KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON REFERENDUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000313

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2023
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON REFERENDUM
BOYCOTT, CROSS-STRAIT PROSPECTS UNDER KMT ADMINISTRATION


Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: KMT "Honorary Chairman" Lien Chan preicted
KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou would win if there
were no "surprises" between now and the March 22 election.
Lien acknowledged that Ma has a "moderate" personality which
may appeal to a broad swath of voters, but attributed Ma's
lead to President Chen's low popularity, he insisted, not
Ma's campaign. Taiwan does not have a large population of
"swing voters," argued Lien, but young people and light-Blue
and -Green voters who sat out January's legislative elections
will probably vote in the presidential election, and mostly
in favor of the KMT. Lien believes the KMT erred in offering
its own UN referendum, and now must call for a boycott of
both UN referenda to ensure the DPP version fails. China has
not been a factor in this presidential election because
Beijing has kept quiet. This is evidence, Lien asserted,
that Beijing has "learned the lessons" of the 2000 and 2004
elections. Once in office, Ma will be able to move quickly on
cross-Strait flights and increased PRC tourism, Lien
predicted, because most of the details have already been
ironed out via the "Macao Process." However, it will be more
difficult for Taipei and Beijing to reach a consensus on
deeper economic cooperation, Taiwan's international "living
space," and the missiles aimed at Taiwan. Beijing must
understand that any consensus must be acceptable to Taiwan's
people, Lien insisted, or further progress will be
politically impossible. End Summary.


2. (C) The Director met with KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan
and his foreign policy adviser Stephen Chen on March 6, at
the offices of Lien's charitable foundation.

KMT Pushes on Green Card
--------------


3. (C) Prior to Lien's arrival, Chen asked the Director when
the USG planned to answer the Central Election Commission
(CEC) inquiry regarding Ma Ying-jeou's alleged U.S.
citizenship. The Director informed Chen that the issue was
being managed from Washington, and that AIT was not involved.
Once the answer had been prepared, the Director continued,
it would be delivered to the CEC through the TECRO office in
Washington. Chen anxiously urged the USG to put the issue to
rest before the presidential election, not after.

Reasonable Chance Ma Will Win...
--------------


4. (C) After congratulating Lien on the birth of his first
grandchild, the Director asked Lien for his predictions on
the presidential race. There is a "reasonable chance" of a
KMT victory, Lien replied, as long as "all other things
remain equal." There are still two weeks remaining before
the election, Lien explained, and the KMT remains on guard
against "surprises" from President Chen and the Hsieh
campaign. The Director noted that others in the KMT had
expressed concern for Ma's physical safety, which is
particularly at risk when Ma interacts with the public. Lien
did not answer the question directly, but gave the sense that
he was not overly concerned by threats to Ma's person. Both
Lien and Stephen Chen agreed that it was too early to talk
about who might be chosen to serve in Ma's cabinet, if he is
elected.

...Thanks to Chen, Not Ma
--------------


5. (C) Lien had little positive to say about Ma or the
quality of his presidential campaign. Lien conceded that Ma
has a "moderate" personality which may be "more acceptable"
to voters than the temperament of his opponent, DPP candidate
Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting). But he was quick to add that the
"real" reason Ma was leading in the polls was the abject
failure of the Chen administration and Chen's own rock-bottom
popularity ratings. After eight years of DPP mismanagement,
Lien continued, the voters are ready to hand the mantle of
leadership to the KMT. Ma's campaign has been nothing
special, Lien intimated, but Ma continues to hold onto the
lead because Hsieh has been handicapped by Chen and the

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deep-Green base. Until recently, Lien continued, Hsieh has
been unable to differentiate himself from Chen on the "raw
nerve issues" of Taiwan politics: Taiwan identity,
independence, and cross-Strait relations. For some time
Hsieh has wanted to stake out more moderate positions on
these issues in order to court "middle voters," Lien added,
but could not do so without risking public criticism from
Chen and alienating the deep-Green base.

Few Swing Voters
--------------


6. (C) Taiwan does not have a large population of middle
voters, opined Lien. He asserted -- presumably on the basis
of KMT and media polls -- that Taiwan's 13 million "expected
voters" are almost evenly split between the MT (6.6 million)
and the DPP (6.4 million). There may be some fence-sitters,
Lien conceded, but they won't play a large role in deciding
the outcome of the presidential election. Perhaps the most
important demographic groups will be young voters who are, to
Lien's surprise, increasingly supportive of the KMT, and
"disinterested" light-blue and -green voters, who sat out the
legislative elections but won't neglect the presidential
ballot. Lien's foreign policy adviser Stephen Chen predicted
that the participation of these two groups could increase
voter turnout to around 80 percent, and surmised that they
would vote 3-2 in favor of Ma.

KMT Must Boycott UN Referenda
--------------


7. (C) The KMT erred by offering its own referendum, Lien
remarked, adding that he fully expects the KMT Central
Standing Committee to call for a boycott of both UN referenda
in the final days of the campaign. Lien told the Director he
first had urged the KMT to do whatever it could to derail the
DPP's UN referendum. After the Central Election Commission
sidestepped all of the KMT's procedural objections, Lien
continued, some within Ma's campaign circle suggested it
would be better for the KMT to offer an alternative UN
referendum, rather than "ceding the field" to the DPP. Lien
opposed the idea, arguing that it would damage the KMT's
relationship with the PRC. Both UN referenda are frauds, he
continued, because their passage will not secure Taiwan's
admission to the UN. By offering its own referendum, Lien
complained, the KMT legitimized the issue, unwittingly
helping the DPP energize its base.


8. (C) If the KMT does not call for a boycott, the DPP UN
referendum could pass, Lien worried. The KMT did not boycott
the cross-Strait and missile defense referenda held alongside
the 2004 presidential election, Lien reasoned, both of which
missed the 50 percent participation threshold by only five
percent. Those referenda posited "technical" questions,
argued Lien, which did not grab and hold the public interest.
In contrast, UN membership is a "symbolic" issue which most
voters understand, which could boost voter turnout and
chances of passage. For this reason, Lien concluded, the KMT
must play it safe and call for a boycott.

China Has Learned Its Lesson
--------------


9. (C) China has not been a significant factor in this
presidential election, remarked Lien, because Beijing has
learned from Chen's two victories not to interfere in
Taiwan's presidential elections. Does this mean that if Ma
is elected, asked the Director, Beijing would move quickly to
expand tourism and establish direct flights? Ma has stated
his intention to begin work on this immediately, replied
Lien, but admitted he did not know exactly what Beijing would
be willing to do or how quickly PRC leadership would act.
Most of the technical details on expanded PRC tourism and
regular cross-Strait charter flights have already been ironed
out via the "Macao process," Chen added, suggesting that
rapid progress was indeed possible.

Reason to Hope on Cross-Strait
--------------


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10. (C) Finding a mutually acceptable interpretation of the
"one China, different interpretations" rubric remains the
most important stumbling block in cross-Strait relations,
Lien conceded. The KMT accepts the "one China" principle,
and China hasn't pressed for more, but if it did, the KMT for
domestic political reasons would have to insist that "one
China" meant the ROC. Lien insisted that PRC President Hu
Jintao understands that Taiwan political leaders must
maintain Taiwan's separate political identity if they are to
remain in office. Lien related that during his meetings with
Hu on this matter, Hu repeatedly stressed the importance of
"seeking commonality while accepting existing differences"
(qiutong cunyi). Lien also stated that the most important
sentiment expressed in the April 29, 2005 CCP-KMT joint
communique was "emphasize the status quo, cooperate on the
future" (zhongshi xianshi, gongchuang weilai). The Director
asked whether Hu's personal power was sufficient to enable
him to increase cooperation with Taiwan. Hu is in a more
"comfortable" position following the 17th Party Congress,
Lien somewhat cryptically replied.


11. (C) The Director expressed hope that Beijing would
substitute its old-fashioned ideas on cross-Strait relations
with a greater emphasis on cooperation and stability.
Without an order from the highest levels, however, the
campaign to isolate Taiwan diplomatically will not stop, and
the PRC military threat to Taiwan will continue to grow. It
would be "stupid" of Beijing to continue these polices after
Ma assumed office, replied Lien, because doing so would choke
off prospects for cooperation. Before any peace agreement can
be signed, Lien added, Taipei and Beijing will have to reach
a consensus on economic cooperation, Taiwan's international
"living space," and the missiles aimed at Taiwan. Beijing
must understand that any consensus must be acceptable to
Taiwan's people, or further progress will be politically
impossible.

Ma Undecided on Lien's Cross-Strait Role
--------------


12. (C) Lien said he had campaigned vigorously on behalf of
the KMT's legislative candidates, attending and giving
speeches at dozens of rallies around the island. Lien also
mentioned that he was suffering from a serious cold, which he
contracted after standing outside in the rain during a rally
to inaugurate Ma's campaign headquarters. Lien said somewhat
disingenuously that, if he can beat the cold, he will
continue to campaign for Ma in the remaining weeks of the
race. Lien added that he and Ma have recently been "close
enough to consult with each other" on matters of cross-Strait
policy, but Ma had not yet asked him to take a prominent role
in advancing cross-Strait relations because such discussions
were still premature.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) It appears that Lien and others in the blue camp
still believe the DPP UN referendum has a good chance of
passing unless the KMT calls for a boycott. In fact, others,
such as KMT Taichung mayor Jason Hu, have now begun to push
publicly for a boycott. Whether the KMT leadership
eventually reverses its position and how KMT candidate Ma
responds could be crucial factors determining the outcomes of
both the UN referendum vote and the presidential election
itself. End Comment.
YOUNG