FIJI, TONGA, KIRIBATI, NAURU, AND TUVALU: A STATUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SUVA 000266

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR MARR SENV EAID FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI, TONGA, KIRIBATI, NAURU, AND TUVALU: A STATUS
REPORT

REF: SUVA 250 (AND PREVIOUS)

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Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
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1. (C) The five small Pacific nations within Embassy Suva's
bailiwick all are of interest to the United States, not least
because each has a vote in the UNGA. In Fiji, Commodore
Bainimarama's December 2006 coup has discolored the bilateral
relationship. He is frustrated at not achieving legitimacy,
but has yet not shown anxiety for an exit strategy.
Continued international pressure coupled with encouragement
of inclusive political dialogue are the best available
options to encourage a rapid return to democracy. In Tonga,
a transition from monarchy to more democratic governance is
under way, with USG encouragement, though details will be
dicey. Mil/mil relationships with the Tonga Defense Services
(TDS) have strengthened via repeated TDS deployments to Iraq.
In Kiribati and Tuvalu, needs are great, resources are
scant, climate change is a huge worry, and opportunities
exist for more USG activity, ideally the return of Peace
Corps to both. Nauru, currently a basket case, needs help to
steer possible new phosphate wealth into a more stable
future. Across the Pacific, the China/Taiwan competition
injects development funds but also feeds corruption. Embassy
Suva, a regional hub, is well-placed and increasingly
well-resourced to play useful roles across a spectrum of USG
interests in the Pacific. End summary.

Fiji IG hypocritically strives for legitimacy
--------------

2. (C) Nineteen months after the December 2006 Fiji coup,
Bainimarama's interim government (IG) still has not achieved
legitimacy. The IG blames the international community,
particularly Australian, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent
U.S. visa sanctions, for its failure to "move the country
forward." There is some truth to that -- visa sanctions have
made it more difficult for the IG to attract talent -- but
the IG mostly has its own self to blame. Bainimarama claims
to champion good governance, defend the Constitution, and
aspire to a non-racial, corruption-free Fiji. In reality,
the military-led IG has practiced crony-ism, intimidated
opponents via human-rights violations, orchestrated numerous
presidential decrees that ignore the Constitution, corrupted
the judiciary, done nothing to integrate ethnic Indians into
the nearly 100% ethnic-Fijian military, failed to permit
investigation of past graft within the military while setting
up new channels for same, and frustrated foreign investors
and the tourism industry. Hypocrisy has reigned, and the
public has noticed.

Bainimarama's "clean up" versus an election
--------------

3. (C) Despite the IG's lack of success, Bainimarama has
insisted that he will only return executive authority to
civilians when a thorough "clean up" has transformed Fiji
into a non-racist, corruption-free nirvana, seemingly a very
long-term process. Thus, it surprised many when the
Commodore pledged to Pacific Island Forum leaders in Tonga
last October that the IG would organize free and fair
elections under the Constitution in March 2009 with all
parties able to participate and with the military to abide by
the results. Ever since, though, the IG has actively looked
for ways to slow progress toward the elections. Picking a
new Election Commission took months; choosing a Supervisor of
Elections took even longer; election-preparation money didn't
flow. And 16 months after the coup the IG's National Council
for Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF) suddenly concluded, based
on Election Commission advice, that Fiji's election process
(embedded in the Constitution) is too race-based to allow a
free election. Bainimarama said: if no reform, no election.

A slim hope for political dialogue
--------------

4. (C) It has been very difficult to see light at the end of
the tunnel. One hope, however slim, has been to bring
Bainimarama into dialogue with other Fiji political leaders
in the thought that talk, in itself, can sometimes create a
degree of empathy, begin to build bridges, and engender
constructive compromises. In the past two months,
Bainimarama has met twice with deposed PM Qarase, at the

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urging of Methodist and Catholic leaders. Both meetings
consisted of Bainimarama lecturing, not at all negotiating.
Still, the IG recently indicated to an EU Troika team some
willingness to convene an inclusive, consensus-based
dialogue. A visit by New Zealand's Sir Paul Reeves this week
will test the parameters. Since most observers believe any
free and fair election would go heavily against the IG, we
judge it unlikely that dialogue will lead to a rapid return
to democracy.

The RFMF's role: coups and PKOs
--------------

5. (C) The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are a
frustration. The U.S. has long valued RFMF roles in
peacekeeping operations such as Lebanon, the Sinai, and UNAMI
in Iraq. Fiji soldiers, big, capable, and charming, have an
excellent PKO reputation. On the other hand, ever since Col.
Rabuka's coups in 1987, RFMF leaders have involved themselves
in domestic politics to the nation's detriment. Bainimarama
and his close advisors have no special talent for governance,
and Fiji is suffering -- politically, economically, and
socially. The racial rift between indigenous Fijians and
Indians is wider, deeper, and more dangerous now than before
the 2006 coup, when May 2006 elections had resulted in a
multi-party cabinet and optimism was briefly in the air. The
USG has suspended its military relationship with the RFMF,
though RFMF participation in MFO Sinai and UNAMI continue out
of necessity.

What's to be done?
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6. (C) With no stellar options, the USG should encourage the
concept of an inclusive, consensus-based political dialogue,
so long as such talk does not needlessly delay election of a
new, legitimate government. The IG's failure to achieve
legitimacy has to be frustrating. Maybe, just maybe,
Bainimarama is starting to look for new options. He has
shown in the past he can change his mind dramatically when he
sees the need. He happily exploits signs of weakness; but he
respects strength. Thus, international pressure for the RFMF
to return to the barracks should continue, accenting that the
IG's present course is wrong-headed. Continued pressure also
encourages Fiji's pro-democracy advocates to keep their own
voices raised. Inevitably, the "immunity" issue will arise.
If granted, it would encourage the RFMF to retreat;
unfortunately, it would also, in effect, encourage RFMF
leaders to contemplate coups yet again in the future. When
democracy returns and coup sanctions recede, we need to find
effective ways to convince the next generations of RFMF
leaders to accept civilian leadership permanently. No more
coups.

Political reform under way in Tonga
--------------

7. (C) Political reform in Tonga is progressing, with USG
encouragement. April election results returned prominent
pro-democracy activists to parliament, despite intense
efforts by PM Sevele to paint those activists as criminal
rioters. Immediately thereafter, Sevele started talking with
pro-democracy leader Pohiva, a positive sign. The King has
made clear to us that he sees the need for meaningful reform
to more democratic governance ASAP. He agrees with our
assessment that the monarchy can either lead reform or will
be led by it. If a spirit of cooperation can prevail in
ongoing negotiations for a plan to give People's
Representatives control of parliament with the King becoming
an "on advice" monarch, Tonga can truly transform itself by

2010. Still, the People's Reps lack experience in power, and
the transition could be bumpy.

Encouraging the TDS: PKO abroad; benign role at home
-------------- --------------

8. (C) Beyond political processes, U.S. interests in Tonga
include military (TDS) participation in international
peacekeeping, particularly with the Coalition of the Willing
in Iraq. The mil/mil relationship is solidifying with each
deployment. In the lead-up to political change, it will be
important to encourage TDS leadership, traditionally
conservative and wedded to the monarchy, not to take sides
domestically beyond helping to ensure a peaceful transition
of power. Also worth noting: the perspective of the
pro-democracy movement about TDS participation in PKO is not

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yet tested, though past deployments have engendered no
protests in the streets.

Kiribati needs help: Peace Corps role?
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9. (C) Kiribati, geographically huge but dramatically
under-resourced, straddling the equator for 3000 miles with a
total population of 100,000, cannot sustain itself. Fiscal
austerity and outside aid are essential. The U.S. has played
a small but very useful role via a much-appreciated Peace
Corps program. Unfortunately, the unreliability of the
Kiribati domestic airline brought a recent decision by Peace
Corps HQ to close the program because of health and safety
concerns. Kiribati has generally been a good friend of the
U.S., though a few years ago it permitted establishment of a
PRC satellite-tracking station on Tarawa -- since removed
when Kiribati shifted relations to Taiwan. The U.S. should
explore ways to build new ties and should resuscitate Peace
Corps there as soon as safety permits. The 65th anniversary
of the WWII Battle of Tarawa in November will be an
opportunity to reconfirm we still value the relationship.
Climate change is a huge issue for Kiribati. The highest
point on Tarawa is a low bridge between islets. President
Tong is already talking with New Zealand about finding a new
homeland for his people when atolls become inundated.

Nauru a basket case with a future?
--------------

10. (C) The tiny Republic of Nauru, population 10,000, is an
island once layered thickly with easily-mined phosphates. It
may hold the record for biggest plunge in wealth. After
building reserves to around $2 billion, profligacy,
mis-management, and seeming exhaustion of phosphate resources
resulted in a catastrophic decline, with debt now around $1
billion. The recent discovery of a new sub-surface layer of
phosphates brings some hope; and politicians say the right
things about saving for the future this time rather than
spending today. But today is difficult to resist, and
leaders are already fighting among themselves over who will
control budget flows. Nauru's fate depends much on its
relationship with former colonial master Australia, by far
the biggest donor there, though Taiwan also counts. The U.S.
urges good-governance themes.

Tuvalu's Peace Corps prospect?
--------------

11. (C) Tuvalu is another tiny nation with a population of
10,000 and a vote in UNGA, which it frequently casts with the
U.S. Like Kiribati it is under-resourced, highly dependent
on aid, and significantly threatened by climate change.
Tuvalu had an extremely popular Peace Corps program that
ended in 1998 only because the Fiji program, which also
administered Tuvalu, closed. Tuvalu's needs continue, and
the re-opening of Fiji's Peace Corps program has offered an
inexpensive opportunity to re-invigorate the link if
resources permit.

The China/Taiwan complication
--------------

12. (C) Of the five nations covered by Embassy Suva, three
(Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu) recognize Taiwan and two (Fiji
and Tonga) recognize the PRC. Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga
have all switched allegiance at least once in the past ten
years. The China-Taiwan competition has brought significant
amounts of aid to the small Pacific nations. Both China and
Taiwan have constructed public buildings, instituted
innovative farming projects, etc. Both have also injected
cash into political processes, often with loose accounting
requirements, thus feeding mis-allocation of resources and
corruption. The USG has urged both China and Taiwan to take
"responsible stake-holder" attitudes and encourage good
governance.

USG interests
--------------

13. (C) Embassy Suva is developing into a solid platform for
USG engagement in the South Pacific. Nations are small, but
12 regional UNGA votes are important to USG interests. Other
players like China, Venezuela, Cuba, even Turkey are
cultivating island leaders. Economically, the U.S. values
fish, and has a modest level of investment (Fiji Water for
instance). The recent additions in Suva of regional

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environmental and public-diplomacy offices are already
contributing markedly to relationships. Inevitably,
political developments in Fiji and Tonga will require much
Embassy attention, at least until the Fiji military comes to
accept it must play a limited domestic role and until the
Tonga monarchy cedes political control to democratic
elements.


14. (C) Even with very modest assistance assets, the USG
plays useful roles: encouraging island leaders toward good
governance; collaborating with Australia, New Zealand, the
EU, and regional organizations on a range of security,
environmental-protection, democracy-promotion, and other
global issues; convincing island nations to vote our way in
multilateral fora; assisting international PKO participation;
etc. With more assets, such as a resumed USAID presence or
creative small-state Millennium Challenge programs, Embassy
Suva could do still more to buttress important USG interests
in the Pacific.
DINGER