MAC CHAIR:CHEN YUNLIN VISIT BEGINS ERA OF "MUTUAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001610 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV TW CH SUBJECT: MAC CHAIR:CHEN YUNLIN VISIT BEGINS ERA OF "MUTUAL NON-DENIAL" REF: TAIPEI 1564 Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4(B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The official portion of ARATS head Chen Yunlin,s groundbreaking visit to Taiwan was a success and demonstrated that China had accepted Taiwan,s call for &mutual non-denial,8 MAC Chair Lai Shin-yuan told the Director November 11. It will be difficult to maintain rapid progress, though, since the easiest issues have NOW been resolved. Opposition DPP party head Tsai Ing-wen was damaged by her inability or unwillingness to prevent anti-Chen protests from turning violent, but the DPP likely will resist calls for substantive dialogue on cross-Strait issues. End Summary. Lai: Government, Public See ARATS Visit a Success -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The official portion of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) head Chen Yunlin,s visit was a clear success, a fatigued Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chair Lai Shin-yuan told the Director during their November 11 meeting. She noted that MAC officials were still wrapping up loose ends from the visit and already beginning preparations for the next round of SEF-ARATS talks in the first half of 2009. Lai expressed appreciation for U.S. support for cross-Strait rapprochement, noting that public endorsements of President Ma,s strategy were essential to its success. ¶3. (C) The public response to the visit was similarly positive, Lai said. Polls showed that between 70 and 84 percent of respondents supported the agreements reached (see Ref A for details of the agreements signed). Perhaps more importantly, one poll showed that 72 percent of those polled approved of what Lai termed the &institutional arrangements8 of the visit (i.e., nomenclature). PRC Tacitly Accepts &Mutual Non-Denial8 -------------- ¶4. (C) While the agreements reached during Chen,s visit were good for Taiwan, and it was useful for the ARATS head to see and hear the protestors that dogged his trip, the most important outcome of the visit was Chen,s tacit acceptance of Taiwan,s call for &mutual non-denial8 of each other,s existence, Lai said. Although the two sides spent a significant amount of time on nomenclature, and the Taiwan media focused heavily on how Chen would address President Ma Ying-jeou in their meeting, the mere fact that Chen met Ma was proof that the PRC NOW tacitly accepted Taiwan,s position. ¶5. (C) Nevertheless, in the run-up to the meeting, SEF and ARATS had extensive discussions on nomenclature, with Taiwan,s representatives insisting that Chen address Ma as &President8 (zongtong) and PRC officials insisting just as strongly on &Mr.8 (xiansheng). Although Lai admitted that the Taiwan position was complicated by the offhand comment Ma made earlier that he had no problem being called &Mr. Ma,8 she made clear that she never had any illusions that a Chinese official would agree to address Taiwan,s President by his formal title. Ultimately, in each of Chen,s meeting, including those with Ma and Lai, Taiwan officials were introduced by their official titles. Not once, Lai said, did Chen object. In the event, Chen,s meeting with Ma was kept to only seven minutes not because of a dispute over nomenclature but because of concerns about security. Easy Work Done -------------- ¶6. (C) Although quick to note the importance of last week,s meetings, Lai emphasized that it had been relatively easy to conclude the agreements reached. Most had been under discussion for years and offered concrete benefits for both sides. The next steps would be more difficult. For example, Taiwan hoped to make progress on agreements to combat financial crimes, but the PRC was hesitant, something Lai attributed to the close links between economic criminals and politicians on the mainland. She noted that PRC negotiators were not pushing to make rapid progress, an approach she endorsed, since going too fast would &result in chaos.8 Lai expected the next SEF-ARATS would take place on the mainland sometime in the first half of 2009. DPP,s Tsai the Biggest Loser -------------- TAIPEI 00001610 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Turning to the at times violent protests that dogged Chen Yunlin during his visit, Lai said opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chair Tsai Ing-wen had been damaged by her performance. Her inability or unwillingness to prevent the DPP-organized demonstrations from turning ugly were the result of her inability to &speak the same language8 (figuratively, but also literally) as the party,s activist core. (Note: Tsai is uncomfortable in the Taiwanese dialect and her UK educational background has led many in the party to portray her as an elitist.) Although she was likely personally uncomfortable with the violence, Tsai could not head it off without losing her standing in the party, Lai speculated. Polling results showed that Tsai,s handling of the protests had harmed her reputation among most people on Taiwan. ¶8. (C) Lai agreed that the DPP and KMT needed to sit down to try and work out some way to make cross-Strait issues less fraught in the future. Ultimately, though, she was pessimistic about the prospects for meaningful dialogue. The heart of the problem was that the DPP,s cross-Strait policies and goals were unclear or non-existent. In reality, Lai suggested, the DPP had very little in the way of ideas for handling relations with the mainland. Instead, DPP leaders were using the issue to bolster support by playing on voters, fears with non-specific references to threats to Taiwan sovereignty. Lai had tried on numerous occasions to talk policy with DPP officials, and had encouraged Tsai to meet with President Ma. For now, though, the DPP appeared to have little interest in serious dialogue. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Ms. Lai has come under some criticism recently from both KMT and DPP critics for her performance as MAC Chairman. Fair or not, this could reflect the fact that, as lines are hardening between the camps on cross-Strait policy, Lai is threatened by the crossfire. This is particularly true since her TSU mentor, former President Lee Teng-hui, has NOW indicated privately to us that she should step down, and has blasted President Ma in general terms on his cross-Strait policy. SYOUNG