TAIWAN, CHINA SCHOLARS TALKING, BUT IS MA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001479 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN, CHINA SCHOLARS TALKING, BUT IS MA LISTENING? Classified By: The Acting Director for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As Taiwan and China scurry to set the date for the next round of "unofficial" cross-Strait talks, a flurry of recent visits by mainland scholars to Taiwan offers insights on Beijing's strategy and suggests Chinese leaders are in no hurry to seal the deal with President Ma Ying-jeou. The PRC is attempting to signal via these academics a preference for a slow and cautious approach to cross-Strait relations and the need for more Taiwan "inducements." Some Taiwan scholars share the complaint voiced by the media, legislators and even some within the government that President Ma listens to only a small cadre of close advisors. End summary. ¶2. (C) AIT poloffs took part in the open session of an October 14 friendly exchange with scholars from the PRC Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) hosted by Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations (IIR). IIR Director Cheng Tuan and Professor Yen Chen-shen kicked off the forum with a downbeat assessment of the state of cross-Strait relations. Although Ma Ying-jeou ran on a platform calling for improved ties with China, mainland-related news was dominated by the failure of Taiwan's toned-down UN bid, the dismal number of mainland visitors to Taiwan, the tainted milk scandal and its implications for international space, particularly in the WHO. The Official Line: Easy Does it and Easy Things First -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Clearly aware that he was speaking to a wider audience in the open session, CICIR Director Cui Liru, accompanied by four colleagues, focused on the positive while rehashing familiar PRC mantras. On direct flights, Cui, visiting Taiwan for the first time, argued that Taiwan was understating their importance - offering as proof the difficulty he was having in booking his return flight to Beijing. He urged patience, making the careworn observations that China was a large country whose leaders faced many domestic issues. Some cross-Strait issues would require considerable time to resolve, he said, noting in particular the difficulty of Taiwan's search for "international space." Similarly, during a September visit to IIR, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Institute of Taiwan Studies Director Yu Keli underscored the need for Taiwan's patience and goodwill. ¶4. (C) In public comments made during an October 12 forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Taiwan's Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies (FICS),Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chair Lai Hsin-yuan also counseled patience, calling for a pragmatic cross-Strait strategy. Echoing Hu Jintao, she urged setting aside controversial topics and concentrating on bread-and-butter issues that would improve peoples' livelihood. For example, cross-Strait dialogue should focus on developing mechanisms for banking and securities supervision, safeguards for Taiwan investment on the mainland and means to mediate economic and trade disputes. China Scholars: Slow Pace, Concrete Results, PRC in Charge -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Separately, Taiwan scholars told poloffs that, in lower-profile exchanges, PRC academics appeared preoccupied not with the substance of the relationship but with their concern that Taiwan, and not China, appeared to take the lead on producing cross-Strait initiatives. PRC scholars seem to have little to offer in the way of new ideas, prefering instead to pick holes in Ma's proposals. FICS Chairman Chao Chun-shan recounted how these scholars have asked him why China should accept Taiwan's definition of "diplomatic truce." Similarly, IIR Professor Yen told poloff that CASS's Yu, Shanghai Institute of International Studies' Yang Jiemin (brother of FM Yang Jiechi) and other PRC academics had pushed for details of how exactly China would benefit from TAIPEI 00001479 002 OF 002 Ma's overtures. Yen's explanation - that China gained from the relaxation in tensions and from the longer-term prospect for greater stability in the region - did not seem to satisfy his counterparts. Yen urged his counterparts not to focus on which side was responsible for new ideas or on the need for an agreement, but to explore creative solutions for tough problems to maintain the improved atmosphere. ¶6. (C) Nevertheless, PRC scholars said Ma needed to be more forthcoming in delivering tangible inducements. It was important for Taiwan to go beyond simply improved atmospherics, Yu and Yang insisted, and demonstrate its commitment to China in some concrete way. Asked by poloff to cite an example of how Taiwan might do so, Yen suggested Taiwan convert to the pinyin Romanization system for Chinese language used on the mainland. As for an example of a creative solution for tough issues, he proposed giving Taiwan WHO observership but include an annual renewal process. Taiwan Scholars: Ma Won't Listen to Us -------------- ¶7. (C) Yen, whose family is closely linked to Ma's, expressed frustration about the President's unwillingness to look outside a small circle of advisors. Professor Yen and others had ideas on how to pave the way for greater international space for Taiwan, including by becoming more involved in UN-affiliated organizations that do not require statehood for membership. He also advocated Taiwan establishing a human rights ommission, which could interact with international counterparts and demonstrate Taiwan has the appropriate structure and is ready to be a key player on global issues. While coy about whether he had offered these ideas to Ma, Yen was was generally pessimistic that Ma would heed advice from academics or anyone outside his core group of like-minded individuals. Chinese Culture University Professor Spencer Yang also offered his insights on Ma's relationship with academics in a recent meeting with poloffs, recounting how Ma invited several scholars, including himself, to a meeting but failed to display an iota of interest in their opinions. Yang subsequently walked out of the meeting before it ended. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) In his early overtures to expand cross-Strait ties - such as unilaterally setting a July 4 date for the start of direct charter - Ma left China little time to react, correctly predicting that Beijing would acquiesence out of desire to be supportive. The comments made PRC scholars during these recent "academic exchanges" suggest, though, that Beijing now wants more control over the course and pace of relations, and is looking for Taiwan to offer concessions to advance cross-Strait reconciliation efforts. Ma and his advisors understand this, and have repeatedly told us they expect Beijing to be very tough in the negotiation over "international space" and other sovereignty-related issues. That said, we expect Ma will work to keep the initiative, forcing Beijing to make decisions on issues it would prefer not to address at all, especially now that there is no longer an "independence threat." Underlying Ma's strategy is his assessment that China understands that lack of progress on "international space" will create public pressure on his government to adopt a less accommodating stance or, in the longer-term, could return the DPP to power. RWANG