Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TAIPEI28
2008-01-09 01:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

KMT CHAIRMAN WU PO-HSIUNG SAYS UN REFERENDA VITAL

Tags:  PGOV TW 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000028 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2033
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT CHAIRMAN WU PO-HSIUNG SAYS UN REFERENDA VITAL
TO MA PRESIDENTIAL VICTORY

Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000028 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2033 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: KMT CHAIRMAN WU PO-HSIUNG SAYS UN REFERENDA VITAL TO MA PRESIDENTIAL VICTORY Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Director met with KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung at KMT headquarters on January 7. Wu was accompanied by former ambassador and KMT policy adviser Steven Chen (Hsi-fan). The KMT cannot and will not abandon its UN referendum because KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou needs it to deflect DPP criticism that he and his party "do not love Taiwan," KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung told the Director. Without the KMT UN referendum, Wu predicted, Ma would "certainly lose" the presidential election, and the KMT would be doomed. On the other hand, the referenda scheduled for the January 12 legislative election are unimportant and have almost no chance of passing, so the KMT decided to boycott them altogether. The KMT must pull out all the stops to ensure victory in the legislative and presidential elections, said Wu, who claimed he had personally recruited the reluctant former KMT Chairman Lien Chan to get on the campaign trail. Wu would not predict a KMT landslide in the January 12 legislative elections, citing numerous close races and the unpredictable impact of DPP vote-buying and other "dirty tricks." Wu sought to reassure the Director that the KMT would never "sell Taiwan out" to China. ¶2. (C) In a side conversation, Steve Chen argued the reported U.S. decision to allow President Chen to transit the U.S. had signaled to Taiwan voters that U.S.-Taiwan relations were just fine, even though Chen's actions had seriously harmed the relationship. The Director refuted this logic and pointed out that preserving transits would be important to any future president. END Summary. MA NEEDS KMT UN REFERENDUM -------------- ¶3. (C) Noting the KMT's recent decision to urge voters to boycott the DPP-sponsored "party assets" and the KMT-sponsored "anti-corruption" referenda scheduled for the January 12 legislative election, the Director asked whether the KMT would also urge voters to boycott the two UN referenda slated for the March 20 presidential election. Voter turnout for the legislative election is expected to be very low, Wu replied, suggesting that neither referendum has much chance of meeting the 50 percent voter participation threshold. Therefore, Wu continued, the KMT felt it had nothing to lose by boycotting the
legislative referenda. (Comment: Wu, in saying that the party was managing strategy for the LY election while Ma's inner circle was focusing on the presidential GAME plan, seemed to signal that Ma had not been directly involved in the decision to boycott this Saturday's referenda. This would make sense given Ma's close association with the controversial (within the KMT) decision to offer up its own UN referendum in March. END Comment.) ¶4. (C) The KMT UN referendum, on the other hand, was essential to Ma's presidential victory, Wu stressed. Without it, Ma would "certainly lose" the presidential election, following DPP attacks that he and his party do not love Taiwan. (Comment: The KMT decision to boycott the legislative referenda may also be intended to steal support for its putative Deep-Blue ally, the New Party (NP),which had come out against both referenda. The KMT is doing what it can to corner the Pan-Blue vote, and has publicly equated a vote for the NP to a vote for the DPP. END Comment.) ¶5. (C) The U.S. has urged China to control its reaction to the UN referenda, and to focus on the possibility of cooperation with Taiwan's next president, the Director said. Wu replied that KMT contacts inside China have told the KMT that the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office understands the limited significance of the two UN referenda, but other government branches, especially the military, do not. If the DPP UN referendum were to pass, Wu worried, the hardliners in China might force President Hu to react harshly. RELUCTANT LIEN JOINS CAMPAIGN -------------- ¶6. (C) Until recently, the Director observed, former KMT TAIPEI 00000028 002 OF 003 chairman Lien Chan had been noticeably absent from KMT campaign efforts. Why, the Director asked, was Lien now actively campaigning for KMT legislative candidates? A presidential defeat would mean "the end" of the KMT, Wu replied. The KMT could not spare any effort to ensure victories in both the legislative and presidential elections. For this reason, Wu claimed, he made a personal appeal his old friend Lien to join the KMT fight. At the same time, Wu implied that it had not been easy to convince Lien to set aside his difficult personal relationship with KMT presidential hopeful Ma Ying-jeou. KMT ON GUARD FOR DPP DIRTY TRICKS -------------- ¶7. (C) In what has become a constant theme with us, Wu said the KMT leadership remained on guard against unspecified DPP "dirty tricks" in the final stages of the legislative campaign. Wu asserted that President Chen had already used DPP control of the Central Election Commission (CEC) to create voting procedure complications which the DPP could use to manipulate legislative election results. (Note: Voters will cast up to four ballots into separate ballot boxes in the upcoming legislative election; one for a legislative candidate, one for a political party, and a ballot on one or both of the party-sponsored referenda. The CEC recently announced that ballots cast for legislative candidates will be counted toward election results even if they are cast in the wrong ballot box. END Note.) Under this rule, Wu argued, legislative election results cannot be announced until the district has counted ballots in all four boxes. Wu said he feared the DPP would use the added delay to tamper with close elections. ¶8. (C) Wu was unwilling to predict a KMT landslide in the upcoming legislative election, citing close races in dozens of important districts. The legislative referenda have failed to spark voter interest in the legislative election, Wu explained, and only 60-70 percent of voters are expected to participate. Wu predicted that the KMT would do well if voter turnout remains between 60-65 percent. However, Wu continued, the KMT could lose if voter turnout remains below 50 percent ("inadequate KMT turnout") or exceeds 65 percent ("high DPP turnout caused by vote-buying"). Steve Chen added that while the "old" KMT practiced vote-buying, the "new" KMT did not. US TRANSIT LETS CHEN OFF THE HOOK -------------- ¶9. (C) When Wu left the room to take an urgent call, Steve Chen asked why, after all the trouble President Chen had caused lately, the U.S. had granted his most recent transit request. Taiwan voters highly value strong U.S.-Taiwan relations, and consider the state of the relationship when they vote, Chen argued. Pres. Chen had harmed the relationship by continuing to push the UN referendum over U.S. objections. However, by granting Pres. Chen's transit request the U.S. has signaled to Taiwan voters that U.S.-Taiwan relations are "business as usual," allowing Pres. Chen to go unpunished. The Director reminded Chen that U.S. policy is to facilitate the safe, convenient, comfortable and dignified travel of Taiwan's president, vice-president, and other senior executive officials. In addition, preserving our practice of permitting transits would be in the interest of Taiwan's next president, whoever he is. IS USG WORRIED CHEN WON'T STEP DOWN? -------------- ¶10. (C) When he returned from his call, Chairman Wu asked the Director whether the U.S. was concerned that President Chen might declare martial law, or even refuse to step down after the presidential election. According to Steve Chen, the KMT leadership is "very worried" that Pres. Chen will suspend the presidential election, or ignore its result. The U.S. considers these scenarios very unlikely, replied the Director. President Chen has repeatedly promised to honor the presidential election result, and to foster a peaceful transition of power. Taiwan's democratic institutions, TAIPEI 00000028 003 OF 003 including its political parties, are strong enough to hold Pres. Chen to his word, if necessary. KMT WON'T SELL OUT TAIWAN -------------- ¶11. (C) As the meeting came to a close, Chairman Wu went out of his way to assure the Director that the KMT would never "sell Taiwan out" to China. Although Pres. Chen claims to love Taiwan, Wu continued, it is Chen who has endangered Taiwan by provoking China. Unlike Chen and the DPP, the KMT goal is to deprive China of any excuse to harm Taiwan. In that sense, Wu concluded, it is the KMT, and not the DPP, that truly loves Taiwan. Washington understands the KMT's strategy in dealing with China, said the Director. Nonetheless, the Director cautioned, if the KMT becomes the ruling party, it should be prepared to deal with a more critical and less cooperative Beijing. Beijing is making poor decisions which adversely affect the KMT even now, replied Wu, noting Malawi's January 4 announcement that it intended to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of Beijing. Wu said it was "very stupid" of Beijing to break this news only days before the LY election, allowing the DPP to unfavorably juxtapose China's threat to Taiwan's international living space with the KMT's call for better cross-strait relations. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Wu seemed relaxed and confident, but not complacent, in discussing his party's electoral prospects. We were struck by his conviction that the KMT's UN referendum is central to Ma's chances of winning in March. The precedent of boycotting both referenda this Saturday would presumably have argued for pulling back from the March referenda as well. What all this says is that both parties are trying to use the volatile referendum issue to maximize their prospects for victory, even at the risk of appearing inconsistent. YOUNG

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