SWEDISH MFA ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND ESDP MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000084 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV SW YI SUBJECT: SWEDISH MFA ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND ESDP MISSION Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Swedish position on Kosovo recognition appears to be starting to move in a positive direction. Sweden supported the January 30 approval of an ESDP mission. MFA contacts tell us Sweden will likely join in recognizing Kosovo, but would prefer for this to occur with substantial EU unity and to be followed by the acquiescence of the UNSYG. Our British colleagues in Stockholm report that ultimately Sweden is likely to be in the second tranche of EU states recognizing Kosovo. FM Bildt is personally establishing the Balkans policy for the government, but seeks political cover for Kosovo recognition from the Foreign Policy Board, which is convened by the King. Sweden is still hoping that the combined lack of an Italian government, Spain's election, and its own consensus-driven process will persuade other members to delay EU recognition until March. End Summary. Timing the Recognition of Kosovo -------------- ¶2. (C) We discussed Kosovo January 31 with FM Bildt's Staff Director Karin Olofsdotter and separately with MFA Western Balkans Head Lars Wahlund. Both emphasized timing issues on the recognition of Kosovo. Both noted that Kosovo was taken up on the margins but not addressed substantively at the January 28-29 GAERC. Sweden takes the position that EU policy on Kosovo -- and the decision on an EU mission -- should be settled before operational matters such as proposed deployments of riot units to Northern Kosovo are decided. The policy discussion that took place January 30 in connection with the approval of the Kosovo ESDP, supported by Sweden, addressed this this issue. Sweden's preference is to have the maximum number of EU countries join in recognizing Kosovo soon after it declares its independence; in Sweden's view, the best time for this is mid-March. ¶3. (C) A March date, Wahlund said, would accommodate timing issues in Spain, Italy, and Sweden. Spain was concerned about the Basque issue being stirred up by Kosovo recognition prior to the March 9 Spanish elections. Italy also needed time in order to form a new government and have it set its policy on Kosovo. Sweden, per Olofsdotter and Wahlund, treated the Kosovo recognition issue of such magnitude that it was deemed essential to convene the Foreign Policy Board (FPB) under the auspices of the King as a venue to establish a consensus between the governing alliance and the opposition parties on the issue. The FPB, which includes the leaders of all parties in parliament and other dignitaries, was next scheduled to meet March 3. When we challenged Wahlund on the necessity of waiting until March for a scheduled meeting of the FPB, he acknowledged that it could be convened earlier on an emergency basis. (Comment: there is no requirement, other than political cover, to convene the FPB on this question.) ¶4. (C) Separately, Charge spoke with UK DCM Nick Griffiths, who said Sweden's approach to Kosovo was coming around within the EU. EU countries are likely to address recognition in three tranches. The first tranche would include the UK, France, and Germany, accompanied by several other countries. Sweden would likely be in the second tranche with a few other countries that would recognize Kosovo shortly after the first tranche. The third tranche would be made up of those most recalcitrant. How and What of Recognition -------------- ¶5. (C) Wahlund underscored Sweden's reservations about what recognition of Kosovo would mean. Sweden hoped that there would be a joint EU decision to recognize Kosovo, rather than "six or ten" EU countries recognizing it initially and a public display of disunity contributing to policy confusion. Olofsdotter said Bildt reacted strongly to the EU "big three" presuming to set Kosovo policy without wider discussion. Wahlund emphasized that Kosovo's status would be peculiar. It would be independent of Belgrade, but not of the international community. It would remain subject to UNSCR ¶1244. Kosovo's sovereignty would be limited. Theoretically, the international community could take back what it had transferred. Sweden would like to see the eventual full sovereignty of Kosovo conditioned on implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. Only after this implementation would Kosovo be supported to join international organizations such as the UN and OSCE. This would likely take, per Wahlund, 5-10 years. ¶6. (C) Sweden's view, according to Wahlund, was that the UNSGY Ban Ki Moon would play a key role in the recognition process. If the EU was mostly united in recognizing Kosovo, that would weigh in favor of the UNSYG supporting the STOCKHOLM 00000084 002 OF 002 recognition and taking the right actions. If there was "no scandle," Ban could interpret the recognition in an appropriate way. Per Wahlund, the Swedes did not agree with the Brits interpretation of the legalities regarding recognition. Wahlund said "there was too much common law." The Swedes considered UNSCR 1244 to be controlling, which left its administration in the hands of the UN executive, UNSYG Ban. Sweden say his acquiescence as essential. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Seeking consensus between the government and the opposition on major foreign policy issues is the practice in Sweden. Using the FPB as a tool to achieve that consensus and its schedule as an additional argument to delay Kosovo recognition until March seems to us a choice, not an imperative. In an added twist, Olofsdotter noted that she did not know PM Reinfeldt's position on recognizing Kosovo. It is a token of how much FM Bildt controls Sweden's foreign policy agenda that an issue of sufficient magnitude to merit a FPB review had apparently not yet been discussed with the Prime Minister. SILVERMAN