LEGISLATIVE SPEAKER WANG JIN-PYNG ON U.S.-TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001148

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: LEGISLATIVE SPEAKER WANG JIN-PYNG ON U.S.-TAIWAN
RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Legislative Yuan (LY) Speaker Wang Jin-pyng
(KMT) told the Director on August 5 that his recent meetings
in Washington went well and he has briefed President Ma on
the U.S. desire that Ma's upcoming transits be kept low-key.
Wang said he believed the U.S. would try to handle arms sales
notifications in a timely manner. The Director urged Wang
and others in Taiwan to deal with the arms sales issue in a
low-key way. Wang agreed that Taiwan needs to open its
market to all U.S. beef products, but he suggested there are
timing considerations and a need to educate the public. Wang
expressed hope the U.S. would actively support Taiwan's
efforts to participate in the WHO/WHA. On domestic politics,
Wang said coordination among the presidential office,
government, legislature, and party has improved somewhat but
remains imperfect. End Summary.

U.S.-Taiwan Relations
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting with the Director on August 5,
Legislative Yuan (LY) Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (KMT) discussed
his recent trip to the U.S., including meetings in Washington
with officials from the State and Defense Departments, NSC,
and USTR. Wang noted that he had agreed with USTR officials
that Taiwan needs to open its market to all U.S. beef
products, but he had pointed out that issues needed to be
resolved and the timing right, or else the media would
criticize the government. The Director told Wang that we
have been urging President Ma to build on the work of the
previous administration and make a science-based decision on
opening its market to all U.S. beef products. The decision
should be based on science, Wang agreed, adding that the
market should be opened when people understand the facts and
the situation is ripe.


3. (C) Wang said he took away from his meetings in
Washington a sense that there are still after-effects from
the damage to the relationship caused by President Chen's
"surprises," with the U.S. now watching the new Taiwan
government. Wang said he also heard from some U.S. officials
that they understood the Congressional schedule and would try
to handle arms sales notifications in a timely manner.
According to Wang, Taiwan needs arms for security and to
provide a strong basis for future negotiations with Beijing
when the agenda turns to political issues. If the U.S. does
not sell Taiwan the weapons it has previously promised, that
would be a damaging blow, and others would believe the U.S.
was withdrawing its support from Taiwan. Wang added that
this point applied to previously agreed-upon weapons sales,
not F-16C/D's.


4. (C) Wang said he suggested to Ma Ying-jeou on August 4
that President Bush would tell PRC President Hu Jintao about
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in their upcoming meeting at the
Olympic opening ceremony. Wang admitted that no one in the
U.S. had said to him that President Bush would be raising
arms sales with Hu Jintao, but he claimed this was something
"everyone knows." The Director told Wang that in fact there
is no evidence for this view. He stressed the importance for
Taiwan to deal with the arms sales issue in a low-key manner
to avoid problems in the U.S.-Taiwan-PRC triangular
relationship. Wang also said he told Ma about the U.S.
insistence on a low-key transit and he advised Ma not to do
anything controversial. According to Wang, Ma said he was
clear about this point and would fully comply with U.S.
wishes.


5. (C) In Wang's view, the U.S. and Taiwan need to restore
mutual trust and increase traditional friendship. Over the
past 50-60 years, the U.S. has made a major contribution to
Taiwan's security and to its economic and democratic
miracles. However, during the past eight years, the
relationship has had problems, so there is a need to restore
mutual trust. Wang also said he was clear that the U.S.
approves of recent cross-Strait developments, and he hoped
the U.S. would work to lobby for votes and to persuade China

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to support Taiwan's participation in the WHO/WHA.

Leadership Policy Coordination
--------------


6. (C) The Director asked Wang about whether there is
adequate cooperation between the President Ma, the cabinet,
party, and LY caucus. The situation has improved somewhat
because the various groups have to work together, Wang
observed. However, President Ma and Premier Liu made a big
mistake at the beginning, believing the LY would
automatically do what they wanted. In fact, the
administration needs to coordinate with the party and show
respect to the LY. Asked whether Ma might take up the party
chairmanship, Wang said this would have both good and bad
points, and the party would have to see what Ma wanted. In
the past, he added, Ma did not do well as party chairman.


7. (C) According to Wang, the weekly meetings of the five
top leaders (President, VP, Premier, KMT Chairman, and LY
Speaker) are useful but imperfect. On August 4, for example,
the group addressed the proposal to have Executive Yuan (EY)
members attend KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) meetings.
Premier Liu agreed to the proposal but said he hoped KMT
Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung would prevent the CSC's LY members
from attacking the EY representatives. Wu asked, "How can I
control them?" However, Wu said he would do his best.
According to Wang, Wu has his differences with Ma.

Multiple Cross-Strait Channels
--------------


8. (C) The Director asked Wang if he saw any problem with
Taiwan having multiple channels of communication with
Beijing, including the party-to-party channel. According to
Wang, Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan only talks about
general principles with Beijing and does not go into concrete
details. Although KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung does discuss
concrete matters, he does not violate the policies of the
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). Wang acknowledged, however,
that the party may first discuss some issues in its channels
to Beijing, with the issues later being transferred to MAC
and then the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) for more
concrete discussion with the Chinese.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Wang was clearly pleased with both the substance and
level of his meetings in Washington, which add to his
influence in Taipei. A wily politico and favorite of the
media, Wang is not always very careful about what he says in
public. Following his trip to the U.S., Wang departs this
weekend for Japan. He is doubtless delighted that he can
travel to places his political rival Ma Ying-jeou cannot
visit.

YOUNG