USCC DELEGATION DISCUSSES U.S.-TAIWAN AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001408 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS USCC FOR SCOTT BUNTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV MCAP MARR CH TW SUBJECT: USCC DELEGATION DISCUSSES U.S.-TAIWAN AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) met August 22 with key members of President Ma Ying-jeou's administration and the head of the island's main opposition party to review the status of U.S. relations with Taiwan and assess the evolving cross-Strait relationship. Members of the Ma adminstration took pains to emphasize that, while the President hoped to improve Taiwan's ties with the PRC, relations with the United States remained paramount. Ma's National Security Advisor and Defense Minister stressed the importance of U.S. military hardware in the island's defense strategy. The Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the need for Taiwan's partners like the United States to support President Ma's flexible approach to securing meaningful participation in UN specialied agencies. The leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cautioned that President Ma's approach to China put Taiwan's sovereignty and security in jeopardy. End summary. NSC Chief: Status Quo the Only Cross-Strait Option -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) NSC Secretary General Su Chi and the members of the USCC delegation led by Vice Chairman Carolyn Bartholomew discussed cross-Strait relations, Taiwan's long-term goals and defense needs, and U.S.-Taiwan relations during their hour-long meeting. Beijing threatened to use force against Taiwan in the mid-1990s and tried to press unification in the late 1990s, Su observed, but both efforts failed. Subsequently, President Chen Shui-bian's effort to promote independence during his tenure also was a disastrous failure. This leaves the cross-Strait status quo, which 80 percent of the people in Taiwan support. Su was confident the status quo could be sustained for some time because, he said, PRC President Hu Jintao saw a stable cross-Strait relationship as his historical legacy. Hu, who leaves office in 2012, has expressed interest in a cross-Strait peace agreement. Su stressed the importance of Taiwan leaders engaging directly with Hu, who, if needed, can override opposition from some in the PLA and Foreign Ministry to international space and peace agreement initiatives. ¶3. (SBU) Not wanting to appear "too greedy" in seeking concessions from Beijing, Taiwan will work to build trust step-by-step, focusing first on economic ties and then addressing international space issues, Su said. Understanding the difficulty and time required to deal with the growing PRC military threat, Taiwan will delink military from other issues and continue to build up its own defense capabilities. Although Beijing regularly lobbies the U.S. against arms sales to Taiwan, it rarely raises the issue with Taiwan, he noted. Su stressed Taiwan's wish to move ahead on the seven pending U.S. arms sales notifications, noting that President Ma Ying-jeou had made this point in discussions with U.S. Senators and Representatives during his recent U.S. transits. In addition to these pending sales, Su said, there was bipartisan KMT-DPP support for buying F-16C/Ds. These were needed to replace F-5E "flying coffins," and would bolster Taiwan's position in dealing with the PRC, Su explained. ¶4. (SBU) Ultimately, though, Taiwan cannot compete militarily with the PRC, especially in missiles, and therefore needs to take a broader approach to security incorporating all elements of power. These include military defense and deterrence, "alliance" with the United States and others, assurances of moderation to China and soft power, especially the power of Taiwan's democracy. President Ma is working to foster internal unity and build bridges to the opposition DPP Party, for example, appointing TSU stalwart Lai Shin-yuan as chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). The previous DPP approach to China that combined provocation plus defense was a recipe for disaster, Su argued. Under the new KMT administration, there has been a paradigm shift in Taiwan's approach to China, the U.S., and other countries. TAIPEI 00001408 002 OF 003 Su believed the signals from Washington have been positive, though he acknowledged it would take time to rebuild understanding and trust after eight years of DPP rule. VFM: Taiwan Needs Voice in International Organizations -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Echoing points made by President Ma Ying-Jeou earlier in the day (reported septel),Vice Foreign Minister David Lin stress the need for Taiwan to have a voice in key international organizations. That said, the Ma administration hoped to avoid the confrontational - and ineffective - approach of the previous government. Thus, a proposal to the UN recently submitted by Taiwan's diplomatic allies sought meaningful participation in international organizations and not membership. While Taiwan did not expect the proposal submitted by its diplomatic allies on August 14 to be voted on at the UNGA, Lin said, it was essential that the United States and others support it publicly. Taiwan's eventual target was to obtain WHA observer status in May 2009. Defense Minister: U.S. Arms Decision Urgent -------------- ¶6. (SBU) MND,s TOP priorities were enhancing combat capabilities, moving to an all-volunteer force by 2013 and finalizing the procurement of U.S. arms currently under USG consideration, Defense Minister Chen Chao-min told visiting members of the USCC. Taiwan under President Ma was committed to its own defense, Chen said, not least by maintaining its defense budget at no less than 3% of GDP. He repeatedly emphasized the need to move forward with a pending sale of a package of U.S. arms to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities in the face of a rapidly expanding PRC military threat. Without quick U.S. action, Chen said, his Ministry would be forced to return procurement funds to Taiwan,s treasury. More seriously, failure to complete the deal could lead some on Taiwan to doubt the U.S. commitment to Taiwan,s defense. While there was a history of good cooperation between MND and DoD, Chen said, he recognized the need for Taiwan to work to rebuild mutual trust damaged due to actions by the previous (Chen Shui-bian) administration. He noted that the USCC annual report and DOD,s annual report on China,s Military Power contributed greatly to Taiwan,s understanding of China. ¶7. (SBU) Chen said President Ma hoped to improve cross-Strait relations but also recognized the need to negotiate from a position of strength. Thus, although cross-Strait relations were progressing in a positive direction, Taiwan would not relax its military readiness. Chen cited a recent statement by one of China's Central Military Commission Vice Chairmen that China would not renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Responding to questions from the Commissioners, Chen also highlighted concerns over PRC defense spending, missile build-up, and cyber attacks. Asked whether Taiwan and China had a military hotline, Chen responded that they did not. Opposition Chair Pans Cross-Strait Rapprochement -------------- --- ¶8. (SBU) After briefly acknowledging her own party's "political troubles" stemming from former President Chen Shui-bian,s alleged involvement in a campaign finance and money laundering scandal, opposition DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen quickly turned to what she called the Ma administration's misguided cross-Strait policy. Despite some obvious tensions, cross-Strait relations were relatively stable when the DPP was in power, Tsai maintained. On the other hand, Ma's approach increases Taiwan's dependence on China and raises the potential for crisis. Ma was raising expectations, she said, ceding the initiative to China and permitting Chinese "intrusion" into questions of sovereignty. Closer ties also would have high social and economic costs, she warned, citing China's "ambush" investment tactics in the TAIPEI 00001408 003 OF 003 real estate industry. Chinese investors would move in, push up prices to earn quick profits, and exit just as quickly, leaving behind property prices too expensive for young graduates. Instead of relying on China to improve Taiwan's economy, Tsai suggested Taiwan accelerate industrial restructuring and increase its competitiveness in the science, technology, and education sectors. ¶9. (SBU) She attributed the DPP,s loss in March 2008 Presidential election to economic issues (job losses, wage rate problem, commodity prices, and import inflation). Nevertheless, she predicted, cross-Strait relations, not the economy, would continue to be a major focus of future political campaigns. Tsai labeled the Ma administration as "too soft" on sovereignty issues, saying Ma was blurring the lines between China and Taiwan. When asked about DPP's current policy on Taiwan's status, Tsai said the party preferred Taiwan be accepted as a country with 23 million people. She added that Taiwan is "at least an entity with international personality" and has the right to make its own decisions, including on what kind of relationship to have with China. ¶10. (U) The delegation has cleared this cable. YOUNG