SWEDISH RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 15-16 GAERC DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 000625 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL GG SE RS EUN SUBJECT: SWEDISH RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 15-16 GAERC DEMARCHE REF: A. A. STATE 96598 ¶B. B. STATE 95724 Classified By: DCM ROBERT SILVERMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B & D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Sweden thinks there is little to fear from a Serbian request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to review the status of Kosovo, according to Hakan Emsgard, Deputy Director General of the EU Department at the MFA. The case would languish there for years, he asserted. Sweden supports EULEX operating in all parts of Kosovo, he stated, but the mission should ¬ go in with too much force.8 EU monitors in Georgia must have access to all parts of the country, but EU unity on this point is fragile. Turkey must do more to improve relations with Cyprus if it is to get a positive review in next fall,s talks with the EU. End Summary. Kosovo and the ICJ -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 11, we met with the Deputy Director General of the EU Department, Hakan Emsgard, and delivered reftel GAERC demarches. Emsgard confirmed press reports that Sweden does not oppose Serbia asking the ICJ to give an opinion on Kosovo's independence. The rationale behind Sweden's position is that because &many UN members are against Kosovo's independence,8 we run the risk that a UN resolution will emerge against Kosovo's declaration of independence. Such could prevent other countries from recognizing Kosovo. By sending the case to the ICJ, &we would buy time8--an ICJ decision would take &a few years,8 during which Serbia would settle down and turn westward, focusing its attention on EU accession. POL Counselor pushed back, noting that a referral to the ICJ would introduce an element of uncertainty and possibly prevent other nations from recognizing Kosovo. Emsgard agreed with these points, but thought the possibility of UNGA involvement in the issue was a potentially larger problem. EULEX and Serbia -------------- ¶3. (C) Emsgard said Sweden,s position is that EULEX should have a mandate for all of Kosovo, including the Serb enclaves, but that if EULEX goes in with too much force it would raise the risk of more incidents like the violence in Mitrovica last March. Enforcing the border regime with Serbia should be a priority and the West should continue its dialogue with the Serbian government. Georgia -------------- ¶4. (C) Emsgard reiterated Sweden's position that the EU must send monitors to Georgia as soon as possible and that they should have access to all parts of the nation, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He remarked that problems within the EU will likely result in little will to confront Russia on the latter point. &EU unity is critical,8 he said, if it is to have an effect on Russia. The EU should focus on rebuilding Georgia and protecting Saakashvili, he added, instead of harming Russia )- especially since there are few effective instruments available to challenge Moscow. Turkey and Cyprus -------------- ¶5. (C) Calling Cyprus the &key to the EU-NATO relationship,8 Emsgard said that if Turkey does not show concrete improvement on its relationship with Cyprus, its accession to the EU will be in danger. He stated that Ankara must ease access for Cypriot vessels into Turkish ports before next fall,s third and final review of Turkey's adherence to its EU accession plan. Emsgard stated that USG help in getting Turkey to be more &cooperative8 was crucial. WOOD