APPROACHING THE EU ON NON-GEORGIA TOPICS IN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 093272

SIPDIS, SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EUN PREL PGOV PHUM GG RU
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU ON NON-GEORGIA TOPICS IN
ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER 5-6 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
(GYMNICH)


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 11.


2. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold an
informal "Gymnich" meeting in Avignon on September 5-6.
We expect the agenda to include: Georgia and EU/Russia
relations, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, updating
the 2003 EU Security Strategy, Transatlantic Relations,
and, time permitting, Serbia and Afghanistan/Pakistan.
This cable contains guidance only on the non-Georgia
agenda items; guidance on Georgia and EU/Russia relations
will be sent septel. Posts in EU member states are
requested to approach host governments as soon as possible
at the appropriate level to convey U.S. views on these
topics. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption
on their response cables. A background section covering
some of these issues is provided prior to a section
containing talking points. Points are to be delivered to
EU members and Brussels institutions only. Other posts
should not/not deliver these points.

BACKGROUND

--------------

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS



3. (SBU) Despite the fluid political dynamics in Israel
and in the Palestinian territories and the public's
perception of a lack of progress in the negotiations, we
must respect the parties' consistent reports that the
negotiations remain professional and substantive and that
advances on core issues are being made. The parties are
clear that they do not intend to settle for a provisional
agreement and that all issues will be addressed in the
final agreement.


4. (SBU) The parties continue to affirm their ongoing
belief that the current negotiating framework is effective
and that they intend to proceed in their discussions based
on the current structure. They emphasize the importance
of sustaining confidentiality in the negotiations in order
to maintain the process' integrity and underscore their
commitment to reaching a comprehensive agreement that
establishes a Palestinian state.


5. (SBU) It is imperative that the international
community's support of the negotiations is coordinated
through the Quartet and that unhelpful intervention is
avoided. Unfocused activism risks diluting international
efforts and could jeopardize this sensitive process.
Premature action in the UN Security Council on a select
set of issues, for example, will contravene the parties'
efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement.


6. (SBU) While the parties continue to welcome the support
of the international community, they are not interested in
direct international intervention in the substance of
their discussions or outside proposals.


EU SECURITY STRATEGY


7. (SBU) The French have made updating the 2003 EU
Security Strategy (EUSS) a priority for their current EU
presidency. The EUSS identifies many of the same threats
to Europe as the U.S. National Security Strategy
identifies for the U.S., e.g., international terrorism,
proliferation, failed states. Given the political support
for a strengthened European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) that exists in many member states, and consequent
influence of an updated EUSS on policy priorities, it is
important that the U.S. and the EU continue to share a
vision as to the threats faced by our societies.



STATE 00093272 002 OF 004




8. (SBU) "Transatlantic relations" will be on the agenda
for the September 5-6 EU Foreign Ministers' Gymnich
meeting in Avignon. We understand this is intended to be
a political assessment of U.S.-EU relations in view of the
upcoming U.S. presidential elections, and an inventory of
subjects on which the U.S. and EU will need a shared
vision. A June statement by French FM Kouchner, Spanish
FM Moratinos, and Portuguese FM Amado noted four broad
areas for discussion: restoring "universal values" (e.g.,
Guantanamo, death penalty); enhancing the dialogue on NATO
transformation, Afghanistan, and WMD/nonproliferation
(Iran),while constructing a real European defense;
strengthening the EU role in the Middle East peace
process; and building a strategic dialogue on financial
flows, energy security, food supply, and poverty. We
understand that Russia will be added to this list. We
should discourage focus on "universal value" issues where
Europe seeks to export aspects of its legal system to
which we could not conform for constitutional reasons even
if we were so inclined. For example, absent
constitutional amendments, we could not adopt European
approaches on the death penalty, on the legal framework
for preventative detention of terror suspects (their civil
law affords them authorities that in our system fall
within military legal frameworks, and they accept
restrictions on freedom of expression that would be

unconstitutional in the U.S.) Focus on these issues will
consequently be divisive and unproductive.



SERBIA



9. (SBU) Although President Tadic has replaced some hard-
liners and dialed-back the rhetoric, Serbia's Kosovo
policy still largely tracks that of former Prime Minister
Kostunica's. For example, Serbia still opposes EULEX
deployment in Kosovo without a new UNSCR and continues to
promote rejectionist parallel institutions in the Kosovo
Serb community. Serbia's effort to seek an UNGA referral
on Kosovo to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is
out of step with its Euro-Atlantic ambitions.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN



10. (SBU) The United States remains concerned about the
security situation along Pakistan's western frontier,
particularly in and around the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) that allows extremists to orchestrate
operations across the border in Afghanistan and beyond. An
additional layer of complication is the continuing
tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, the result of
various security incidents this year. The United States
remains committed over the long-term to helping alleviate
problems in the border region between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Without a collective international effort,
however, it will be difficult to contain the existing
threat emanating from border region.




11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
possible (in advance of September 5-6 Gymnich).



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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

--We welcome your views on ways that the international
community could, in consultation with the parties, add
precision to its role in supporting the negotiations,
without jeopardizing the integrity of this sensitive

process.


STATE 00093272 003 OF 004

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU ON NON-GEORGIA TOPICS IN
ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER 5-6 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
(GYMNIC
--Efforts to facilitate dialogue among the Palestinian
factions must concentrate on reinstating the legitimate PA
institutions in both the West Bank and Gaza. Sustainable
political arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza must be
based on the Quartet principals: renunciation of violence,
recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past agreements
between the parties.


EU SECURITY STRATEGY


--We note the EU's interest in updating its 2003 security
strategy. We believe that the U.S. and EU member states
confront many of the same threats and challenges, and
welcome an open dialogue with you on the direction of your
discussions, with a view to fostering a shared
transatlantic vision.


TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

-- We understand transatlantic relations will be on the
Gymnich agenda, to include an assessment of priorities in
view of the upcoming U.S. elections. We expect that
maintaining strong transatlantic relations will be a key
priority for whichever administration succeeds the current
one.

--In our view, transatlantic relations are best when we
focus on meeting common threats, such as terrorism, energy
security, and aggressive Russian behavior, and not when we
focus on issues where there are inherent differences in
our two legal systems. We would appreciate your

perspective on which issues will most require a joint
approach.



SERBIA


--ICJ Case: Serbia's pursuit of an ICJ advisory opinion
request from the UNGA is inconsistent with Serbia's Euro-
Atlantic aspirations. We do not believe that Kosovo's
independence - or the steps the international community
has taken in response - were unlawful. But we are
concerned that an ICJ referral will delay progress on the
ground, and in international recognition foster division,
and may result in unpredictable opinions that may be
destabilizing and could inadvertently set precedents that
reach far beyond the Balkans and Europe.

--EULEX: We urge EU members to demonstrate strength and
capacity to execute the full EULEX mandate. A EULEX
presence in the north is critical, while recognizing EULEX
may have to gradually ramp up in the north. A robust
EULEX presence in Serb enclaves south of the Ibar is
critical to limit separatist tendencies there. We need EU
capitals to fill EULEX personnel shortfalls, especially in
Police Units for the North. Tadic needs to hear clearly
from the EU and from EU Member States that Serbia should
end its opposition to EULEX and to its deployment
throughout Kosovo, especially in the north and along the
border. Belgrade needs to hear that its effort to draw
closer to Brussels will be impacted by Serbia's actions
toward Kosovo, particularly EULEX in the north.



AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

--We would like to work with our EU partners to develop
the economy in the Tribal Areas, continue military
operations in the Northwest Frontier Province and the
Tribal areas, and strengthen Pakistan's cross-border
relationship with Afghanistan.

-- The USG is committed to supporting the Afghan
Government's request to expand the Afghan National Army.
The international community's support for sustaining the
Afghan National Army is needed.


STATE 00093272 004 OF 004

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU ON NON-GEORGIA TOPICS IN
ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER 5-6 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
(GYMNIC
-- We encourage our EU partners to carefully align their
generous pledges from the June 12 Paris Conference to the
Afghan National Development Strategy and transparently
report their spending plans to the Afghan Ministry of
Finance and UNAMA. This information is critical to
improve aid effectiveness and help the Afghan Government
build a budget that fulfills the plan we all pledged to
support.




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