MA ADMINISTRATION MOVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001705 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018 TAGS: PREL GPGOV PINR TW CH SUBJECT: MA ADMINISTRATION MOVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZE KMT-CCP FORUM REF: A. TAIPEI 1496 ¶B. TAIPEI 1564 Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) Although Honorary KMT Chair Lien Chan will take part in the December 20-21 KMT-CCP Forum in Shanghai, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-Hsiung will be in charge, Taiwan Deputy National Security Advisor Ho Sze-yin told the Deputy Director December ¶9. Although the talks will remain informal and consultative, the Ma administration will work with the KMT to shape the agenda for the meeting. Taiwan's delegation to the talks will include two Minister-level officials and three agency heads, with the specific agencies represented to be decided based on the outcome of negotiations over the Forum's agenda. These moves are part of an effort to institutionalize the inter-party dialogue, ensure that Taiwan speaks with one voice in its contacts with the PRC, secure KMT legislators' buy-in to the President's cross-Strait policies and, ultimately, pursue a less confrontational relationship with China in a transparent and effective manner. End Summary. An Unhappy Lien Moved to the Sidelines -------------- ¶2. (C) Taiwan Deputy National Security Advisor Ho Sze-yin called in the Deputy Director December 9 to brief him on the status of Taiwan's internal preparations for the December 20-21 KMT-CCP Forum in Shanghai. Ho noted that Lien Chan had led the first three rounds of the Forum, praising the KMT Honorary Chairman's role in initiating the dialogue. The time had come, though, to institutionalize the meetings within the formal KMT structure under the leadership of current KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Thus, while the two will both travel to Shanghai, and will ostensibly co-lead the delegation, Wu will, in fact, "call the shots." Lien was unhappy with the decision, Ho admitted, but had been persuaded to accept that the change was in Taiwan's best interests. Ho also noted that, in a change from previous practice, the government would coordinate actively with the KMT in developing the agenda and other discussion items for the Forum. ¶3. (C) The primary reason for the changes, Ho said, was to ensure that Taiwan spoke with one voice in its dialogue with the mainland. While the inter-party dialogue would remain an unofficial, non-binding channel to float ideas, the new arrangement would allow the administration to make sure that �0A;Taiwan gained maximum benefit from the party-to-party talks and to ensure that Taiwan was not sending mixed messages to China on cross-Strait issues. This was particularly important, Ho said, given the complexity and sensitivity of the issues now on the table. Since many ideas discussed in the Forum later would be passed on to the SEF-ARATS channel for more formal consideration, it was important that the government have a say in the preliminary stage of dialogue. Ho also noted that expanding cross-Strait interaction increased the likelihood of "accidents" occurring, citing the example of the scuffle involving an ARATS official visiting Tainan in late October (ref A). Upgrading the KMT-CCP channel would give Taiwan another way to consult on such incidents in the future. ¶4. (C) While Taiwan had not vetted Lien's replacement with the PRC, Ho did not expect Beijing to object. China understood that KMT representatives needed government backing to remain relevant. In any event, there was no question of a party/state divide in the Chinese system. Ho expressed optimism that institutionalizing the relationship between KMT cross-Strait contacts and the Ma administration's efforts also would make it easier to get buy-in from KMT Legislative Yuan (LY) members, many of whom would take part in the Forum. He noted that as many as 20 LY members would attend the talks in Shanghai. This, in turn would make it easier to secure LY endorsement of SEF-ARATS agreements. Up to now, Ho said, LY members felt shut out of the process because Taiwan law explicitly prohibited them from taking any part in cross-Strait negotiations beyond ratifying agreements reached by the executive branch. (Note: This week the full LY is reviewing, and is expected to approve, the four agreements reached during the November SEF-ARATS talks in Taipei. See Ref B for the details of those agreements.) Ma Administration Committed to Transparency -------------- ¶5. (C) In deciding to strengthen the government's coordination with the KMT, President Ma was guided by three TAIPEI 00001705 002 OF 002 overarching principles, Ho said. First, the KMT-CCP talks would remain unofficial. Second, while the Forum could "float ideas," it was not authorized to make binding agreements. Finally, and most importantly, the Ma administration would be completely transparent in its formal talks with the PRC. While, obviously, this did not mean that the actual SEF-ARATS talks would be open to the public, there would be no secret agenda items and the results of the talks would be made known quickly. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Establishing closer coordination between the inter-party dialogue and the quasi-official SEF-ARATS channel should allow Ma to better manage Taiwan's overall cross-Strait approach. Certainly, giving some voice to KMT LY members and other senior party officials may reduce some of the internecine sniping that has marked so much of Ma's tenure as President. That said, in elevating Wu Poh-hsiung at the expense of Lien Chan, Ma may be simply trading one potential rival for the role of Taiwan's "China desk officer" for another. Meanwhile, news (and word is almost certain to leak) that the administration is, in essence, making the KMT-CCP dialogue a tool of government policy, will only heighten the suspicion and sense of disenfranchisement of the DPP and its supporters. Ultimately, though, Ma's decision to make use of the KMT's unique ability to engage the PRC is probably the correct one as he looks at the tools available to him as he pursues a more beneficial, less confrontational relationship with China. End comment. SYOUNG