REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR ISF TRANSITION

S E C R E T STATE 091327 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2018 TAGS: MARR MCAP MOPS PINS MASS AE BA EG IS IZ JO KU QA SA, TU SUBJECT: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR ISF TRANSITION PLAN Classified By: PM A/S Mark T. Kimmitt for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (U) This is an action request. -------------- OBJECTIVE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Department requests that Posts engage appropriate host country officials to notify and elicit support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) Transition Plan and the associated U.S. weapons sales. State and Defense Department officials -- together with the Iraqi Defense Attach -- will be meeting jointly with senior officials from the embassies of Bahrain (27 August),Egypt (25 August),Israel (11 September), Jordan (22 August),Kuwait (28 August),Oman (TBD),Qatar (TBD),Saudi Arabia (25 August),Turkey (27 August),and the UAE (TBD) to socialize the ISF transition plan and weapons sales. Posts' engagement should follow Washington's meetings. (Note: Department will inform Embassies Muscat and Doha once meetings in Washington have been scheduled. End Note.) -------------- REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶3. (U) Embassies should report results of efforts by cable to PM/RSAT Dave Burke and Brooke Milton Kurtz as soon as possible, but no later than a week following your respective demarches. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶4. (S) In mid-July 2008, Principals approved, and instructed the briefing of regional allies on, the ISF Transition Plan (also known as the ISF Modernization Proposal) and its related weapons sales. Iraq's goal is to establish a modernized independent COIN capability in the near-term (2009-2014) while building toward a force independently capable of defending its sovereign territory (2014-2020). Procurement of military equipment is key to doing so. ¶5. (U) Specifically, the types/numbers of major end items for modernizing the COIN Force include: -140 M1A1 Abrams Tanks -392 LAV-25s Light Armored Vehicles -24 Light Armed Recon Helicopters (including Hellfire missiles) -665 81mm and 565 120mm Mortars -Support infrastructure for these systems. Congressional notification for these packages will be completed by August 30. ¶6. (U) Phase II of the plan, creation of the Self Defense Force, would include additional Tanks, LAVs and Light Armed Recon helicopters as well as a number of 155mm Howitzers. ¶7. (S) This phased plan was designed in part to assuage our regional partners' concerns of a rearming Iraq. At the end of each phase, off-ramps are built in should the U.S. determine this plan no longer supports our national security interests. Furthermore, the type and quantity of the equipment offered in each phase is tailored to maximize the ISF's capability for COIN operations and security against external threats. ¶8. (S) Given the former Iraqi regime's past aggression, there may be some reluctance among our regional allies to support the rebuilding of Iraq's military forces. Kuwait in particular may be concerned about the number of main battle tanks (MBTs). At the end of the program (approximately 10-12 years),Iraq could hold a two to one advantage over the Kuwaiti military in MBTs. (Note: Iran has 1822 tanks; Israel 3800; Jordan 835; Kuwait 218; Saudi Arabia 915; and Turkey 4132. By the end of the second phase, Iraq will have purchase 420 tanks from the United States under this plan. End Note.) Saudi Arabia, to a much lesser extent, also may express concerns about MBTs, given the long border it shares with Iraq. Iraq's rearming also could lead some of the Gulf States to increase their military capabilities as a hedge against any potential future aggression. This could likely be viewed by Israel as an indirect threat. Israel also will have concerns about growing Iraq's MBT capability, at least rhetorically. -------------- WAY AHEAD -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Washington will email posts a presentation shared with Congressional staff and embassies in Washington that may be useful in briefing host country officials. Additionally, Posts may draw on the following points: -- The U.S. remains firmly committed to security and stability in the Middle East. -- In particular, a secure and stable Iraq is in our mutual interest. National counterinsurgency (COIN) and self-defense military capabilities are necessary for such an Iraq. -- Iraq's goal is to establish a modernized independent COIN capability in the near-term (2009-2014) while building toward a force independently capable of defending its sovereign territory (2014-2020). -- This plan helps to restore a traditional Arab defensive bulwark against potential Iranian aggression. -- To do so, Iraq needs to purchase certain military equipment, which we are taking steps to provide. -- In our decision to do so - including with regard to the type and quantity of equipment requested, we have carefully taken your security and that of the region into consideration. Our support for your security has not changed. -- The weapons systems we intend to release for sale to Iraq do not introduce any new military technology into the region. This equipment is not more advanced than that what we have released to you. -- The quantities proposed will not pose a significant threat to Iraq's neighbors. -- The design of the force limits the offensive capability of the force. It does not have the necessary enablers and support equipment necessary for a protracted offensive operation outside of the territorial limits of Iraq. -- Specifically, the types/numbers of weapons for modernizing the COIN Force include: -140 M1A1 Abrams Tanks -392 LAV-25s Light Armored Vehicles -24 Light Armed Recon Helicopters (including Hellfire missiles) -665 81mm and 565 120mm Mortars -Support Infrastructure for these systems -- These proposed sales are in the Congressional notification process. -- Phase II of the plan to create the Self Defense Force would include additional Tanks, LAVs and Light Armed Recon helicopters as well as a number of 155mm Howitzers. -- The Iraqi government has stated its desire to rebuild its military capabilities, with or without U.S. assistance, and has begun looking at other potential countries for weapons (e.g., from the Ukraine, Russia, and China). -- It is in our mutual interest that Iraq purchase U.S. equipment. Use of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system provides a mechanism to the U.S. to guide, assist, and monitor the level of the ISF's capability as the transition evolves -- In addition, equipping Iraq with U.S. military hardware will enhance interoperability with U.S. other allies' forces, and facilitate mil-to-mil relations between Washington and Baghdad -- (For Israel Only) Israel's Qualitative Military Edge will not be negatively impacted by implementation of this plan. POINT OF CONTACT ¶10. (U) For further information, please contact Dave Burke (PM/RSAT) 202-736-7717, E-mail: burkedm@state.sgov.gov. RICE