EGYPT: POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF RETRANSFER, END-USE

S E C R E T STATE 099685 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 TAGS: EG MAS PARM PREL SUBJECT: EGYPT: POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF RETRANSFER, END-USE AND SECURITY OBLIGATIONS REF: NONE Classified By: PM A/S MTKIMMITT Per E.O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Cairo. Please see paragraph 2. -------------- OBJECTIVE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Department requests that Post engage appropriate host country officials to determine the status of the Chinese proposal, discussed below, and confirm whether any subsequent action has been taken by the Egyptian military. ¶3. (S/REL EGYPT) Points to Deliver: -- We have information that a Chinese defense company in late 2007 drafted a proposal for submission to the Egyptian military for a test kit designed for use with the US produced AN/ALQ-131 jamming pod and radar warning receiver. -- In February 2007, MOD Tantawi committed Egypt to fully comply with its end-use, retransfer and security obligations to the United States. This was a welcomed, positive step in addressing this challenge and it moved our relationship in the right direction. -- It is imperative that the Egyptian government clearly understand the importance of its compliance with end-use, retransfer and security obligations and protecting against unauthorized access to U.S. technology and information. -- We must be very clear that any unauthorized sharing of sensitive data associated with U.S. military equipment, even inadvertently, may violate Egypt's end-use, retransfer and security obligations, which may require a report to Congress pursuant to section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. -- We ask you to investigate whether technical data or access to defense articles had been provided without USG authorization and share with us the results. -------------- REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶4. (U) Post should report findings by cable to PM/RSAT Chris Danielewski and PM/DTCC Tim Watkins, preferably no later than September 30. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶5. (S//NF) According to intelligence reporting, a Chinese defense company in late 2007 drafted a proposal for submission to the Egyptian military for a test kit designed for use with the U.S.-origin AN/ALQ-131 jamming pod and radar warning receiver. The AN/ALQ-131 is an airborne, electronic countermeasures (ECM) modular-jamming pod, which is canister-contained, that targets anti-aircraft radars. This system can be installed on F-16C Fighting Falcons, among other aircraft, which are currently in use by the Egyptian air force. There has been no additional reporting to confirm whether the Egyptian government has accepted or responded to this proposal. ¶6. (S//NF) The Chinese company's ability to draft a test kit proposal to the Egyptian military suggests that it may have access to, or be in receipt of, technical data on the U.S. produced AN/ALQ-131 system. If the Government of Egypt (GOE) transferred such sensitive technical data to the Chinese company, the GOE may have violated its retransfer, end use or security obligations to the United States. ¶7. (S//NF) If the GOE did indeed transfer technical data, or provide access to U.S. technology, to a third party without USG authorization, this would represent a continuation of a pattern of infractions by Egypt regarding its retransfer and end-use obligations to the United States. Between 2006 and 2007, we notified Congress of 4 possible violations, to include the notification in January 2007 that Egypt allowed testing of a Chinese-manufactured electro-optical countermeasure system ("Bodyguard") against the GOE's U.S.-provided precision guided munitions (PGMs). Most recently in June 2008, the Department notified Congress of an incident involving the possible transfer of a U.S.-origin radar warning receiver technical data to Chinese or French nationals. End Points. RICE NNNN End Cable Text