TAIWAN, CHINA SCHOLARS TALKING, BUT IS MA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001479

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN, CHINA SCHOLARS TALKING, BUT IS MA
LISTENING?

Classified By: The Acting Director for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: As Taiwan and China scurry to set the date
for the next round of "unofficial" cross-Strait talks, a
flurry of recent visits by mainland scholars to Taiwan offers
insights on Beijing's strategy and suggests Chinese leaders
are in no hurry to seal the deal with President Ma Ying-jeou.
The PRC is attempting to signal via these academics a
preference for a slow and cautious approach to cross-Strait
relations and the need for more Taiwan "inducements." Some
Taiwan scholars share the complaint voiced by the media,
legislators and even some within the government that
President Ma listens to only a small cadre of close advisors.
End summary.


2. (C) AIT poloffs took part in the open session of an
October 14 friendly exchange with scholars from the PRC
Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) hosted by
Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations
(IIR). IIR Director Cheng Tuan and Professor Yen Chen-shen
kicked off the forum with a downbeat assessment of the state
of cross-Strait relations. Although Ma Ying-jeou ran on a
platform calling for improved ties with China,
mainland-related news was dominated by the failure of
Taiwan's toned-down UN bid, the dismal number of mainland
visitors to Taiwan, the tainted milk scandal and its
implications for international space, particularly in the
WHO.

The Official Line: Easy Does it and Easy Things First
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3. (C) Clearly aware that he was speaking to a wider audience
in the open session, CICIR Director Cui Liru, accompanied by
four colleagues, focused on the positive while rehashing
familiar PRC mantras. On direct flights, Cui, visiting
Taiwan for the first time, argued that Taiwan was
understating their importance - offering as proof the
difficulty he was having in booking his return flight to
Beijing. He urged patience, making the careworn observations
that China was a large country whose leaders faced many
domestic issues. Some cross-Strait issues would require
considerable time to resolve, he said, noting in particular
the difficulty of Taiwan's search for "international space."
Similarly, during a September visit to IIR, Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (CASS) Institute of Taiwan Studies
Director Yu Keli underscored the need for Taiwan's patience
and goodwill.


4. (C) In public comments made during an October 12 forum
hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) and Taiwan's Foundation on International and
Cross-Strait Studies (FICS),Taiwan's Mainland Affairs
Council (MAC) Chair Lai Hsin-yuan also counseled patience,
calling for a pragmatic cross-Strait strategy. Echoing Hu
Jintao, she urged setting aside controversial topics and
concentrating on bread-and-butter issues that would improve
peoples' livelihood. For example, cross-Strait dialogue
should focus on developing mechanisms for banking and
securities supervision, safeguards for Taiwan investment on
the mainland and means to mediate economic and trade disputes.

China Scholars: Slow Pace, Concrete Results, PRC in Charge
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Separately, Taiwan scholars told poloffs that, in
lower-profile exchanges, PRC academics appeared preoccupied
not with the substance of the relationship but with their
concern that Taiwan, and not China, appeared to take the lead
on producing cross-Strait initiatives. PRC scholars seem to
have little to offer in the way of new ideas, prefering
instead to pick holes in Ma's proposals. FICS Chairman Chao
Chun-shan recounted how these scholars have asked him why
China should accept Taiwan's definition of "diplomatic
truce." Similarly, IIR Professor Yen told POLOFF that CASS's
Yu, Shanghai Institute of International Studies' Yang Jiemin
(brother of FM Yang Jiechi) and other PRC academics had
pushed for details of how exactly China would benefit from

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Ma's overtures. Yen's explanation - that China gained from
the relaxation in tensions and from the longer-term prospect
for greater stability in the region - did not seem to satisfy
his counterparts. Yen urged his counterparts not to focus on
which side was responsible for new ideas or on the need for
an agreement, but to explore creative solutions for tough
problems to maintain the improved atmosphere.


6. (C) Nevertheless, PRC scholars said Ma needed to be more
forthcoming in delivering tangible inducements. It was
important for Taiwan to go beyond simply improved
atmospherics, Yu and Yang insisted, and demonstrate its
commitment to China in some concrete way. Asked by POLOFF to
cite an example of how Taiwan might do so, Yen suggested
Taiwan convert to the pinyin Romanization system for Chinese
language used on the mainland. As for an example of a
creative solution for tough issues, he proposed giving Taiwan
WHO observership but include an annual renewal process.

Taiwan Scholars: Ma Won't Listen to Us
--------------


7. (C) Yen, whose family is closely linked to Ma's, expressed
frustration about the President's unwillingness to look
outside a small circle of advisors. Professor Yen and others
had ideas on how to pave the way for greater international
space for Taiwan, including by becoming more involved in
UN-affiliated organizations that do not require statehood for
membership. He also advocated Taiwan establishing a human
rights ommission, which could interact with international
counterparts and demonstrate Taiwan has the appropriate
structure and is ready to be a key player on global issues.
While coy about whether he had offered these ideas to Ma, Yen
was was generally pessimistic that Ma would heed advice from
academics or anyone outside his core group of like-minded
individuals. Chinese Culture University Professor Spencer
Yang also offered his insights on Ma's relationship with
academics in a recent meeting with poloffs, recounting how Ma
invited several scholars, including himself, to a meeting but
failed to display an iota of interest in their opinions.
Yang subsequently walked out of the meeting before it ended.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) In his early overtures to expand cross-Strait ties -
such as unilaterally setting a July 4 date for the start of
direct charter - Ma left China little time to react,
correctly predicting that Beijing would acquiesence out of
desire to be supportive. The comments made PRC scholars
during these recent "academic exchanges" suggest, though,
that Beijing now wants more control over the course and pace
of relations, and is looking for Taiwan to offer concessions
to advance cross-Strait reconciliation efforts. Ma and his
advisors understand this, and have repeatedly told us they
expect Beijing to be very tough in the negotiation over
"international space" and other sovereignty-related issues.
That said, we expect Ma will work to keep the initiative,
forcing Beijing to make decisions on issues it would prefer
not to address at all, especially now that there is no longer
an "independence threat." Underlying Ma's strategy is his
assessment that China understands that lack of progress on
"international space" will create public pressure on his
government to adopt a less accommodating stance or, in the
longer-term, could return the DPP to power.
RWANG