang observed that this trend includes
the Taiwan business people working in China, who tend to
favor Ma. Ma also has succeeded in making inroads with
younger voters and professionals. Ho told AIT that Ma's
support among younger voters is outpacing Hsieh's by a two to
one ratio and Spencer Yang said that Ma has gained more
support from professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, who
have traditionally supported the DPP but now are split
between the two parties.

Ma Administration: Wary of Putting the Cart Before the Horse?
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The academics suggested Ma, if elected, would take a
cautious approach, emphasizing experience, in his personnel
appointments. Several scholars cautioned that the entire
focus now is on winning the election. Philip Yang said the
KMT learned its lesson after 2004 when party members had been
more concerned with competing for future-administration

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positions than with ensuring Lien Chan's victory. Chu said
Ma would likely pick non-controversial figures with strong
government experience for top posts, and Spencer Yang
suggested Ma would also probably include several younger and
ethnic minority officials. Several academics named Soochow
University President Liu Chao-hsuan, who is close to Ma, and
former Vice Premier Chiang Pin-kung as likely candidates for
Premier.


6. (C) Ma's vulnerability to the demands of powerful figures
within his party would probably affect his administration's
staffing and policy formulation, the academics suggested.
Spencer Yang predicted that party leaders, not Ma's campaign
staff, would run the government if Ma wins. Chu Yun-han said
that Ma's control over policy would depend on how large a
victory he achieved in the election and how favorable a power
sharing arrangement he worked out with legislative speaker
(and rival) Wang Jyn-ping and KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung.
Philip Yang said Ma probably would work to forge a consensus
among all KMT factions for his first two years, and then
would focus on his re-election, making it unlikely that he
would push any controversial policies during his first term.
Ma is not a micromanager like President Chen, Chu observed.
Moreover, Chiang argued, lack of a decisive grip on power
within the KMT might prompt Ma to delegate some sensitive
responsibilities, such as cross-strait relations, to other
people. The academics named close Ma advisers John (Chung)
Kuan, and Su Yeong-chin and his brother Su Chi as senior
party members likely to hold key positions in the
administration. Chiang thought Su Chi might serve in a
high-level position concerning foreign policy, especially
U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Constructive Not Confrontational Cross-Strait Relations
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Ma has said publicly that his cross-Strait policy
will focus on strengthening economic links and AIT contacts
agreed that this was the area Ma in which was likely to have
the most success. While some contacts recognized that public
pressure may push Ma to try to expand Taiwan's international
space, most contacts agreed that Ma's primary goal would be
to avoid controversy. Several contacts suggested that Ma's
criticisms of Beijing's Anti-Secession Law and human rights
violations would make quick breakthroughs in cross-Strait
relations unlikely. While Beijing is probably deliberating
on what carrots to offer Ma, Philip Yang said, he did not
expect any major moves by the Mainland until and unless Ma is
re-elected. Chiang, who has close ties to Wang Jyn-ping,
predicted that Wang would take the lead in forging improved
ties to China, adding that the KMT already had negotiated a
deal with China for Wang to visit the Mainland after the
election. (Comment: We expect Ma to keep a firm grip on
cross-Strait policy, one of the most important planks of his
platform.)

The KMT Today - Still Your Father's Party
--------------


8. (C) The lingering primacy of the old guard and
intra-party competition has hindered KMT reform and is likely
to create difficulties for Ma both within his party and with
the public, the scholars said. According to Chu Yun-han, the
political culture of the KMT today is the same as eight years
ago, and Chiang also stressed that party reform has been
stagnant. The KMT also has been hurt, Philip Yang suggested,
by its failure to recruit and groom younger party members
during the 1990s.

Whither the DPP and Taiwan Democracy?
--------------


9. (C) The academics believed that, if Frank Hsieh loses, he
will be finished and it will probably be several election
cycles before the DPP can again pose a serious threat to the
KMT at the local or national levels. Chu suggested that a
DPP loss in the presidential election coupled with the
drubbing in the legislative elections would be the impetus
for reform within the DPP, and he and Philip Yang posited

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that the party's future depends on the emergence of a younger
generation of leaders. Philip Yang also argued that the
paucity of moderate politicians within the DPP would hinder
the party's ability to attract support beyond its core base,
saying the party needs someone like Ma who could articulate
and implement a moderate vision of Taiwan's future within the
broader international context.


10. (C) The academics were divided over whether KMT
victories in the presidential and legislative elections might
represent a setback for Taiwan democracy. Philip Yang argued
that a Ma victory would be a blow to democratic development.
Conversely, Chu argued that a KMT win was not a setback for
democracy because there were plenty of examples in western
democracies where a single party held a majority in the
legislature and also was the head of government. Rather, Chu
said, impediments to Taiwan's future democratic development
stem from its relationship with China and the United States,
the divisive effects of the debate on Taiwan's national
identity, political clientelism, and the growing gap between
the rich and the poor.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) While the KMT has been doing a fair job of
maintaining an outward appearance of party unity in order to
maximize chances for a Ma victory, these accounts highlight
the latent tensions likely to emerge in a battle over the
spoils of victory if they win.
YOUNG