KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN HANDICAPS UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000185 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2023 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN HANDICAPS UN REFERENDA, PRESIDENTIAL RACE REF: TAIPEI 0148 Classified By: Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The KMT hopes Beijing will refrain from harsh statements on the UN referendum, which can damage KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's presidential campaign, KMT Vice Chairman John Kuan told the Deputy Director on February 4. Both UN referenda are likely to fail, Kuan predicted, because the public, worried about the economy, is less and less interested in "symbolic issues" like UN membership. The KMT will wait until late in the race to decide whether or not to boycott the referenda, depending on public opinion. The increased support for the KMT in the core Green areas of southern Taiwan gives the KMT its best chance yet to retake the presidency on March 22, Kuan suggested. DPP candidate Frank Hsieh's recent personal attacks on Ma have only a limited effect, and swing voters, who care more about the candidates' ability to deliver on promises of expanded economic ties with China, do not accept Hsieh's argument that the KMT will have too much power if it wins the presidency in addition to the legislature. Nonetheless, Kuan predicted that the election will be a close one as both parties have solid support bases. End Summary. KMT: Hopes China Will Keep Quiet -------------- ¶2. (C) KMT Vice Chairman John Kuan told the Deputy Director on February 4 that the KMT was displeased by Beijing's February 1 statement that Taiwan was "courting danger" and risking a "heavy cost" by going forward with the UN referenda vote on March 22. The KMT does not expect either referendum to pass, and welcomes public statements from the U.S. that the referenda has harmed bilateral relations. However, Kuan explained, when China uses a "threatening" tone, it only stokes anti-China sentiment on Taiwan, making KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's campaign that much more difficult. Kuan complained that too few people in China truly understood the dynamics of Taiwan's democratic system, and that Beijing simply "couldn't stop itself" from weighing in on the UN referenda question. Because Beijing won't listen to KMT entreaties to keep quiet on the referenda, Kuan lamented, perhaps the U.S. could "encourage" Beijing to avoid overreacting. UN Referenda Unlikely to Pass -------------- ¶3. (C) Both UN referenda will probably fail, Kuan predicted, regardless of whether the KMT urges voters to boycott them. The "anti-corruption" and "party assets" referenda held alongside the January 12 Legislative Yuan (LY) elections failed even though they are "practical" concerns more closely related to "voters' daily lives," opined Kuan. Voters care even less about the purely symbolic question of UN membership for Taiwan. ¶4. (C) Reiterating the party's public position, Kuan told the Deputy Director that the KMT does not oppose a UN referendum per se, only combining them with the presidential election. The KMT-controlled LY is willing to pass a resolution to "replace" the two UN referenda, Kuan continued, but is opposed to President Chen's proposal of a "defensive referendum" (see reftel). The KMT will hold off on a decision to call a boycott until the final stages of the presidential race, Kuan predicted, using polling results to determine the level of public support. If support continues to drop, Kuan said, and the DPP doesn't play any "dirty tricks" to stir up controversy, the KMT may keep quiet and wait for the measures to fail. If the CEC attempts to manipulate the voting process to increase the probability of passage, however, the KMT will consider urging its voters to boycott both referenda. Maintaining that "consistent" U.S. opposition to the UN referenda had succeeded in dampening support for the measures, Kuan urged the U.S. to do more. Green Turning Blue? -------------- TAIPEI 00000185 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) The KMT is in a better position than 2004 to retake the presidency, claimed Kuan. In gauging its electoral prospects, he noted, the KMT gives greater weight to voting behavior from recent elections than to polling results. The KMT used to trail the DPP by 20 points in the DPP strongholds of Kaohsiung, Tainan, Chiayi, and Yunlin. However, in the recent LY election, the KMT polled within 10 points of the DPP in Tainan, while in Chiayi City and County, the KMT won one seat and lost the other by only two thousand votes. The KMT even won six of the nine LY seats up for grabs in Kaohsiung City and County. Nonetheless, the DPP still managed to win nearly 45 percent of the total vote, which indicates DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting) is still competitive. If the KMT manages to win in the north and central regions as expected, Kuan calculated, Ma could lose the south by ten points and still win the presidential election. Ma Will Benefit from Bandwagon Effect -------------- ¶6. (C) Kuan discounted the possibility that the DPP's defeat in the LY elections will produce a "pendulum" effect benefiting Hsieh, arguing that the KMT's LY victory is more likely to generate a "watermelon" or bandwagon effect that will help Ma. Deep-Green voters will buy the DPP's argument that a single party should not hold all of the political power, Kuan conceded, but others, particularly "swing" voters, will not accept this argument, especially given the close proximity of the two elections. The president is vested with control over Taiwan's national defense, foreign policy, and cross-Strait relations, Kuan explained, all areas where the KMT is viewed as "more qualified" than the DPP. Hsieh and the DPP would need much more than the two months they have left to change this public perception, argued Kuan. As a DPP leader, Hsieh shares responsibility for President Chen's failures, Kuan argued. By urging voters to give him the presidency simply because the KMT holds the LY, Kuan asserted, Hsieh is trying to dodge responsibility and to persuade voters to give up their democratic right to demand sweeping government change. ¶7. (C) Hsieh's recent campaign to undermine Ma's credibility, including the "green card" scandal, have slightly tarnished Ma's image, Kuan conceded. Nonetheless, most of the public continue to view Ma as honest and "clean." Ma built this reputation over two decades of public service, and Hsieh will be unable to tear it down with a steady drip of unflattering, but minor, accusations. Ma's biggest weakness remains his status as a "mainlander." To deflect charges that he is "not in touch" with average Taiwanese, Kuan told the Deputy Director, Ma has resumed his successful "long-stay" program in those areas of southern Taiwan where support for the KMT is traditionally weak. The strategy is a "defensive" one, Kuan explained, designed not to win these districts, but to minimize Ma's margin of defeat. Kuan: No Leadership Gap -------------- ¶8. (C) The Deputy Director asked Kuan whether Hsieh had succeeded in challenging Ma's leadership capability, referring to a current joke among voters, including many Blue voters, that their choice is limited to a scoundrel ("huai dan," literally "bad egg" - Hsieh) or a fool ("ben dan," literally "stupid egg" - Ma). Blue supporters have criticized Ma for lacking strong leadership skills, Kuan admitted, but this is only because their expectations of Ma were unreasonably high. The DPP and KMT can each claim at least 40 percent of the electorate as hard-core supporters, and while Blue supporters may be dissatisfied with Ma's leadership, they won't defect to support Hsieh. Hsieh has had to resort to personal attacks because he cannot disassociate himself from President Chen's eight years of poor economic stewardship. The public also believes Ma and the KMT are better able to work with the PRC to expand cross-Strait economic ties. Hsieh's promises to loosen restrictions on cross-Strait trade have been discredited by loud protests from pro-Green media outlets, added Kuan, which TAIPEI 00000185 003 OF 003 suggests that Hsieh will encounter stiff opposition from within his own party if, once elected, he tries to move in that direction. ¶9. (C) While arguing that Ma has a clear edge over Hsieh at this point, Kuan also predicted that the upcoming election will be quite close. He said that both parties retain their strong support base of around 45 percent each (as opposed to the often cited 60-40 advantage for the KMT). The fight will be for the remaining ten percent of undecided "swing" voters. Hence, the KMT is not at all complacent, he claimed. The key to the election in the final analysis is which party is able to remain united and to mobilize support for its candidate. At this juncture, Kuan concluded, the KMT appears more united than the DPP. YOUNG