KOSOVO -- GUIDANCE FOR AUGUST 6 UNSC CONSULTATIONS

UNCLAS STATE 084143 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: UNSC UNMIK KPKO PREL YI KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO -- GUIDANCE FOR AUGUST 6 UNSC CONSULTATIONS ¶1. The Department requests that USUN draw from the following points in delivering its statement during the August 6 UNSC consultations on the Secretariat's investigation into the events of March 17 in Mitrovica. ¶2. Begin Points: Mr. President: I thank Assistant Secretary General Mullet for appearing before the Council today. Let me begin by restating my government's profound regret for the loss of life of the Ukrainian peacekeeper and the many injuries that were suffered by brave UN peacekeeping personnel as a result of the violent and illegal attacks on UN forces in Mitrovica on March 17. We have serious concerns about the report which Ambassador Mullet has provided us today. From his briefing it appears that the conclusions of the investigation are seriously flawed. Moreover, we find it highly irregular, if not inappropriate, to be discussing the report of an investigation which none of the Council members has seen. The utility of our discussion today is greatly diminished because of the second-hand nature of the information before us. Nevertheless, I must clearly state that we strongly disagree with the investigation's reported judgments that are critical of the UNMIK leadership's decision-making and planning regarding the operation to retake control of the Mitrovica courthouse. The UNMIK authorities are not present to account for themselves. If they were the Council would hear a very different and more credible version of events. Let me briefly review the events leading up to the attacks on UNMIK at the Mitrovica courthouse. Prior to March 17, Northern Kosovo saw a steady increase in political tension and violence. On February 19, organized Kosovo Serb gangs torched UN customs and border checkpoints. The challenges facing UNMIK's leaders at that time were clear and mounting. We are left to wonder how the report treats the pattern of threatening and violent behavior in Northern Kosovo and in Mitrovica specifically during the period prior to March 17. Starting on February 18, protesters gathered at the UN courthouse in Mitrovica for daily demonstrations. -- On March 11 they forced their way into the courtyard and were turned away. -- On March 12 they padlocked the courthouse doors. -- On March 14, they forced their way into and occupied the courthouse. In the days following, UNMIK pursued a negotiated solution. It achieved partial success with the departure of a large number of protesters. But it also received credible reports that Serb hardliners were planning further provocations and violence and that Serbia had facilitated the arrival of additional numbers of protesters prepared to use violence against UNMIK personnel. Again, we are left to wonder if the investigation addressed these credible reports. On March 17 UNMIK sought to peacefully but finally restore order at the UN courthouse. Is it the contention of the investigators that UNMIK was acting outside of its mandate in seeking to resolve the impasse at the Courthouse? Should UNMIK have allowed the violence to continue and escalate? UNMIK subsequently arrested the remaining demonstrators. Upon UNMIK's departure from the courthouse, Kosovo Serbs attacked them with lethal force. They were attacked with AK-47s and pistols. Approximately 30 fragmentation hand grenades were thrown at them. They were firebombed repeatedly with Molotov cocktails. This was not an emotional response from an unruly mob, but rather a carefully planned and orchestrated attack. How can it be, we wonder, that the investigators apparently concluded that this premeditated violence is the responsibility of UNMIK? The events outlined here were recorded in a series of videotapes taken by KFOR. These videos do not lie: they clearly show a concerted, deliberate, and prepared attack on international forces. Did DPKO review this information and thoroughly review it with military and security analysts prior to issuing its report? These are not academic questions. The events in Mitrovica continue to have critical implications for the situation in Kosovo. Illegal Serb authorities continue to flout UNSCR 1244, intimidate the people of that region and threaten violence. Based on what we have heard thus far, this report, should it ever be released, will be an inspiration to continue this deeply unhelpful conduct. We have been through this before. If the International Community fails to respond to violence and intimidation, we are doomed to repeat the tragic mistakes that have afflicted other peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, including UNPROFOR. Let me stress that the United States did not oppose the investigation undertaken by Ssenkandi. Without access to his report, however, we cannot accept its lessons learned. Most importantly, we oppose any conclusions drawn in this investigation that would shift responsibility for the tragic events of March 17 from the violent criminals who organized and instigated the violence, to the brave forces of UNMIK and KFOR, who conducted themselves in a professional manner, even when under unprovoked attack. We also call on Council members to join us in offering full support to the international authorities in Kosovo to vigorously resist any further illegal efforts to challenge Kosovo's peace and security. Mr. President, we would like to know what the Secretariat plans to do with this report. If this document is going to have any currency at all in guiding policy or procedure within UNMIK or any other peacekeeping mission, my government will press for a full and intensive review and seek to correct what appear to be significant omissions and failures in analysis. RICE