Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TAIPEI164
2008-02-01 13:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:
DPP VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SU TSENG-CHANG ON
VZCZCXRO7278 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH DE RUEHIN #0164/01 0321355 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 011355Z FEB 08 FM AIT TAIPEI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8058 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7799 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9304 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9557 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2368 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0912 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9063 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1728 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6339 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000164
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: DPP VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SU TSENG-CHANG ON
THE DPP CAMPAIGN, UN REFERENDUM, AND PRESIDENT CHEN
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000164
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: DPP VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SU TSENG-CHANG ON
THE DPP CAMPAIGN, UN REFERENDUM, AND PRESIDENT CHEN
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary: DPP vice presidential candidate Su
Tseng-chang told the Director on January 31 that President
SIPDIS
Chen Shui-bian has retreated to the "second line" following
the party's defeat in the January 12 legislative elections.
Su stressed that with Chen's influence already declining
rapidly, the president will be unable to launch any new
initiatives between the March 22 presidential election and
when he leaves office on May 20. Su stressed that a major
DPP campaign theme will be the need to elect Frank Hsieh as
president to prevent one-party domination by the KMT. By
playing up this theme and also attacking Ma for having had a
U.S. "green card," Hsieh has cut KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's
lead to 10 points, according to the DPP's internal polling.
Su pointed to Hsieh's emphasis on the election, not the UN
referendum, in his campaigning. He also discussed at length
concerns that, if elected, Ma might, for short-term economic
benefits, make deals with Beijing that were not in Taiwan's
long-term interests. End Summary.
2. (C) The Director discussed political developments and the
presidential campaign with DPP vice presidential candidate Su
Tseng-chang on January 31. The Director noted to Su the
SIPDIS
inaccuracy of a "China Times" article claiming the Director
had told KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung that "the DPP had no
hope." Stressing that he had made no such statement, the
Director explained that the U.S. greatly respects Taiwan's
democracy and maintains neutrality in elections, which are up
to the voters of Taiwan to decide. Su accepted the
Director's points and emphasized that he was careful never to
talk to the press about the content of his meetings with the
Director.
The LY Election Defeat
--------------
3. (C) On the DPP's defeat in the January 12 Legislative
Yuan (LY) elections, Su explained that the new electoral
system resulted in the DPP's ending up with only 20 percent
of the seats despite winning almost 40 percent of the votes.
However, the failure of the DPP to increase its vote share
after 8 years in power is a serious problem. Many people,
who objected to actions and statements by government
officials during the campaign, used their vote to "punish"
the DPP. (Note: Su was presumably referring in particular to
the confrontational approach adopted by Education Ministry
officials in changing the name of the former Chiang Kai-shek
Memorial.) Although Chen's activist campaign style worked in
the past, people had a negative reaction this time, so the
more Chen campaigned, the worse the situation became. While
local crowds warmed to Chen's Deep Green rhetoric, the
television audience throughout Taiwan did not.
Presidential Campaign
--------------
4. (C) The DPP needs to reflect and reform following the LY
election defeat, Su acknowledged, but it cannot do so until
after fighting and hopefully winning the presidential
election. The DPP needs to convince the voters to elect a
DPP president to prevent an over-concentration of power in
the hands of the KMT. If the KMT adds the presidency to its
3/4 majority in the LY, Su explained, it will have a free
hand to appoint the leadership of all five branches of
government (Executive, Legislative, Control, Examination, and
Judicial Yuan).
5. (C) The DPP will need to work hard to win the
presidential election, Su admitted. However, the KMT's vote
share in the LY elections was not as large as its seat total
would suggest, and presidential and LY elections are not the
same. In a presidential election, the issues are at a higher
level and the turnout rate is greater. According to a new
DPP internal poll, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's lead over
Frank Hsieh has shrunk to 10 percent. Su attributed this
"positive trend" to Ma's green card problem and to widespread
public concern about one-party domination, as exemplified by
TAIPEI 00000164 002 OF 003
Lee Yuan-tseh's recent decision to endorse Hsieh. Su pointed
to the large crowds that attended the three major rallies
held by Hsieh (Kaohsiung, Taichung, Taipei County) since the
LY elections. The deep concern of DPP supporters is
reflected in the size of the crowds and the fact that almost
all people stayed until the very end of the rallies.
President Chen on the Second Line
--------------
6. (C) Following the LY elections, Su said, President Chen
has retreated to the second line and public attention has
shifted to the presidential candidates. Chen's political
influence is rapidly declining, and it will be impossible for
him to launch any new initiatives between the March 22
election and the May 20 inauguration of the new president.
After the election, people will be paying attention to the
president-elect, and his words are the ones that will carry
weight.
UN Referendum
--------------
7. (C) By law, Su noted, the DPP UN referendum cannot be
withdrawn, but it will be very difficult for the referendum
to meet the high participation threshold requirement (50
percent of all eligible voters). Although failure of the UN
referendum would be another setback for the DPP, the
presidential election is more important. Therefore, the DPP
is now emphasizing the presidential election and not
emphasizing the UN referendum. Because the KMT knows most
people want to join the UN, it hopes to deal with the issue
in an indirect way, for example, by proposing an LY
resolution on joining the UN to substitute for the UN
referendum.
Concerns about Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait Policy
-------------- --------------
8. (C) Acknowledging the importance of economic issues to
the voters, Su expressed concern that Ma Ying-jeou, if
elected, would move quickly to further open cross-Strait
economic relations. Beguiled both by media reporting and
their own desire to make money, the public is not
sufficiently aware of the danger the PRC poses to Taiwan's
democracy, Su argued. Like "a thirsty person drinking
poison," the KMT would accept PRC conditions such as Taiwan
being part of CHINA in hopes of gaining a quick-fix for the
economy. In trying to solve a short-term problem, however,
the KMT would create long-term problems for Taiwan.
9. (C) Increasing numbers of taxi drivers and waitresses in
Taiwan are from China, Su suggested, implying that this trend
adds to Taiwan's unemployment problem. Ma, however, would
accept large numbers of PRC tourists without adequate
measures to ensure they would all return and not stay and
work illegally in Taiwan. In addition, Ma would recognize
PRC degrees, which, according to Su, would allow doctors,
nurses, and lawyers to come from CHINA to Taiwan for work.
The KMT also plans to allow PRC immigrants to receive Taiwan
identification cards after just two years, compared to the
current 8-year requirement, Su claimed.
10. (C) Su expressed concern that Ma, wishing to make quick
deals with the PRC, would follow up the KMT's "1992 consensus
on one China" with a new "08 consensus" with Beijing that
Taiwan is part of China. Ma supports the goal of
unification, which is also enshrined in the KMT's party
constitution. Although Ma would not dare to make a move
toward unification during his first term, he might do so
during a second term, Su worried.
Comment
--------------
11. (C) Although clearly realizing the difficult race the
DPP ticket faces, Su was relatively upbeat, perhaps buoyed by
recent developments such as the narrowing of Ma's lead and
the greater coherence in Hsieh's campaign, now that President
TAIPEI 00000164 003 OF 003
Chen has retreated to the second line. Increased party
unity and the sense of crisis in the DPP base may also be
factors, especially since the DPP traditionally counts on
stirring up the emotions of its supporters to win last minute
come-from-behind victories. As the latest DPP attacks on the
green card issue show, this presidential election will be
hard fought, and it may well end up being close.
YOUNG
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: DPP VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SU TSENG-CHANG ON
THE DPP CAMPAIGN, UN REFERENDUM, AND PRESIDENT CHEN
Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary: DPP vice presidential candidate Su
Tseng-chang told the Director on January 31 that President
SIPDIS
Chen Shui-bian has retreated to the "second line" following
the party's defeat in the January 12 legislative elections.
Su stressed that with Chen's influence already declining
rapidly, the president will be unable to launch any new
initiatives between the March 22 presidential election and
when he leaves office on May 20. Su stressed that a major
DPP campaign theme will be the need to elect Frank Hsieh as
president to prevent one-party domination by the KMT. By
playing up this theme and also attacking Ma for having had a
U.S. "green card," Hsieh has cut KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's
lead to 10 points, according to the DPP's internal polling.
Su pointed to Hsieh's emphasis on the election, not the UN
referendum, in his campaigning. He also discussed at length
concerns that, if elected, Ma might, for short-term economic
benefits, make deals with Beijing that were not in Taiwan's
long-term interests. End Summary.
2. (C) The Director discussed political developments and the
presidential campaign with DPP vice presidential candidate Su
Tseng-chang on January 31. The Director noted to Su the
SIPDIS
inaccuracy of a "China Times" article claiming the Director
had told KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung that "the DPP had no
hope." Stressing that he had made no such statement, the
Director explained that the U.S. greatly respects Taiwan's
democracy and maintains neutrality in elections, which are up
to the voters of Taiwan to decide. Su accepted the
Director's points and emphasized that he was careful never to
talk to the press about the content of his meetings with the
Director.
The LY Election Defeat
--------------
3. (C) On the DPP's defeat in the January 12 Legislative
Yuan (LY) elections, Su explained that the new electoral
system resulted in the DPP's ending up with only 20 percent
of the seats despite winning almost 40 percent of the votes.
However, the failure of the DPP to increase its vote share
after 8 years in power is a serious problem. Many people,
who objected to actions and statements by government
officials during the campaign, used their vote to "punish"
the DPP. (Note: Su was presumably referring in particular to
the confrontational approach adopted by Education Ministry
officials in changing the name of the former Chiang Kai-shek
Memorial.) Although Chen's activist campaign style worked in
the past, people had a negative reaction this time, so the
more Chen campaigned, the worse the situation became. While
local crowds warmed to Chen's Deep Green rhetoric, the
television audience throughout Taiwan did not.
Presidential Campaign
--------------
4. (C) The DPP needs to reflect and reform following the LY
election defeat, Su acknowledged, but it cannot do so until
after fighting and hopefully winning the presidential
election. The DPP needs to convince the voters to elect a
DPP president to prevent an over-concentration of power in
the hands of the KMT. If the KMT adds the presidency to its
3/4 majority in the LY, Su explained, it will have a free
hand to appoint the leadership of all five branches of
government (Executive, Legislative, Control, Examination, and
Judicial Yuan).
5. (C) The DPP will need to work hard to win the
presidential election, Su admitted. However, the KMT's vote
share in the LY elections was not as large as its seat total
would suggest, and presidential and LY elections are not the
same. In a presidential election, the issues are at a higher
level and the turnout rate is greater. According to a new
DPP internal poll, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's lead over
Frank Hsieh has shrunk to 10 percent. Su attributed this
"positive trend" to Ma's green card problem and to widespread
public concern about one-party domination, as exemplified by
TAIPEI 00000164 002 OF 003
Lee Yuan-tseh's recent decision to endorse Hsieh. Su pointed
to the large crowds that attended the three major rallies
held by Hsieh (Kaohsiung, Taichung, Taipei County) since the
LY elections. The deep concern of DPP supporters is
reflected in the size of the crowds and the fact that almost
all people stayed until the very end of the rallies.
President Chen on the Second Line
--------------
6. (C) Following the LY elections, Su said, President Chen
has retreated to the second line and public attention has
shifted to the presidential candidates. Chen's political
influence is rapidly declining, and it will be impossible for
him to launch any new initiatives between the March 22
election and the May 20 inauguration of the new president.
After the election, people will be paying attention to the
president-elect, and his words are the ones that will carry
weight.
UN Referendum
--------------
7. (C) By law, Su noted, the DPP UN referendum cannot be
withdrawn, but it will be very difficult for the referendum
to meet the high participation threshold requirement (50
percent of all eligible voters). Although failure of the UN
referendum would be another setback for the DPP, the
presidential election is more important. Therefore, the DPP
is now emphasizing the presidential election and not
emphasizing the UN referendum. Because the KMT knows most
people want to join the UN, it hopes to deal with the issue
in an indirect way, for example, by proposing an LY
resolution on joining the UN to substitute for the UN
referendum.
Concerns about Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait Policy
-------------- --------------
8. (C) Acknowledging the importance of economic issues to
the voters, Su expressed concern that Ma Ying-jeou, if
elected, would move quickly to further open cross-Strait
economic relations. Beguiled both by media reporting and
their own desire to make money, the public is not
sufficiently aware of the danger the PRC poses to Taiwan's
democracy, Su argued. Like "a thirsty person drinking
poison," the KMT would accept PRC conditions such as Taiwan
being part of CHINA in hopes of gaining a quick-fix for the
economy. In trying to solve a short-term problem, however,
the KMT would create long-term problems for Taiwan.
9. (C) Increasing numbers of taxi drivers and waitresses in
Taiwan are from China, Su suggested, implying that this trend
adds to Taiwan's unemployment problem. Ma, however, would
accept large numbers of PRC tourists without adequate
measures to ensure they would all return and not stay and
work illegally in Taiwan. In addition, Ma would recognize
PRC degrees, which, according to Su, would allow doctors,
nurses, and lawyers to come from CHINA to Taiwan for work.
The KMT also plans to allow PRC immigrants to receive Taiwan
identification cards after just two years, compared to the
current 8-year requirement, Su claimed.
10. (C) Su expressed concern that Ma, wishing to make quick
deals with the PRC, would follow up the KMT's "1992 consensus
on one China" with a new "08 consensus" with Beijing that
Taiwan is part of China. Ma supports the goal of
unification, which is also enshrined in the KMT's party
constitution. Although Ma would not dare to make a move
toward unification during his first term, he might do so
during a second term, Su worried.
Comment
--------------
11. (C) Although clearly realizing the difficult race the
DPP ticket faces, Su was relatively upbeat, perhaps buoyed by
recent developments such as the narrowing of Ma's lead and
the greater coherence in Hsieh's campaign, now that President
TAIPEI 00000164 003 OF 003
Chen has retreated to the second line. Increased party
unity and the sense of crisis in the DPP base may also be
factors, especially since the DPP traditionally counts on
stirring up the emotions of its supporters to win last minute
come-from-behind victories. As the latest DPP attacks on the
green card issue show, this presidential election will be
hard fought, and it may well end up being close.
YOUNG