CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SINGAPORE'S ACE

S E C R E T STATE 093765 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2033 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL SN PK SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SINGAPORE'S ACE PRESSUREWELD AND PAKISTAN (S) REF: A. 07 STATE 016106 ¶B. 07 SINGAPORE 000803 ¶C. 07 STATE 132776 ¶D. 07 SINGAPORE 001797 ¶E. 07 STATE 159276 ¶F. 07 SINGAPORE 002128 ¶G. STATE 059289 ¶H. SINGAPORE 000639 Classified By: EAP/MTS DIRECTOR KAMALA S. LAKHDHIR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Singapore, please see paragraph 5. ¶2. (S) Background: On several occasions since September 2007, the United States has alerted the government of Singapore to efforts by the Singaporean firm Ace Pressureweld and the Pakistani trading company Sahara International to supply a variety of controlled items to entities affiliated with Pakistan's missile and nuclear programs (Reftels). In response, Singapore indicated it was monitoring Ace Pressureweld's activities and had initiated a direct dialogue with the company regarding its export control obligations under Singapore's law (Refs D and F). ¶3. (S) In June 2008, we alerted Singapore that Ace Pressureweld and Sahara International were working to procure a variety of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, including a 5-axis machining center controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Sahara International was attempting to acquire this equipment on behalf of Pakistan's Progressive Engineering, which has been associated with an entity responsible for overseeing the development of short range ballistic missiles (Ref G). Singapore authorities responded to this information by noting that they were auditing Ace Pressureweld, but had not actually begun to formally investigate this company (Ref H). ¶4. (S) We would like to inform Singapore officials that it appears Ace Pressureweld is continuing to broker proliferation-related sales to Pakistan. For example, as recently as July 2008, Ace Pressureweld and Sahara International were working to procure a heavy duty turning center on behalf of an entity associated with Pakistan's missile program. We would like to emphasize that the United States remains concerned about Ace Pressureweld's exports to Pakistan and request that Singapore authorities provide us an update of the actions they have taken in this case. We again urge Singapore to use all available measures to prevent Ace Pressureweld from acting as a source of supply to proliferation programs in Pakistan. (Note for Post: If Singapore officials ask whether this machine is controlled, Post should note that this machine is not controlled under any of the multilateral export control regimes. End note.) ¶5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Singapore approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET REL SINGAPORE) -- On several occasions since September 2007, the United States has alerted the government of Singapore to the efforts of the Singaporean firm Ace Pressureweld and the Pakistani trading company Sahara International to supply a variety of controlled items to entities affiliated with Pakistan's missile and nuclear programs. -- In our discussions of this case, you indicated that appropriate authorities were investigating the activities of Ace Pressureweld and had initiated a direct dialogue with the company regarding its export control obligations under Singapore law. -- In June 2008, we informed you that Ace Pressureweld and Sahara International were working to procure a variety of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, including a 5-axis machining center controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),on behalf of Pakistan's Progressive Engineering. -- Progressive Engineering has been associated with the Project Management Office, which is the entity responsible for overseeing Pakistan's development of the M-11/HATF-III/Ghaznavi short range ballistic missile. -- We were informed that appropriate Singapore authorities were in the process of auditing Ace Pressureweld, but had not actually begun to formally investigate the company. -- The United States remains concerned that Ace Pressureweld is continuing to use its base of operations in Singapore to broker proliferation-related sales to Pakistan. -- For example, as recently as July 2008, Ace Pressureweld and Sahara International were working to procure a heavy duty turning center on behalf of Progressive Engineering. -- Such procurement activity is consistent with the past efforts of Ace Pressureweld to assist weapons-related entities in Pakistan. -- The United States would appreciate learning of the actions the government of Singapore has taken in response to the information we have provided you in this ongoing case. -- We also urge you to use all available measures to prevent this firm from acting as a source of supply to proliferation programs in Pakistan. -- We look forward to continuing cooperation with your government on nonproliferation and export control issues. End talking points/non-paper ¶7. (U) Washington POC are ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185) and EAP/MTS Daniel Bishcof (Phone: 202-647-2931). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EAP/MTS. ¶8. (U) A Word version file of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. RICE