SEF CHAIRMAN P. K. CHIANG ON THE CHEN YUNLIN VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001602 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON CH TW SUBJECT: SEF CHAIRMAN P. K. CHIANG ON THE CHEN YUNLIN VISIT AND FUTURE PLANS FOR CROSS-STRAIT TALKS REF: TAIPEI 1584 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman ¶P. K. Chiang told the Director on November 10 that, on the surface, the PRC's ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin had been understanding about the political situation in Taiwan and appreciative of the government's efforts to protect his security. Nonetheless, Chen doubtless had "many feelings" in reaction to lapses in law and order during the protest demonstrations. Chiang noted that NSC Secretary General Su Chi himself had conducted the negotiations with ARATS regarding Chen's meeting with President Ma and nomenclature for addressing the president. However, an apparent agreement on the meeting format fell through at the end. Chiang relayed that Su said the meeting was cut back from one hour to just ten minutes because of security concerns about DPP protesters nearby. Despite the difficulties encountered during Chen's visit, Chiang was optimistic about the future of cross-Strait negotiations on economic and other practical issues, noting that financial cooperation would be a focus of the next round of SEF-ARATS talks in Beijing next spring. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On November 10 the Director met with Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman P. K. Chiang (Chiang Pin-kung) to discuss the November 3-7 visit to Taiwan by PRC Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin. The Director noted that the U.S. has publicly welcomed the cross-Strait dialogue and the four agreements that were signed, adding that we have also expressed regret for the violent incidents that took place during Chen's visit. Chiang, who said he had been totally exhausted by the time the visit ended on Friday, expressed appreciation for the positive U.S. statement about the cross-Strait talks. Chen Yunlin Visit Planning -------------- ¶3. (C) On planning for the Chen Yunlin visit, Chiang revealed that Chen originally had wanted to stay in Taiwan for seven days, while SEF had proposed a four-day visit that focused on the SEF-ARATS talks. The SEF proposal was similar to the schedule Chiang had during his trip to Beijing last June for the prior round of cross-Strait talks. However, in addition to participating in the SEF-ARATS talks, Chen Yunlin also wanted to see southern Taiwan and he requested to visit Sun-Moon Lake, Hualien, and Kaohsiung. Even after ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing was accosted by DPP protesters in Tainan on October 21, Chen Yunlin still insisted he wanted to visit Kaohsiung harbor. Subsequently, however, Chen compromised and the two sides agreed on a five-day visit, all in the Taipei area. Chiang noted that Chen Yunlin had also requested to host a tea party for educational, cultural, and other figures from southern Taiwan. However, SEF rejected this proposal because such a high-profile event would have the appearance of being a "united front" effort by Chen. ¶4. (C) Chiang noted there had been coordination problems in scheduling the dinner hosted by KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan. SEF had originally planned the dinner for Wednesday, but learned that Chen and Lien had already made their own arrangements to hold the dinner on Tuesday. In addition to problem over the date, SEF was unhappy Lien hosted his dinner at the Ambassador Hotel, a difficult setting from the security standpoint. Chiang noted there was also a lesser problem with Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, who, pulling rank as KMT chairman, insisted on hosting a dinner rather than a lunch for Chen, upending the original SEF proposal. In contrast to the difficulties with Lien and Wu, Chiang said he had no problem persuading Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng to host a very small breakfast (one table) because for Wang to hold a larger event while excluding DPP legislators would have been problematic. Chiang took the Director's point that it would be good for Chen to meet DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, but he suggested Chen would be reluctant to agree to such a meeting because it would appear too political. TAIPEI 00001602 002 OF 003 Chen and the Demonstrators -------------- ¶5. (C) Chiang believed Chen had expected to see protest demonstrations, but had thought the government would be better able to handle the situation. On the surface, Chen had been understanding, realizing the difficulty of the situation in Taiwan and appreciating the government's efforts to ensure his security. However, Chiang was sure Chen had "many feelings" in reaction to the lapses in law and order. Chiang described the scene in the Formosa Regent Hotel on Wednesday (Nov. 5),where Chen, his delegation, and the other guests had been unable to leave a dinner hosted by Wu Poh-hsiung until about 2:00 a.m. because of the crowd of demonstrators outside. During the wait, Chen Yunlin talked to Wu, while P. K. Chiang said he had plenty of time to talk to other ARATS officials about what to do in the next round of SEF-ARATS talks. As time passed, the Chen delegation appeared a little tired and frightened. Chen insisted that his delegation should all leave together, rather than he departing first. Chen watched some television coverage of the protest, and about 1:30 a.m. the police said it was safe to leave. Fortunately, the police were able to clear a path, and with a police escort, Chen encountered no problems when he finally did leave. However, some demonstrators pounded on the car of KMT Deputy Secretary General Chang Jung-kung when he departed, Chiang added. Meeting with President Ma Cut Short -------------- ¶6. (C) During the ordeal at the Formosa Regent, Chiang said, he had phoned Ma to suggest two options for Ma's meeting with Chen Yunlin the next day (Thursday): either change the location or change the time of the meeting. The next morning, Ma announced the meeting would be moved up from 4:30 p.m. to 11 a.m. According to Chiang, the original plan was for a one-hour meeting between Ma and Chen. According to this plan, during the open part of the meeting, after the announcement of the arrival of President Ma, he would welcome "Chairman Chen," and Chen would respond, "On behalf of Mister Hu Jintao, I convey his respects to you (using the honorific form)." Ma and Chen would each have 3-5 minutes to speak, and the open meeting would then be followed by a closed door session. ¶7. (C) Although he had thought arrangements for the Ma-Chen meeting were settled, Chiang said, there were many changes toward the end. He was unsure why the apparent agreement on the scenario fell through. On Thursday morning, Chiang noted, NSC Secretary General Su Chi, who handled all negotiations with ARATS on the nomenclature issue, said the meeting had been shortened to just 10 minutes because of security concerns. (Note: Su Chi told the Director on November 7 that the last-minute decision to shorten the meeting resulted from failure to reach agreement on how Chen would address President Ma. See reftel.) International Space -------------- ¶8. (C) In his June trip to Beijing for SEF-ARATS talks, Chiang recalled, he had raised the issues of international space, WHO/WHA, and a Taiwan FTA with ASEAN countries during his meetings with President Hu Jintao and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. The Chinese had given a typical response: "The two sides can find a solution through consultations." This time, Chiang said, he did not raise the issue of international space openly with Chen Yunlin because the focus of the talks was on economic issues. However, he noted, other Taiwan leaders had referred to the international space issue in their meetings with Chen, including President Ma and Wang Jin-pyng. Financial Issues and Future Talks -------------- ¶9. (C) Chiang said the seminar on financial issues that TAIPEI 00001602 003 OF 003 followed the SEF-ARATS talks had provided a good opportunity for experts from the two sides to hold a "pre-discussion" before SEF and ARATS take up these issues. Both sides say they are prepared to begin talks next month, Chiang said, the hope being to produce an agreement to be signed at the next round of high-level SEF-ARATS talks, which will take place in Beijing, probably next April or May. Chiang noted that Taiwan already has bank representative offices in China and, depending on the outcome of the negotiations, hopes to open operating bank branches on the mainland. During the negotiations on these and on other issues (e.g., investment protection, dispute resolution, IPR, standards, education, crime fighting, and an economic "framework agreement"), Chiang noted that SEF and ARATS will provide heads of delegations, but the actual detailed work will be handled by officials from the relevant ministries of the two sides, who can serve as SEF or ARATS "advisors." This would be similar to how the U.S. and Taiwan handle negotiations through AIT and TECRO, Chiang observed. Mainland Tourists -------------- ¶10. (C) During the SEF-ARATS talks, the two sides reviewed the reasons for the small numbers of PRC tourists coming to Taiwan. Both sides said they would take measures to simplify procedures. For Taiwan, this will include reducing the number of people required to form a tour group and increasing the length of time tourists can stay in Taiwan. In addition, visa procedures will be simplified. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite the difficult challenges he endured during Chen Yunlin's visit, P. K. Chiang appeared optimistic that economic cooperation and other practical aspects of cross-Strait relations will continue to expand smoothly over the next year. Chiang seemed slightly disappointed that Chen's meeting with President Ma had not gone according to the original script. In the event, participants on both sides may have been relieved that the meeting went quickly, given the thousands of angry DPP demonstrators gathering nearby. Perhaps more importantly, however, Chen Yunlin could not have departed Taiwan without a stronger sense of the controversy and emotions that underlie the process of cross-Strait reconciliation. SYOUNG