Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE92325
2008-08-27 23:03:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

TFGG01 - GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST ON SOUTH

Tags:  UNSC PREL GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2325 2402305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 272303Z AUG 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0000
UNCLAS STATE 092325 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNSC PREL GG
SUBJECT: TFGG01 - GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST ON SOUTH
OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA PARTICIPATION IN UNSC

REF: USUN 757

UNCLAS STATE 092325 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: UNSC PREL GG SUBJECT: TFGG01 - GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST ON SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA PARTICIPATION IN UNSC REF: USUN 757 ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request: The Department requests that action addressees, with the exception of Moscow, Hanoi, Tripoli and Pretoria, approach host governments at the highest appropriate level to urge them to oppose the participation of representatives from the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in upcoming UN Security Council meetings on Georgia. Objectives -------------- ¶2. (SBU) To convince Security Council members that with negotiations on a draft resolution on the Georgia crisis at a critical stage, dealing with the issue of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's participation, especially in light of de facto officials' moves to secure independence from Georgia and Russia's recognition of the Georgian regions as independent states, would complicate and delay efforts to successfully adopt a resolution. In particular, to do so at this stage would be seen as validation of Russia's unilateral act to recognize as independent states these Georgian territories, an act which we strongly condemn and is inconsistent with numerous security council resolutions affirming Georgian territorial integrity. It would also reward Abkhaz leaders for destroying the UN Friends effort by launching a military attack against Georgia ir conjunction with Russia. ¶3. (SBU) To secure a "no" vote against S. Ossetian/Abkhaz participation in the event of a procedural vote on the matter i the Security Council. ¶4. (SBU) To outline to UNSC members the additional reasons for opposition to S. Ossetian/Abkhaz participation, including the political signal that the Security Council would be sending given the recent decision by Russia to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia and public statements of prominent South Ossetian leaders supporting the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from South Ossetia. Background -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Last week, the de facto leaders of the separatist regions of South Ossetia (Georgia) and Abkhazia (Georgia), informed the Belgian Presidency of the UN Security Council of their desire to participate in any subsequent UNSC meetings on Georgia as "parties to the conflict." Although the Security Council has debated the situation in Georgia as it relates to the conflict in Abkhazia numerous times since it first mandated the UN Observer Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG) in 1993, representatives from the regions have never participated (or been present) during any UN discussions. The question of Abhka and/or South Ossetian participation in future UNSC discussions would complicate efforts to reach agreement on a draft resolution, divert Council Members' attention, and provide at least de facto arguments for their status that would complement the regrettable Russian recognition. ¶6. (U) The Security Council will soon take up the issue of whether to invite Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives to participate in an upcoming meeting on Georgia. If a procedural vote is held on the issue, supporters of the request would need at least 9 affirmative votes for invitations to be issued (opponents would need to marshall 7 negative votes). Should th Council vote to extend invitations, the US would not have the power to veto the outcome. ¶7. (SBU) The United States opposes a UN Security Council invitation for Abkhaz or South Ossetian leaders to participate in UN discussions. Such participation would compromise the Security Council's position on Georgia's territorial integrity, especially given Russia's unilateral recognition of the independence of these Georgian territories. The issue still at hand is implementation of the ceasefire agreement negotiated by President Sarkozy between the presidents of Russia and Georgia, and securing the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian forces to their pre-August 6 position. Additionally, inclusion of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders in UN discussions will hinder resolution as their recent statements and actions, as well as that of Russia in recognizing the two Georgian territories, indicate an unwillingness to consider anything but independence from Georgia, which contradicts the Council's long-time commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity. ¶8. (SBU) Moreover, de facto leaderships from both regions have organized and participated in attacks on Georgian forces and villages. South Ossetia's de facto leader has admitted that hi subordinates are conducting ethnic cleansing against Georgians. The Abkhaz attack, with Russian assistance, on Georgian personnel in the Upper Kodori Valley, undermined the letter, spirit, and viability of the UN Friends process. The U.S. is not prepared to grant any legitimacy to separatist regimes that have largely completed the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from the territories they control, and have repeatedly stated publicly that Georgian civilians will not be allowed to return to their homes. Such an attitude is unacceptable. ¶9. (SBU) Abkhaz and South Ossetia leaders have not been present during previous UN discussions involving Georgia. Most recently, they did not participate in the April 2008 UN discussion on the renewal of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) nor in the June or July emergency special sessions. W should also remind Council members that Russian attempts to include Abkhaz leaders in the past have not been successful. Now is not the time to be seen as rewarding Russia's military actions in Georgia, failure to fully comply with the ceasefire agreement, and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Department Point of Contact -------------- ¶10. (U) Posts should provide responses to this demarche at the earliest opportunity by cable. Department's point of contact is IO/UNP K.G. Moore, 202 647-2392, moorekg@state.gov. RICE

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -