Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STOCKHOLM494
2008-07-09 14:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Stockholm
Cable title:
PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHSM #0494/01 1911414 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 091414Z JUL 08 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3590 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 2480 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0293 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3150 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0319 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000494
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018
TAGS: PARM MOPS MARR PREL ECON PGOV SW
SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE
AESA RADAR FOR GRIPEN FIGHTER PLANES
REF: A. USDAO STOCKHOLM DTG 051506ZJUN2008
B. IIR 6 982 0173
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000494
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018
TAGS: PARM MOPS MARR PREL ECON PGOV SW
SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE
AESA RADAR FOR GRIPEN FIGHTER PLANES
REF: A. USDAO STOCKHOLM DTG 051506ZJUN2008
B. IIR 6 982 0173
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (S) Embassy Stockholm recommends we postpone a response
to the Swedish request for release of AESA radar for Swedish
Gripens until after Norway's selection of its next fighter
jet, currently slated for December 2008. In informing Sweden
of this delay, we should consider offering U.S. support for
the enhanced Nordic military cooperation proposals, and also
consider a SecDef visit in the fall, per GOS request. End
Summary.
The Swedish Case for AESA
--------------
2. (S) In a June 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of
Defense Sten Tolgfors reviewed Sweden's arguments on the
benefits to the U.S. of release of AESA radar for use on the
SAAB JAS Gripen 39 fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and
B):
-- AESA on Gripens would enhance NATO interoperability;
-- Sweden works closely with the U.S. and NATO on security
and makes important contributions through military
deployments under NATO aegis in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
Sweden supports a greater role for Europe in Iraq, where
Sweden is opening an Embassy and recently hosted the
International Compact with Iraq conference in Stockholm;
-- The Gripen contains 50 percent U.S. content, including
engines, avionics and weapon systems; sales of the Gripen are
good for U.S. industry. AESA would increase U.S. content and
enhance sales prospects;
-- Sweden supports Nordic military cooperation, which moves
Sweden closer to NATO.
Postponing a Response on AESA
--------------
3. (S) Our original report on AESA releaseability reviewed
the Swedish case (ref A). We now supplement our
recommendations to call for a postponement, taking into
account the potential impact on the Norway fighter jet
competition. Our recommendation for postponement is based on
the following three points:
-- The Swedish government has requested the granting of U.S.
export licenses for Raytheon's Advanced Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radar to be used on SAAB JAS Gripen 39
fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and B),asserting that
this would enhance Nordic region air coverage and
interoperability. The Gripen is competing with the Lockheed
Martin F35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for a sale to Norway of
48 fighter aircraft. Norway is expected to take the decision
on the Gripen vs the JSF by early December. The Gripen is
also competing with the JSF and Boeing's F-18 for a later
sale to Denmark of an additional 48 fighters. Swedish
officials and SAAB want AESA radar in time to make the Gripen
more competitive. Swedish officials tell us they anticipate
a decision from Washington on AESA releaseability by
September 2008.
-- Given this potential impact of AESA releaseability on the
Norway competition, and possibly the Denmark competition, we
suggest postponing the decision on AESA releaseability for
the Gripen until after Norway's decision in December. We
futher recommend informing the Swedes of this delay in
advance. This recommendation supplements ref A assessment of
releaseability.
-- If this course is chosen, we should also explore doing
something else for Sweden to demonstrate our bilateral
engagement and support for Nordic cooperation, while
informing them of the delay. We recommend exploring offers
to support aspects of the Sweden's proposals for enhanced
Nordic cooperation. This is politically and economically
important to all the Nordic and especially to Sweden. It is
likely that many of the approximately 140 recommendations for
Nordic cooperation would benefit from U.S. support and be in
our interest. We propose also a favorable response to ref B
request for a visit to Sweden by Secretary of Defense Gates
in fall 2008.
WOOD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018
TAGS: PARM MOPS MARR PREL ECON PGOV SW
SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE
AESA RADAR FOR GRIPEN FIGHTER PLANES
REF: A. USDAO STOCKHOLM DTG 051506ZJUN2008
B. IIR 6 982 0173
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (S) Embassy Stockholm recommends we postpone a response
to the Swedish request for release of AESA radar for Swedish
Gripens until after Norway's selection of its next fighter
jet, currently slated for December 2008. In informing Sweden
of this delay, we should consider offering U.S. support for
the enhanced Nordic military cooperation proposals, and also
consider a SecDef visit in the fall, per GOS request. End
Summary.
The Swedish Case for AESA
--------------
2. (S) In a June 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of
Defense Sten Tolgfors reviewed Sweden's arguments on the
benefits to the U.S. of release of AESA radar for use on the
SAAB JAS Gripen 39 fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and
B):
-- AESA on Gripens would enhance NATO interoperability;
-- Sweden works closely with the U.S. and NATO on security
and makes important contributions through military
deployments under NATO aegis in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
Sweden supports a greater role for Europe in Iraq, where
Sweden is opening an Embassy and recently hosted the
International Compact with Iraq conference in Stockholm;
-- The Gripen contains 50 percent U.S. content, including
engines, avionics and weapon systems; sales of the Gripen are
good for U.S. industry. AESA would increase U.S. content and
enhance sales prospects;
-- Sweden supports Nordic military cooperation, which moves
Sweden closer to NATO.
Postponing a Response on AESA
--------------
3. (S) Our original report on AESA releaseability reviewed
the Swedish case (ref A). We now supplement our
recommendations to call for a postponement, taking into
account the potential impact on the Norway fighter jet
competition. Our recommendation for postponement is based on
the following three points:
-- The Swedish government has requested the granting of U.S.
export licenses for Raytheon's Advanced Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radar to be used on SAAB JAS Gripen 39
fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and B),asserting that
this would enhance Nordic region air coverage and
interoperability. The Gripen is competing with the Lockheed
Martin F35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for a sale to Norway of
48 fighter aircraft. Norway is expected to take the decision
on the Gripen vs the JSF by early December. The Gripen is
also competing with the JSF and Boeing's F-18 for a later
sale to Denmark of an additional 48 fighters. Swedish
officials and SAAB want AESA radar in time to make the Gripen
more competitive. Swedish officials tell us they anticipate
a decision from Washington on AESA releaseability by
September 2008.
-- Given this potential impact of AESA releaseability on the
Norway competition, and possibly the Denmark competition, we
suggest postponing the decision on AESA releaseability for
the Gripen until after Norway's decision in December. We
futher recommend informing the Swedes of this delay in
advance. This recommendation supplements ref A assessment of
releaseability.
-- If this course is chosen, we should also explore doing
something else for Sweden to demonstrate our bilateral
engagement and support for Nordic cooperation, while
informing them of the delay. We recommend exploring offers
to support aspects of the Sweden's proposals for enhanced
Nordic cooperation. This is politically and economically
important to all the Nordic and especially to Sweden. It is
likely that many of the approximately 140 recommendations for
Nordic cooperation would benefit from U.S. support and be in
our interest. We propose also a favorable response to ref B
request for a visit to Sweden by Secretary of Defense Gates
in fall 2008.
WOOD