SWEDISH MFA ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND ESDP MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000084

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV SW YI
SUBJECT: SWEDISH MFA ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND ESDP MISSION


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The Swedish position on Kosovo recognition appears to
be starting to move in a positive direction. Sweden
supported the January 30 approval of an ESDP mission. MFA
contacts tell us Sweden will likely join in recognizing
Kosovo, but would prefer for this to occur with substantial
EU unity and to be followed by the acquiescence of the UNSYG.
Our British colleagues in Stockholm report that ultimately
Sweden is likely to be in the second tranche of EU states
recognizing Kosovo. FM Bildt is personally establishing the
Balkans policy for the government, but seeks political cover
for Kosovo recognition from the Foreign Policy Board, which
is convened by the King. Sweden is still hoping that the
combined lack of an Italian government, Spain's election, and
its own consensus-driven process will persuade other members
to delay EU recognition until March. End Summary.

Timing the Recognition of Kosovo
--------------

2. (C) We discussed Kosovo January 31 with FM Bildt's Staff
Director Karin Olofsdotter and separately with MFA Western
Balkans Head Lars Wahlund. Both emphasized timing issues on
the recognition of Kosovo. Both noted that Kosovo was taken
up on the margins but not addressed substantively at the
January 28-29 GAERC. Sweden takes the position that EU
policy on Kosovo -- and the decision on an EU mission --
should be settled before operational matters such as proposed
deployments of riot units to Northern Kosovo are decided.
The policy discussion that took place January 30 in
connection with the approval of the Kosovo ESDP, supported by
Sweden, addressed this this issue. Sweden's preference is to
have the maximum number of EU countries join in recognizing
Kosovo soon after it declares its independence; in Sweden's
view, the best time for this is mid-March.


3. (C) A March date, Wahlund said, would accommodate timing
issues in Spain, Italy, and Sweden. Spain was concerned
about the Basque issue being stirred up by Kosovo recognition
prior to the March 9 Spanish elections. Italy also needed
time in order to form a new government and have it set its
policy on Kosovo. Sweden, per Olofsdotter and Wahlund,
treated the Kosovo recognition issue of such magnitude that
it was deemed essential to convene the Foreign Policy Board
(FPB) under the auspices of the King as a venue to establish
a consensus between the governing alliance and the opposition
parties on the issue. The FPB, which includes the leaders of
all parties in parliament and other dignitaries, was next
scheduled to meet March 3. When we challenged Wahlund on the
necessity of waiting until March for a scheduled meeting of
the FPB, he acknowledged that it could be convened earlier on
an emergency basis. (Comment: there is no requirement, other
than political cover, to convene the FPB on this question.)


4. (C) Separately, Charge spoke with UK DCM Nick Griffiths,
who said Sweden's approach to Kosovo was coming around within
the EU. EU countries are likely to address recognition in
three tranches. The first tranche would include the UK,
France, and Germany, accompanied by several other countries.
Sweden would likely be in the second tranche with a few other
countries that would recognize Kosovo shortly after the first
tranche. The third tranche would be made up of those most
recalcitrant.

How and What of Recognition
--------------

5. (C) Wahlund underscored Sweden's reservations about what
recognition of Kosovo would mean. Sweden hoped that there
would be a joint EU decision to recognize Kosovo, rather than
"six or ten" EU countries recognizing it initially and a
public display of disunity contributing to policy confusion.
Olofsdotter said Bildt reacted strongly to the EU "big three"
presuming to set Kosovo policy without wider discussion.
Wahlund emphasized that Kosovo's status would be peculiar.
It would be independent of Belgrade, but not of the
international community. It would remain subject to UNSCR

1244. Kosovo's sovereignty would be limited. Theoretically,
the international community could take back what it had
transferred. Sweden would like to see the eventual full
sovereignty of Kosovo conditioned on implementation of the
Ahtisaari plan. Only after this implementation would Kosovo
be supported to join international organizations such as the
UN and OSCE. This would likely take, per Wahlund, 5-10
years.


6. (C) Sweden's view, according to Wahlund, was that the
UNSGY Ban Ki Moon would play a key role in the recognition
process. If the EU was mostly united in recognizing Kosovo,
that would weigh in favor of the UNSYG supporting the

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recognition and taking the right actions. If there was "no
scandle," Ban could interpret the recognition in an
appropriate way. Per Wahlund, the Swedes did not agree with
the Brits interpretation of the legalities regarding
recognition. Wahlund said "there was too much common law."
The Swedes considered UNSCR 1244 to be controlling, which
left its administration in the hands of the UN executive,
UNSYG Ban. Sweden say his acquiescence as essential.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) Seeking consensus between the government and the
opposition on major foreign policy issues is the practice in
Sweden. Using the FPB as a tool to achieve that consensus
and its schedule as an additional argument to delay Kosovo
recognition until March seems to us a choice, not an
imperative. In an added twist, Olofsdotter noted that she
did not know PM Reinfeldt's position on recognizing Kosovo.
It is a token of how much FM Bildt controls Sweden's foreign
policy agenda that an issue of sufficient magnitude to merit
a FPB review had apparently not yet been discussed with the
Prime Minister.
SILVERMAN