Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE82699
2008-07-31 21:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

FOLLOWING UP WITH MEXICO ON PSI

Tags:  KNNP MNUC PARM PREL MX 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2699 2132111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 312108Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0000
UNCLAS STATE 082699 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL MX
SUBJECT: FOLLOWING UP WITH MEXICO ON PSI

REF: A. MEXICO 01372

B. MEXICO 01331

UNCLAS STATE 082699 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL MX SUBJECT: FOLLOWING UP WITH MEXICO ON PSI REF: A. MEXICO 01372 ¶B. MEXICO 01331 ¶1. SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND: In advance of the May 29 U.S.-hosted Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Outreach Workshop in Washington, the U.S. extended invitations to a number of key countries that have not yet endorsed the PSI and also urged their endorsement. Washington appreciates Embassy's work in support of this PSI outreach effort with Mexico (refs A and B). Mexican SRE Assistant Director General for Security and Legal Issues Julian Juarez attended the PSI Workshop, along with Mexican Embassy Military Attache Jose Luis Chavez and Embassy political officials Jorge Colin and Fernando Gonzalez Saiffe. Representatives of 20 other countries that have not yet endorsed the PSI also attended the workshop, as well as most of the 92 PSI participating states. The workshop provided detailed information on the broad range of PSI activities and tools that have been developed for training, organizing for, and conducting interdictions of shipments of proliferation concern. ¶2. On July 17, State/ISN met with visiting CISEN National Authority Coordinator Jesus Mao Cervantes to discuss the PSI further. Mao was receptive to the PSI, but said he and the Mexican interagency still have many questions about how the PSI functions and how PSI participation would benefit Mexico. He stated that Mexico is interested in observing the August 11-21, 2008 PANAMAX exercise in Panama. PANAMAX is an annual exercise that SOUTHCOM conducts with Western Hemisphere countries. This year's exercise will include a PSI interdiction scenario as one of its aspects. Mao also said that Mexico was interested in sending interagency observers to PSI exercise MARU in New Zealand September 15-19, to the extent its resources allow. (Mexico has been invited to observe both exercises.) There was discussion of the U.S. possibly providing briefings on the PSI in Mexico City between the two exercises. Mao said the SRE would be able to arrange meetings in Mexico City to include other relevant Mexican agencies. ¶3. OBJECTIVE AND ACTION REQUEST: Washington wishes to send a small team of PSI experts, led by State/ISN DAS Ken Staley, to Mexico City immediately following the PANAMAX exercise to follow up on our recent meetings and provide in-depth briefings for relevant Mexican agencies on the value of PSI participation. Embassy is requested to propose such a visi
t and obtain host government's agreement and identification of acceptable dates. At the same time, Embassy is requested to provide the following summary of the May 29 Outreach Workshop to host government and explain that it is for the information of officials from relevant agencies, such as the SRE, Ministry of Defense and military services, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence agencies. ¶4. REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINTS OF CONTACT: Embassy is requested to report host government's response to the proposed visit by COB August 6. E-mail replies are acceptable. Washington points of contact on the PSI are Jane Purcell, e-mail: PurcelJa@state.gov, 202-647-6186; and Carlos Guzman, e-mail: GuzmanCS@state.gov, 202-647-6320. ¶5. Begin text of U.S. paper for Mexico: SUMMARY OF THE PSI FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OUTREACH WORKSHOP, MAY 29, 2008 Patricia A. McNerney, Acting Assistant Secretary for the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau of the U.S. Department of State, chaired a Outreach Workshop on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on Thursday, May 29, 2008, which was open to all PSI countries and non-PSI countries. Representatives from 21 non-PSI countries attended the meeting. The workshop provided detailed information on the broad range of PSI activities, and shared best practices and tools that have been developed to assist countries with implementing the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. -- OVERVIEW OF THE PSI. France led a panel of speakers from the U.S. and United Kingdom that addressed the origins of the PSI, the Statement of Interdiction Principles, and the PSI's practical implications as a equal and voluntary initiative that fully respects national and international laws. This panel also presented new examples of PSI successes and the benefits of PSI, demonstrating how the PSI enhances the global nonproliferation objectives of all countries. -- CURRENT PROLIFERATION THREATS AND CHALLENGES. The UK led a panel of speakers from Australia, Canada and Italy that discussed the challenges posed by transshipments by sea, land, and air and lessons learned during the last five years; cooperation with industry and involvement of industry in support of effective interdiction actions; and the challenges of interdicting dual-use items and materials. In addition, the topic of proliferation finance was introduced to convey how proliferators exploit vulnerabilities of the international financial system to finance the trade of proliferation-sensitive items, and how the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has developed guidance to deal with this problem at the national and international level. The organization of national customs operations to prevent and stop proliferation-related trafficking was also covered. -- THE PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP (OEG). The UK introduced the role of the OEG, emphasizing that the OEG works on behalf of all PSI endorsing states to develop operational concepts for interdiction; to explore related operational issues associated with the legal, law enforcement, customs and intelligence arenas; and to collaborate to develop an exercise program to increase partner capacity and improve national and international interoperability. The presentation highlighted the record of the OEG in the last five years, to include 16 meetings, over 30 live exercises, tabletop exercises, and workshops, and developing capacity building products such as the Model National Response Plan and the WMD Commodity Reference Manual. The presentation concluded by addressing the challenges for the OEG in the areas of growth, sustaining momentum, and adapting to the threat of WMD proliferation. -- THE PSI AND INDUSTRY OUTREACH. Denmark introduced its experience with industry outreach to address ways of conducting interdiction operations while minimizing impact to trade; the importance of information exchange between government agencies and industry; developing guidelines for cooperation; involving industry during exercises; and examples of how to conduct industry outreach at the national and international level. -- THE PSI EXERCISE PROGRAM. Poland led a panel of speakers from the U.S., Ukraine, and Croatia that introduced the PSI exercise program and the history of PSI exercises; explained the strategy for current and future exercises; discussed the different types of exercises in the maritime, land and air domains, and described the different interagency actions involved with each area. The presentations also discussed the benefits of participating in exercises and ideas on level of involvement and participation in future exercises, to include non-PSI countries as observers when opportunities arise. Ukraine and Poland offered short briefs on their respective experiences in hosting two recent PSI exercises. Ukraine hosted PSI exercise "Eastern Shield" in October 2007 and Croatia hosted PSI exercise "Adriatic Shield" in May 2008. -- PSI LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED. The UK and the Netherlands introduced a primer on legal aspects related to the PSI, emphasizing that all PSI activities are consistent with national and international laws. The presentations highlighted the importance of taking stock of existing national authorities and emphasized the utility of the PSI as a tool to implement UNSCR 1540. Additionally the issues of jurisdiction, disposition and liability were addressed, highlighting that these issues pose short-term implementation challenges in some instances but at the same time, demonstrate a measure of the success of the PSI in interdicting prohibited WMD-related items. -- ORGANIZING FOR THE PSI. New Zealand provided an overview of the PSI Model National Response Plan, which provides guidance on key issues that a country needs to consider when developing a framework for responding to a PSI situation, and addresses questions and issues to be addressed when developing or improving national action plans. A copy of the plan was distributed to all PSI and non-PSI countries in attendance. Singapore provided a briefing on how a government can organize internal interagency coordination to optimize its ability to achieve overall PSI objectives. It highlighted the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Committee to assess, coordinate, and advise senior officials on relevant agency actions related to PSI events, with the goal of achieving interconnectivity among all relevant agencies, prompt exchange and flow of information, and a timely response. -- WALK-THROUGH OF AN INTERDICTION SCENARIO. A U.S. Naval War College professor facilitated a panel discussion of interdiction decision-making based on two hypothetical WMD trafficking interdiction scenarios. The panel consisted of legal, diplomatic, policy, military, and custom/law enforcement experts highlighting key issues that may arise during an interdiction situation. The scenarios provided participants with lessons about the PSI that have been identified through previous PSI games, exercises, and actual interdictions. -- HOW EXPORT CONTROLS SUPPORT THE PSI. Romania and Croatia presented briefings on their governments' experience in enacting export control laws, emphasizing the importance of strengthening primary export control legislation; taking stock of existing legislation to address gaps with revised and new legislation; highlighting the efficiency of a catch-all clause; and asserting that all countries, including those not a country of origin, face the threat of WMD proliferation and may provide opportunities along a proliferation or smuggling route. Note: Available presentation materials were distributed to country representatives who attended the workshop on May 29. Presentation materials are available upon request. End text. RICE

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