KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN HANDICAPS UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000185

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2023
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN HANDICAPS UN
REFERENDA, PRESIDENTIAL RACE

REF: TAIPEI 0148

Classified By: Deputy Director Robert S. Wang,
Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: The KMT hopes Beijing will refrain from harsh
statements on the UN referendum, which can damage KMT
candidate Ma Ying-jeou's presidential campaign, KMT Vice
Chairman John Kuan told the Deputy Director on February 4.
Both UN referenda are likely to fail, Kuan predicted, because
the public, worried about the economy, is less and less
interested in "symbolic issues" like UN membership. The KMT
will wait until late in the race to decide whether or not to
boycott the referenda, depending on public opinion. The
increased support for the KMT in the core Green areas of
southern Taiwan gives the KMT its best chance yet to retake
the presidency on March 22, Kuan suggested. DPP candidate
Frank Hsieh's recent personal attacks on Ma have only a
limited effect, and swing voters, who care more about the
candidates' ability to deliver on promises of expanded
economic ties with China, do not accept Hsieh's argument that
the KMT will have too much power if it wins the presidency in
addition to the legislature. Nonetheless, Kuan predicted
that the election will be a close one as both parties have
solid support bases. End Summary.

KMT: Hopes China Will Keep Quiet
--------------


2. (C) KMT Vice Chairman John Kuan told the Deputy Director
on February 4 that the KMT was displeased by Beijing's
February 1 statement that Taiwan was "courting danger" and
risking a "heavy cost" by going forward with the UN referenda
vote on March 22. The KMT does not expect either referendum
to pass, and welcomes public statements from the U.S. that
the referenda has harmed bilateral relations. However, Kuan
explained, when China uses a "threatening" tone, it only
stokes anti-China sentiment on Taiwan, making KMT
presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's campaign that much more
difficult. Kuan complained that too few people in China
truly understood the dynamics of Taiwan's democratic system,
and that Beijing simply "couldn't stop itself" from weighing
in on the UN referenda question. Because Beijing won't
listen to KMT entreaties to keep quiet on the referenda, Kuan
lamented, perhaps the U.S. could "encourage" Beijing to avoid
overreacting.

UN Referenda Unlikely to Pass
--------------


3. (C) Both UN referenda will probably fail, Kuan predicted,
regardless of whether the KMT urges voters to boycott them.
The "anti-corruption" and "party assets" referenda held
alongside the January 12 Legislative Yuan (LY) elections
failed even though they are "practical" concerns more closely
related to "voters' daily lives," opined Kuan. Voters care
even less about the purely symbolic question of UN membership
for Taiwan.


4. (C) Reiterating the party's public position, Kuan told the
Deputy Director that the KMT does not oppose a UN referendum
per se, only combining them with the presidential election.
The KMT-controlled LY is willing to pass a resolution to
"replace" the two UN referenda, Kuan continued, but is
opposed to President Chen's proposal of a "defensive
referendum" (see reftel). The KMT will hold off on a
decision to call a boycott until the final stages of the
presidential race, Kuan predicted, using polling results to
determine the level of public support. If support continues
to drop, Kuan said, and the DPP doesn't play any "dirty
tricks" to stir up controversy, the KMT may keep quiet and
wait for the measures to fail. If the CEC attempts to
manipulate the voting process to increase the probability of
passage, however, the KMT will consider urging its voters to
boycott both referenda. Maintaining that "consistent" U.S.
opposition to the UN referenda had succeeded in dampening
support for the measures, Kuan urged the U.S. to do more.

Green Turning Blue?
--------------

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5. (C) The KMT is in a better position than 2004 to retake
the presidency, claimed Kuan. In gauging its electoral
prospects, he noted, the KMT gives greater weight to voting
behavior from recent elections than to polling results. The
KMT used to trail the DPP by 20 points in the DPP strongholds
of Kaohsiung, Tainan, Chiayi, and Yunlin. However, in the
recent LY election, the KMT polled within 10 points of the
DPP in Tainan, while in Chiayi City and County, the KMT won
one seat and lost the other by only two thousand votes. The
KMT even won six of the nine LY seats up for grabs in
Kaohsiung City and County. Nonetheless, the DPP still
managed to win nearly 45 percent of the total vote, which
indicates DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting)
is still competitive. If the KMT manages to win in the north
and central regions as expected, Kuan calculated, Ma could
lose the south by ten points and still win the presidential
election.

Ma Will Benefit from Bandwagon Effect
--------------


6. (C) Kuan discounted the possibility that the DPP's defeat
in the LY elections will produce a "pendulum" effect
benefiting Hsieh, arguing that the KMT's LY victory is more
likely to generate a "watermelon" or bandwagon effect that
will help Ma. Deep-Green voters will buy the DPP's argument
that a single party should not hold all of the political
power, Kuan conceded, but others, particularly "swing"
voters, will not accept this argument, especially given the
close proximity of the two elections. The president is
vested with control over Taiwan's national defense, foreign
policy, and cross-Strait relations, Kuan explained, all areas
where the KMT is viewed as "more qualified" than the DPP.
Hsieh and the DPP would need much more than the two months
they have left to change this public perception, argued Kuan.
As a DPP leader, Hsieh shares responsibility for President
Chen's failures, Kuan argued. By urging voters to give him
the presidency simply because the KMT holds the LY, Kuan
asserted, Hsieh is trying to dodge responsibility and to
persuade voters to give up their democratic right to demand
sweeping government change.


7. (C) Hsieh's recent campaign to undermine Ma's credibility,
including the "green card" scandal, have slightly tarnished
Ma's image, Kuan conceded. Nonetheless, most of the public
continue to view Ma as honest and "clean." Ma built this
reputation over two decades of public service, and Hsieh will
be unable to tear it down with a steady drip of unflattering,
but minor, accusations. Ma's biggest weakness remains his
status as a "mainlander." To deflect charges that he is "not
in touch" with average Taiwanese, Kuan told the Deputy
Director, Ma has resumed his successful "long-stay" program
in those areas of southern Taiwan where support for the KMT
is traditionally weak. The strategy is a "defensive" one,
Kuan explained, designed not to win these districts, but to
minimize Ma's margin of defeat.

Kuan: No Leadership Gap
--------------


8. (C) The Deputy Director asked Kuan whether Hsieh had
succeeded in challenging Ma's leadership capability,
referring to a current joke among voters, including many Blue
voters, that their choice is limited to a scoundrel ("huai
dan," literally "bad egg" - Hsieh) or a fool ("ben dan,"
literally "stupid egg" - Ma). Blue supporters have
criticized Ma for lacking strong leadership skills, Kuan
admitted, but this is only because their expectations of Ma
were unreasonably high. The DPP and KMT can each claim at
least 40 percent of the electorate as hard-core supporters,
and while Blue supporters may be dissatisfied with Ma's
leadership, they won't defect to support Hsieh. Hsieh has
had to resort to personal attacks because he cannot
disassociate himself from President Chen's eight years of
poor economic stewardship. The public also believes Ma and
the KMT are better able to work with the PRC to expand
cross-Strait economic ties. Hsieh's promises to loosen
restrictions on cross-Strait trade have been discredited by
loud protests from pro-Green media outlets, added Kuan, which

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suggests that Hsieh will encounter stiff opposition from
within his own party if, once elected, he tries to move in
that direction.


9. (C) While arguing that Ma has a clear edge over Hsieh at
this point, Kuan also predicted that the upcoming election
will be quite close. He said that both parties retain their
strong support base of around 45 percent each (as opposed to
the often cited 60-40 advantage for the KMT). The fight will
be for the remaining ten percent of undecided "swing" voters.
Hence, the KMT is not at all complacent, he claimed. The
key to the election in the final analysis is which party is
able to remain united and to mobilize support for its
candidate. At this juncture, Kuan concluded, the KMT appears
more united than the DPP.
YOUNG