Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STOCKHOLM404
2008-06-03 14:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Stockholm
Cable title:
SWEDISH RESPONSE: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR
how-toVZCZCXRO0027 OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHSM #0404 1551447 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 031447Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3485 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 000404
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CPI (CRUSSELL)
ISN/RA (RNEPHEW)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC IR SW
SUBJECT: SWEDISH RESPONSE: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR
IRAN'S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN (SBU)
REF: STATE 52030
(SBU) On June 3, Deputy Economic Counselor shared reftel
points with Asa Gustafsson, Deputy Director, Department for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, at the Swedish MFA.
Gustafsson commented that she would discuss this information
with other relevant authorities, such as the Swedish
Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP). She noted that her
preliminary assessment is that Sweden exercises stringent
control on the vast majority of these items. However, she
will request a more thorough analysis by the ISP to ensure
that all items critical to Iran's new IR-2 centrifuge design
are included. Post will report any additional response
septel.
WOOD
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CPI (CRUSSELL)
ISN/RA (RNEPHEW)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC IR SW
SUBJECT: SWEDISH RESPONSE: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR
IRAN'S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN (SBU)
REF: STATE 52030
(SBU) On June 3, Deputy Economic Counselor shared reftel
points with Asa Gustafsson, Deputy Director, Department for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, at the Swedish MFA.
Gustafsson commented that she would discuss this information
with other relevant authorities, such as the Swedish
Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP). She noted that her
preliminary assessment is that Sweden exercises stringent
control on the vast majority of these items. However, she
will request a more thorough analysis by the ISP to ensure
that all items critical to Iran's new IR-2 centrifuge design
are included. Post will report any additional response
septel.
WOOD